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ABSTRACT 
 
It is commonly held in the literature that users find security and privacy difficult to 
comprehend. It is also acknowledged that most end-user applications and websites have built-
in security and privacy features. Users are expected to interact with these in order to protect 
their personal information. However, security is generally a secondary goal for users. 
Considering the complexity associated with security in combination with the notion that it is 
not users’ primary task, it makes sense that users tend to ignore their security responsibilities. 
As a result, they make poor security-related decisions and, consequently, their personal 
information is at risk. Usable Security is the field that investigates these types of issue, 
focusing on the design of security and privacy features that are usable. In order to understand 
and appreciate the complexities that exist in the field of Usable Security, the research fields 
of Human-Computer Interaction and Information Security should be examined. Accordingly, 
the Information Security field is concerned with all aspects pertaining to the security and 
privacy of information, while the field of Human-Computer Interaction is concerned with the 
design, evaluation and implementation of interactive computing systems for human use.  
 
This research delivers a framework to evaluate Usable Security in online social networks. In 
this study, online social networks that are particular to the health domain were used as a case 
study and contributed to the development of a framework consisting of three components: a 
process, a validation tool and a Usable Security heuristic evaluation. There is no existing 
qualitative process that describes how one would develop and validate a heuristic evaluation. 
In this regard a heuristic evaluation is a usability inspection method that is used to evaluate 
the design of an interface for any usability violations in the field of Human-Computer 
Interaction. Therefore, firstly, a new process and a validation tool were required to be 
developed. Once this had been achieved, the process could then be followed to develop a new 
heuristic evaluation that is specific to Usable Security. In order to assess the validity of a new 
heuristic evaluation a validation tool is used. The development of tools that can improve the 
design of security and privacy features on end-user applications and websites in terms of their 
usability is critical, as this will ensure that the intended users experience them as usable and 
can utilise them effectively. The framework for evaluating Usable Security contributes to this 
objective in the context of online social networks.  
 
Keywords:  User experience, usable security, heuristic evaluation, online social networks 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Over recent years, the growth of the Internet has accelerated. It is estimated that there are 
currently over two billion users that have access to the Internet (Internet World Stats, 2011). 
This growth has been driven by developments in technology and people’s appetite for 
absorbing and sharing information and entertainment.  
  
Social networks have recently been identified as one of the most popular form of 
communication online (Gartner, 2008; Madden & Zickuhr, 2011). Today, social networking 
is as routine as sending an e-mail at home or work. Research is being undertaken across a set 
of academic disciplines to examine the nature and implications of this popular medium. The 
importance of the network structure, as well as the behaviours and motivations of member 
individuals and organisations, are gradually becoming better understood. However, there is 
relatively little work that links the behaviours of individuals with specific features in social 
networks, particularly given the complexity of the multiple devices and contexts of use.  
  
Web 2.0 social networking sites are broadly defined as those websites that rely primarily on 
their users for content and allow users to make visible connections to each other. There are a 
few common features shared by these sites. Users are often encouraged to create a profile 
listing their interests and other personal information. Users are also usually permitted to 
upload content, such as photos and videos, to the site. Most importantly, these sites encourage 
interaction by users, including commenting on each other’s postings and uploading content 
(Frost & Massagli, 2008).  
 
Online social networks are characterised by rich content and collaboration between users. A 
large amount of the content on these sites, ranging from personal data to multimedia files, is 
contributed by arbitrary Web users. As part of the collaborative aspects of these sites, users 
are encouraged to post comments on other users’ profiles and pages. However, social 
networking is a disruptive technology that has changed the way people 
communicate.   Employees exchange updates on Facebook and Twitter, log opinions on 
blogs, and upload snapshots to photo-sharing sites.  Beyond Facebook and Twitter, social 
networking comprises a wide range of Web 2.0 tools. In addition, public social networking 
media include blogs, wikis, map-based mashups, and social news sites (Boulos & Wheelert, 
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2007). Anyone can access these networks from work, home, or on the road and users can 
disseminate any type of information, be it public or private, fact or fiction. 
  
Social networking can bring competitive advantages to a business, for example, including 
real-time sharing of information and analysis, better collaboration, and an enriched 
relationship with customers (Gartner, 2008; Madden & Zickuhr, 2011). Consumers now 
broadcast their thoughts and actions to an ever-widening audience of friends, family, and 
followers. As the user base of social networks increases – Facebook alone has more than 800 
million members – the scope of the networks is also expanding (Facebook, 2011).  
 
Consumers use social networking to make purchasing decisions, corporations promote new 
products and services with tweets, and customer service takes on a life of its own. Social 
networking can also make employees feel valued, connected and an important part of the 
community. Social networking is also being used to provide public related services, such as 
for health. All of these interactions occur beyond traditional company walls and firewalls, 
extending the secure perimeter of the corporate network into remote locations and into 
employees' and consumers’ homes (National Cyber Security Alliance, 2011a). Yet there are 
high-risk hazards associated with social networking. Network attacks, data leakage and theft, 
reputational damage, and compliance issues are hazards that must be addressed. Due to these 
risks, users cannot afford to disregard issues of security and privacy in social networking 
environments (Palo Alto Networks, 2010; National Cyber Security Alliance, 2011b).  
  
The provision of effective security for social networking requires experience in user 
behavioural change and knowledge of data classification, Web applications, and enterprise 
security, as users may easily leak critical (and regulated) information via social media. 
Moreover, ambitious cybercriminals can gain access to sensitive data by infecting networks 
with malicious code that connects to Web 2.0 platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. 
These threats are abetted by the very nature of social media, which is built on flexible Web 
architecture that enables exploitation and compromise.  
 
Cybercriminals have acknowledged that Web 2.0 platforms are becoming increasingly 
powerful and open, and enable more sharing of rich data. Such an extraordinarily dangerous 
combination leaves the enterprise vulnerable to hacking, viruses and malware (Palo Alto 
Networks, 2010; National Cyber Security Alliance, 2011b). It has become alarmingly 
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commonplace for hackers to unleash malicious code on social media sites to attack networks 
with viruses, spam, phishing expeditions and Trojan horses.  
 
A study by the Verizon RISK Team (Baker, Goudie & Hylender, 2010), reports that 28% of 
security breaches in 2010 employed social tactics. This represented a dramatic increase of 
16% since 2008. Numerous paths can be used to employ social tactics, with the most 
common path being email, while the path of social networking websites was employed in 5% 
of the cases. Owing to the ever-increasing growth of social networking websites, their more 
established use as corporate assets and the nature of trusting friends, it is expected that 
criminals will be employing this path for data breaches over the next few years (Baker et al., 
2010).  
 
1.2 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND RATIONALE 
People have always had the need to protect themselves and their assets, as their physical 
safety and possessions may be at risk of an attack or damage. The use of information 
technology is no different. There are many types of threat from which users’ physical and 
data assets must be protected. To assist in this protection, industry has developed a range of 
security mechanisms which make an attack more difficult and will also limit its consequences 
should one occur. These mechanisms are effective; but users need to understand how to use 
them correctly.  
 
The human element is critical in the course of an interaction, but it is also a vulnerable one. 
Attackers have acknowledged this and have paid more attention to it than designers. They 
have exploited this element and used it to their advantage, making their attacks easier and 
more fruitful (Sasse & Flechais, 2005). Users find security and privacy difficult to understand 
and they are, typically, a secondary goal that prevents them from focusing on their main tasks 
(Whitten & Tygar, 2005). Yet, it is essential to attend to these issues, if they are to protect 
their information successfully. Owing to the complexity of such measures, users avoid 
interacting with the available security and privacy features on websites and applications; 
consequently providing attackers with an even greater advantage. 
 
It is important that users understand the need to adopt more secure online behaviours. Yet, it 
is unreasonable to expect them to have the knowledge and skills to protect themselves from 
all threats. Accordingly, the developers and research community have an obligation towards 
users and should assist them in protecting themselves, as they require guidance and 
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education. Understanding humans and their abilities and considering user-centred design 
approaches in development can make effective security and privacy mechanisms more usable 
as well. This will increase their effectiveness because users will have the tools to protect 
themselves, they will become easier to utilise and people will understand how to use them 
correctly. This will yield mechanisms that are workable in practice, also preventing users 
from being the ―weakest link‖ in the security chain (Sasse & Flechais, 2005). 
 
Knowing the threats and low-cost tips for online-secure behaviours is helpful but it is not 
sufficient, as these are only the initial steps; moreover some of the tips require further 
exploration.  One has to ask whether it is adequate for a business owner to be aware of threats 
and to educate employees about security alone, or whether it is logical for a home user to 
have several difficult passwords for several different accounts, and to write them down and 
store them somewhere. This is not usable nor is it secure. Moreover, is it actually less secure 
to have automatic software and security updates? Or, if it is usable from the users’ 
perspective, whether a business should configure the strictest security settings on Internet 
browsers?  
 
The reality is that current security and privacy features make unreasonable demands on users, 
system administrators and developers alike (Sasse & Flechais, 2005). Accordingly, keeping a 
system’s or users’ personal information secure involves an increasing amount of complexity. 
Developers struggle because they are not aware of the security implications of their design 
decisions; yet, they are the ones left with the responsibility for making security decisions and 
designs for new applications and websites. 
 
Security and privacy features that have a usable design will improve users’ security 
behaviours. Users have the ability to learn and use an application or website quickly, if they 
like it and if it is usable. Facebook has over 800 million active users (Facebook, 2011). Of 
those, very few were actually trained to become expect users. In using websites like 
Facebook, users firstly need to understand the importance of security and privacy, which is 
challenging. Once they have done so and decided to take the measures needed to secure their 
profile or information, the security and privacy features must be usable. Otherwise, users will 
not secure themselves effectively. When this occurs, developers and researchers are 
accountable because they have failed the users. The developers who create great applications 
and websites that many users interact with daily, have the ability to develop usable security, 
if provided with the appropriate assistance. Collaboration is therefore required between 
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industry and research to provide developers with tools for developing usable security. 
Developers can then design effective security measures and deploy them in their applications 
and websites for the users. 
 
Online social networking environments are a prime example of spaces where there is a 
critical need for usable security. The potential contributions of usable security to the private 
and public sectors provide optimistic prospects; however, the security and privacy of 
information (personal and organisational) remains a legitimate concern. This is even more the 
case in networked environments that are based on open dissemination of information.  
 
The need for a privacy framework in social networking environments has been emphasised, 
as it is seen as a possible solution to conflicting privacy issues (Boyd & Ellison, 2007; 
Preibusch, Hoser, Gurses & Berendt, 2007; Hodge, 2006). Taking this into account, the 
purpose of the study is to develop a framework for evaluating usable security to address the 
usability and user experience issues that users face with regard to the security and privacy 
features available to them in these environments. 
 
Theories and evaluation tools for usable security, including guidelines and principles, are 
limited and those that exist are at an elementary and progressive stage. As a result, developers 
struggle to design security and privacy that is usable. Moreover, usable security is a relatively 
immature field that needs further development. Hence, the topic lends itself to qualitative 
research (Johnston, 2004). Research in this field is critical, considering the fact that security 
and privacy tools are regarded as too complex for users to understand and apply. Usable 
security is discussed in chapter 3. 
 
To evaluate designs for their usability and user experience, usability inspection methods have 
been implemented in the field of human-computer interaction. Since usability and user 
experience are crucial to usable security, usability inspection methods provide a platform for 
developing an evaluation tool that is specific for usable security. The usability inspection 
method that is considered for the development of a usable security evaluation tool is a 
heuristic evaluation and human-computer interaction and usability inspection methods will be 
discussed in chapter 2. 
 
It is well-known that heuristic evaluations are too limited in scope to specifically address the 
domain of usable security. Consequently, in order to achieve more accurate results in 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
7 
 
evaluations, heuristics must be developed that can address the requirements of a specific 
application domain. Therefore, a new heuristic evaluation should be developed that is specific 
to usable security.  
 
In addition, there is limited literature and no specific approach describing how new heuristic 
sets should be developed, although new ones have previously been developed for specific 
application domains by making use of various methods. Therefore, it is necessary to construct 
a process in which a heuristic evaluation to investigate usable security can be developed. The 
process must demonstrate the validity and applicability of the heuristic evaluation, as this was 
a concern of those that were formerly developed. Owing to the nature of this research, the 
process will centre on a qualitative approach. 
 
From the above discussion, the following issues can be extracted, which substantiate the 
problem description and rationale for this study: 
 There is a need to understand the security and privacy requirements for online social 
networking environments from a user perspective.  
 There is a lack of evaluation tools that can assist developers in designing usable 
security on websites and applications. 
 To our knowledge, there is no qualitative process that clearly demonstrates how to 
design heuristics for a specific application domain. 
 There is no framework that evaluates usable security in online social networking 
environments. Hence, there is a need to understand the rationale for an effective 
usable security framework, as well as what must be incorporated in it. 
 
The primary objective of this study is to consider these issues and develop a framework for 
evaluating usable security. This will ensure that security and privacy features on websites and 
applications address user requirements from a usability and user experience perspective.  
 
As highlighted, there is currently a paucity of knowledge and research in the literature 
pertaining to usable security. Hence, the focus of this study is to address this gap. This study 
will investigate the fields of human-computer interaction, information security and usable 
security to determine the requirements and components that are needed to develop a 
conceptual framework for evaluating usable security. This framework will benefit users and 
developers alike and is anticipated that it will prove to be a theoretical guide for developers 
by providing them with the ability to enhance their designs for the intended users. This will 
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be achieved by ensuring that security and usability form a unified process that is considered 
in user interface design. As a result, user competencies and preferences will be 
acknowledged, leading to higher levels of usable security. This should, in turn, assist users in 
protecting their information more effectively and provide a more positive user experience. 
Accordingly, this substantiates the purpose of the framework.      
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of the study was the following: 
 
 
 
The primary research question is supported by four research sub-questions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4 THE SCOPE AND CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
There is a need to restrict the scope of the study. The following two sections focus on the 
matters of limiting scope and delineation of the study.  
 
1.4.1 Scope of the Study 
The framework for evaluating usable security was derived on the basis of a qualitative study. 
This research includes a case study that was conducted on two online social networks in the 
health context. Within the design of the system, these websites are embedded with social 
networking tools and capabilities. Accordingly, their purpose is to promote collaboration and 
free sharing of information between patients and health care providers (Purdy, 2008). 
Nevertheless, users are concerned about the security of their information and this therefore 
remains a key priority in, and may be a contributing factor to, the adoption of these websites. 
It is essential that users are provided with security and privacy features that are as easy to use 
as they are effective. An extensive discussion on online health social networks will be 
presented in chapter 6. 
 
What are the components of a framework to qualitatively evaluate usable security? 
1. Which usability inspection method can be adapted to evaluate usable security? 
2. Which approach can be followed to develop the method? 
3. How can the validity and applicability of the method and approach be tested? 
4. How can the method and approach be constituted into a framework? 
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The focus of the case study was on the security and privacy features that are available on the 
websites. Further research is needed to generalise these results because the level of usable 
security will differ among online health social networks. Nevertheless, it is the usable 
security heuristic evaluation that assists in determining the usability of security and privacy 
features. By evaluating more online health social networks with the usable security heuristic 
evaluation, it will be possible to determine a minimum acceptable level of usable security. 
This can provide the essential usable security requirements when designing or improving 
security and privacy features in the context of online health social networks. 
 
Subsequently, a validation tool was developed and used by experts to assess the usable 
security heuristic evaluation. The order, analysis and triangulation of the data are based on a 
new approach to develop heuristic sets for specific application domains.  
 
1.4.2 Delineation 
A formative usability evaluation was conducted as part of the case study. Online health social 
networks were selected because they attract a wide range of users who possess different 
characteristics, desires, cultural backgrounds, preferences and expectations. The benefits of 
online social networks in health are well emphasised (Purdy, 2008). However, attention has 
been focused on readiness to address the related cultural, legal, managerial and technical 
implications. From a legal perspective, there is uncertainty surrounding the security and 
privacy of users’ personal health information (Purdy, 2008).  
 
The current approach to usability and user experience when performing security-related tasks 
in the context of online health social networks must be evaluated. Accordingly, what is 
required is an understanding of the security and privacy considerations involved from the 
perspective of usability and of designing a positive user experience. Moreover, these must be 
considered in parallel with the actual security concerns surrounding the context. 
 
The research was conducted in South Africa, with the formative usability evaluation being 
conducted in Port Elizabeth with postgraduate students from the School of ICT at the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University. The formative usability evaluation and the related results 
are discussed in chapter 6. The findings obtained from the validation tool are based on the 
practical experiences and theoretical knowledge of experts in the fields of human-computer 
interaction, information security and usable security. The validation tool and the results 
thereof are discussed in chapter 7. 
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1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research study follows an interpretivist research philosophy and is supported by an 
inductive reasoning research approach. In addition, a case study was used as research strategy 
to complement the research approach. Hofstee (2008) and Creswell (2009) support the idea of 
using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in a research study. This study 
mainly applies qualitative methods, as it originates from the field of human-computer 
interaction. The weakness with qualitative research is that it can be subjective in that the 
researcher’s opinions can also influence the results. To combat this, several techniques and 
procedures are used. These include secondary data, questionnaires, heuristic evaluations and 
a formative usability evaluation. These were conducted with experts and users in order to 
eliminate bias. Furthermore, using multiple techniques and procedures promotes better data 
triangulation, which substantiates the validity of the results.  
 
The four research sub-questions are presented in table 1.1. Their objectives and the 
techniques that will be used to answer them are also provided. The research design and 
methodology is discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
Table 1.1: Overview of research questions with their objectives and techniques 
# Research question Objective Technique/Procedure 
1 Which usability inspection 
method can be adapted to evaluate 
usable security? 
Investigate usability 
inspection methods and 
determine the method for 
adaption. 
Secondary data 
2 Which approach can be followed 
to develop the method? 
Investigate heuristics that 
were developed for a specific 
application domain and 
determine a new process for 
developing heuristics for 
specific application domain. 
Secondary data 
3 How can the validity and 
applicability of the method and 
approach be tested? 
Develop a validation tool to 
assess the method and apply 
the method in the context of 
online health social networks. 
Follow the approach to 
develop the new method and 
publish a paper on the 
approach. 
Secondary data, 
heuristic evaluation, 
formative usability 
evaluation, 
questionnaires 
4 How can the method and 
approach be constituted into a 
framework? 
Determine the components for 
the usable security framework 
and connect them in a 
coherent body. 
Secondary data, 
heuristic evaluation, 
formative usability 
evaluation, 
questionnaires, data 
triangulation 
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1.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethical considerations must be taken into account in the research process. Such 
considerations focus on what is morally correct or incorrect when conducting research and 
are affected by the circumstances in which the research is undertaken. This relates to the fact 
that humans differ in terms of their beliefs and cultures (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). Therefore, 
what is acceptable in a certain sphere of life may not be in another. 
 
In research, it is the participants’ right to be fully informed so that they can make an educated 
decision about participating or not (Lues & Lategan, 2006). This ensures that they volunteer 
to participate and are not forced to do so against their will, while being fully aware of any 
possible consequences. Just as the consequences of the study are communicated, so must the 
aims. Additionally, participants’ must be allowed to withdraw at any time and they must not 
be subjected to any type of harm or danger, physically or psychologically. 
 
An important ethical consideration is confidentiality. This must be provided where necessary 
or desired. In this research study, informed consent was required for the formative usability 
evaluations and this was acquired before the formative usability evaluation was conducted. 
The aims of the formative usability evaluation and of the research study in general were 
communicated to the participants, who were also informed that they had the right to withdraw 
from the formative usability evaluation at any time. All participants agreed and signed 
informed consent forms. These are confidential and will be kept by the promoter of this 
research study for a period of two years. Examples of the two consent forms that each 
participant signed are included in the Appendices CD-ROM. These are presented in Appendix 
B.43: Consent Form for MedHelp and B.44: Consent Form for Google Health. 
 
1.7 LAYOUT OF THESIS 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction and provides an 
overview of the research. Moreover, it outlines the problem, the research questions, the 
methodology and the scope and limitations of the study. Chapters 2 and 3 are the theoretical 
chapters and provide the contextualisation and background information, which facilitates the 
conceptualisation of the research study. In chapter 2, the focus is on human-computer 
interaction and in chapter 3 a detailed overview is provided for usable security.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the process for developing heuristics for a specific application domain and 
the usable security heuristics with their checklist items. The research design and methodology 
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follow in chapter 5. This is an extensive chapter that covers research philosophies, 
approaches, strategies, choices, time horizons and techniques and procedures. Those selected 
to be applied in this research study are emphasised, explained and supported.  
 
A case study is presented in chapter 6. The case study was conducted on two online health 
social networks and the results of the case study and the recommendations flowing from it are 
discussed. Chapter 7 presents the results and analysis of the experts’ assessments of the 
usable security heuristic evaluation. These experts used a validation tool that was developed 
in this study to conduct their assessments. In chapter 8 the applicability of the framework is 
described. Consequently, the contribution of the thesis is highlighted in chapter 9, which 
summarises the findings and identifies possible avenues for future research. The research 
process is illustrated in figure 1.1, which also presents the layout of the chapters graphically 
and identifies where the four research sub-questions have been addressed. In the next chapter 
human-computer interaction is explored. 
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CHAPTER 2: HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on the field of HCI. There are a number of terms and disciplines that 
are used in this field: of particular interest to this research are the disciplines of human-
computer interaction (HCI), user-centred design (UCD), usability and user experience (UX). 
These disciplines will be considered for the design and development of the Usable Security 
(USec) heuristic evaluation (HE) and for the process of developing HEs for specific 
application domains (SADs). The models and frameworks that are presented in each 
discipline contributed in the development of the framework. There is a broad volume of 
literature pertaining to these disciplines; however, reference is only made to the literature that 
had a direct impact on this research study. The disciplines will be introduced in this chapter 
and a discussion on their relations is also provided.  
 
Section 2.2 will introduce the field of HCI. Subsequently, UCD is discussed in section 2.3. 
Section 2.4 introduces the discipline of usability and in section 2.5, UX will be discussed. 
Following this, is a discussion on evaluation methods used in HCI in section 2.6. The 
summary is presented in section 2.7.  
 
2.2 HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 
Simply stated, HCI is the field concerned with improving the design and development of 
websites/applications for users. The ACM SIGCHI Curricula for Human-Computer 
Interaction defines HCI as the following (Hewett, Baecker, Card, Carey, Gasen, Mantei, et 
al., 1996, p. 5): 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of HCI is to achieve a certain level of performance in terms of the quality and 
optimality of a service. In order to realise this, a fit has to be produced between the user, the 
machine and the actual service. Determining whether an HCI design is good is largely 
subjective and dependent on the context (Te’eni, 2006). The human, computer, use and 
context are the main characteristics in the development process. Figure 2.1 gives a 
representation of the nature of HCI (Hewett et al., 2002).  
―HCI is a discipline concerned with the design, evaluation and implementation of 
interactive computing systems for human use and with the study of major phenomena 
surrounding them.‖ 
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Figure 2.1: The nature of HCI (Hewett et al., 2002, p. 13) 
 
In the process of HCI design, the degree of activity between the human and the computer 
must be well-thought through. User activity has three different levels: these include physical, 
affective and cognitive. Accordingly, the physical aspect focuses on the mechanics of 
interaction between the human and the computer; the cognitive aspect focuses on the ways in 
which the human can understand the system and interact with it; and the affective aspect 
focuses on making the interaction a pleasurable experience for the human and ensuring that 
the human continues using the machine. This aspect depends on emotions and attitudes 
(Karray, Alemzadeh, Saleh & Arab, 2008). 
 
HCI is an extensive subject area that includes a number of terms and disciplines, as 
previously mentioned. These are either used interchangeably or applied to complement each 
another during design. Nonetheless, they all share the common goal of improving the 
intended users’ experience by making them the focal point of the design. Some of the more 
familiar disciplines are UX, UCD, user interface (UI) design, interaction design (ID), 
information architecture (IA) and usability. Their objectives can overlap as a result of their 
interdependencies. 
 
Owing to the terms and disciplines that exist in the area, it is difficult to provide a definite 
consensus on their relationships. Literature indicates different views with regard to this, yet 
not necessarily conflicting ones. This has become even more complicated by the surface of 
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UX. Accordingly, extensive research has been conducted to define UX design and its role 
with the other disciplines. Therefore, it is appropriate to provide a stance on the perspective 
that is taken in this research study, as this will enhance the understanding of this chapter in 
terms of the disciplines discussed.  
 
With regards to HCI, Saffer (2009) states that it has different (non-design) traditions and 
methodologies in comparison to the other disciplines. This is as a result of its pure research 
focus. Based on Saffer’s (2009) views and because this is a pure research project, this study is 
positioned within the field of HCI, even though Saffer and the ACM SIGCHI Curricula for 
Human-Computer Interaction refer to HCI as a discipline as well. Within HCI, this research 
study will investigate the disciples of UCD, usability and UX. In agreement, Saffer (2009) 
presents UX design as a discipline that overlaps with all other disciplines and that needs to be 
considered in each. 
 
2.3 USER-CENTRED DESIGN 
The purpose of UCD is to develop products with a high degree of usability. To achieve this, 
the user becomes the centre of focus in the product development process. Usability is 
therefore the outcome of correct UCD. Owing to their dependant relationship, it is worth 
introducing UCD before usability is discussed in section 2.4. UCD is defined as the following 
(Henry, 2007, p. 29): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To better understand the concept on which UCD is founded, it would be beneficial to first 
compare it to an alternative approach that is used when developing software products, the 
system-centred design approach (SCD). The design of a new system in SCD is highly 
focused on the actual characteristics of the system. For example, designing a product that is 
to run on a particular platform will evidently influence its design process. This is because the 
new system will need to be designed in such a manner that it optimises and fits into the 
―UCD is a user interface design process that focuses on usability goals, user 
characteristics, environment, tasks, and workflow in the design of an interface. UCD 
follows a series of well-defined methods and techniques for analysis, design, and 
evaluation of mainstream hardware, software, and Web interfaces. The UCD process 
is an iterative process, where design and evaluation steps are built in from the first 
stage of projects, through implementation.‖ 
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platform for which it is intended (Leventhal & Barnes, 2007). In UCD, however, the focus of 
the design is not based solely on the system characteristics, as it is in SCD. Instead, it is based 
on the fundamental objective to best address the users’ needs and tasks. This is the vehicle 
that drives the design process. The needs and tasks of users must also be in line with what is 
stated in the requirements documents. It is even possible to sacrifice certain system efficiency 
in order to address users’ needs with regard to their interactions with the interface (Leventhal 
& Barnes, 2007). 
 
It is evident that UCD depends on the participation of the intended users of a new product 
throughout the design process. Terms that are used synonymously with UCD are human-
centred design (HCD) and user-centred system design (UCSD). ISO 9241-210 (2010), 
however, states that, in the case of HCD, it also addresses the impact of the stakeholders and 
not only those of the users, as in UCD. HCD is defined as the following (ISO 9241-210, 
2010, p. 2): 
 
 
 
 
 
As with HCD, the definition for UCSD identifies the user as the focal point of the design by 
stressing the importance of usability throughout the design process. UCSD is defined as the 
following (Gulliksen, Goransson, Boivie, Blonkvist, Persson & Cajander, 2003, p. 401): 
 
 
 
 
 
Gathering requirements from users and involving them in the design process is not a simple 
task. Nevertheless, there are various investigative methods that can help the design team 
accomplish this effectively (Benyon, Turner & Turner, 2005). The most frequently used 
methods will be discussed in more detail in section 2.6. 
 
2.3.1 Human-Centred Design Activities 
As mentioned previously, the terms UCD and HCD are used interchangeably; therefore, 
discussing the activities involved in HCD is relevant. There are four main activities that 
―HCD is an approach to systems design and development that aims to make interactive 
systems more usable by focusing on the use of the system and applying human 
factors/ergonomics and usability knowledge and techniques.‖ 
―UCSD is a process focusing on usability throughout the entire development process 
and further throughout the system life cycle.‖ 
Chapter 2: Human-Computer Interaction 
 
19 
 
compose the HCD approach. These are displayed in figure 2.2. It is also worth noting that the 
HCD activities will only initiate once it has been confirmed that there is a need to design a 
new system, product or service. This is represented in the top circle of figure 2.2, referred to 
as ―Identify need for human-centred design‖.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: The interdependence of human-centred design activities (ISO 13407, 1999; ISO 9241-210, 2010) 
 
Once the need for HCD has been established, the next step is to understand the context in 
which the new system will be implemented. A brief overview of this and the other activities 
will now be provided. The four activities are the following (ISO 13407, 1999; ISO 9241-210, 
2010): 
 Understand and specify the context of use. Context of use encompasses the 
characteristics of the intended users, the tasks that the users will need to perform and 
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the environment (organisational, technical and physical) in which the users will be 
using the system.  
 Specify the user and organisational requirements. This activity determines and 
specifies the major requirements of a new system, product or service. It needs to be 
extended by creating an explicit statement of user requirements. These requirements 
are dependent on the intended users, context of use and the organisational objectives. 
 Product design solutions. Potential design solutions are produced as part of this 
activity. The solutions are based on the description of the context of use, results from 
any baseline evaluations and the established state of the art in the application domain. 
Design and usability standards and guidelines, as well as the experience and 
knowledge of the multidisciplinary design team are all crucial. Iteration is essential at 
this point and can result in additional user requirements. 
 Evaluate designs against requirements. User-centred evaluation (from a user 
perspective) is essential in determining if the human-centred design process is a 
success. Moreover, new information regarding user requirements may be collected 
and baselines can be established for comparing alternative designs. User-centred 
evaluation can provide feedback, which then can also be used to improve a preferred 
design and assess if user and organisational objectives have been fulfilled. 
Additionally, it helps monitor the long-term use of the system, product or service. 
 
In chapter 4, the process to develop a HE for a SAD and the USec HE is presented. The HCD 
activities have been modified in order to provide a platform for developing the process. 
Additionally, the key characteristics of UCD, which are focused on users, empirical 
measurements and iteration, are reflected in the process (Gulliksen et al., 2003; Gould & 
Lewis, 1985; Holtzblatt & Beyer, 1993).  
 
2.4 USABILITY 
The relationship between usability and UCD was mentioned in section 2.3. A term that can 
be used to express this relationship is usability engineering. The usability engineering 
procedure is concerned with two perspectives; the product and the process of the product’s 
development, both of which are equally important. The product focuses on elements such as 
the content of the user interface, human factor issues, design guidelines and interaction styles. 
The process, on the other hand, relates to the strategy that was followed to develop the 
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product. This involves methods, techniques and tools for development and assessment 
(Leventhal & Barnes, 2007). 
 
As with UCD, correct usability engineering is difficult to achieve, as it requires the usability 
engineer to identify the target users and have a detailed understanding of the tasks they will 
need to perform. This is a time-consuming process, which is often based on deadlines, and 
resource and budget constraints. These properties will be adjusted accordingly, depending on 
the project. Furthermore, the tasks that will need to be designed can be complex. This may 
even result in conflicting requirements from the user and the organisational perspectives. 
Another requirement for correct usability engineering is for the usability engineer to 
constantly make reference to industry standards and documents throughout the usability 
engineering process (Leventhal & Barnes, 2007). 
 
The usability of products is determined by evaluating whether or not certain usability 
objectives have been realised in the design of the product. From the website/application 
perspective, usability objectives include the following (Nielsen, 1993; Rubin & Chisnell, 
2008):  
 Learnability (memorability) – First-time users should have the ability to accomplish 
basic tasks and infrequent users should be able to relearn the system effortlessly. 
 Efficiency – Users must be able to perform tasks fast, once they have learnt to use the 
system. 
 Usefulness – The product must address the users’ needs by enabling them to achieve 
their goals and perform the tasks that it was designed for.   
 Effectiveness (ease of use) – Users’ speed of performance and error rates are 
quantitatively measured in accordance with the percentage of users.   
 Errors – The product should consider and eliminate any errors that the users could be 
prone to. If any severe errors do occur, the users should be able to recover from them 
easily. 
 Satisfaction (attitude or likeability) – Relates to the users’ perceptions and feelings on 
the design and product. 
 
Definitions on usability emphasise the objectives of effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction 
as being paramount to the design of the product. Usability is defined as the following (ISO 
9241-210, 2010, p. 3): 
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2.4.1 Usability Framework 
Usability is based on specifications and measurements. ISO 9241-11 (1998) states that in 
order to measure usability it is first necessary to decompose its core characteristics; 
effectiveness, efficiency, satisfaction and the components of the context of use. These need to 
be decomposed into sub-components, which will then determine measurable and verifiable 
attributes. A usability framework distinguishes these components and also illustrates their 
relationships. Figure 2.3 displays a usability framework. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Usability framework (ISO 9241-11, 1998, p. 10) 
 
2.4.2 Model of Usability 
Models of usability have been introduced by many researchers in the field. They determine 
the characteristics of usability, how the characteristics interconnect and how the 
characteristics contribute to the overall usability of a product or service. In addition, they 
provide a means for measuring usability (as in the usability framework). Common 
characteristics can be identified within most usability models. The model of usability 
presented by Leventhal and Barnes (2007) integrates the most important characteristics and 
―Usability is the extent to which a system, product or service can be used by specified 
users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a 
specified context of use.‖ 
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variables of several usability models and then combines them into a single model. The model 
itself is the outcome of an analysis of three other usability models: Shackel’s operational 
model of usability, Nielsen’s model of the attributes of system acceptability of which 
usability is an attribute and Eason’s framework for usability. 
 
Consequently, following the structure of these usability models, Leventhal and Barnes (2007) 
created their own model. In their model, they identify a set of situational and a set of user 
interface variables. When the two sets are considered collectively they can influence 
usability. It is worth noting that the model recognises two key aspects within the situational 
variables – task and user. Variables relating to the task include frequency, rigidness, and 
situational constraints, while variables relating to the user include expertise and motivation. 
With regards to the user interface, the variables include ease of learning/use/relearning, 
flexibility, satisfaction and task match. 
 
The model of usability identifies the type of user interface variables and situational variables 
that must be considered from both a user and a task perspective. All variables contribute 
towards usability, an important component for USec, and were therefore considered.  
 
2.4.3 Usability Guidelines and Principles 
A number of guidelines and principles exist that can guide and help developers design more 
usable websites/applications. These make a significant contribution to the design by 
promoting consistency and good practice throughout. However, applying them alone will 
have a lower degree of impact without having a good design process in place (e.g. UCD). 
 
An important aspect of the use of guidelines and principles is that they need to be interpreted 
within a context. Therefore, if a guideline does not apply to a particular website then it should 
not be implemented. Typically, developers will work through a list of guidelines and mark 
which do and do not conform to the website/application under development. Hence, 
guidelines relate to different aspects of the design; home page, task orientation, navigation, 
information architecture, trust, search, page layout, visual design, help, feedback, errors, and 
so forth. Some of the most noteworthy resources for usability guidelines include the 
following: 
 Nielsen's ten usability heuristics (http://www.useit.com/) 
 ISO 9241 usability heuristics (ISO 9241-11, 1998) 
 Usability.gov (http://www.usability.gov/) 
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 Welie.com (http://www.welie.com/) 
 Research-Based Web Design & Usability Guidelines (Leavitt & Shneiderman, 2006). 
 Xerox HE checklist (Pierotti, 1995). 
 
2.5 USER EXPERIENCE  
Recently, the discipline of UX has been gaining substantial interest within the HCI field. Its 
contributions stem from the fact that it attempts to consider subjective attributes, such as 
aesthetics, emotions and social aspects, in the design and development of products. 
Previously, these attributes were associated with the ease of use of a product. However, 
nowadays they are being analysed in terms of the users’ sensations, behaviours, perceptions 
and emotions. Researchers have provided various theories and frameworks regarding UX. 
Consequently, it would seem that the complexity and richness of the UX depends on the 
diversity of these approaches (Ardito, Costabile, Lanzilotti & Montinaro, 2007). 
 
Ardito et al. (2007) state that although designing for experience includes efficiency, it 
requires far more. Whereas designing for efficiency would require focusing on attributes such 
as speed, simplicity, functionality and error-free designs, UX is involved with the users’ 
feelings. Consequently, when using the product the focus is on beauty (harmonious, clear), 
emotions (affectionate, lovable, erotic), and stimulus (intellectual, motivational). In the 
design of multimodal interfaces, additional feelings that would need to be considered include 
touch (smooth, soft) and acoustical (rhythmic, melodious).  
 
In order to understand how interaction impacts and, ultimately, forms experience, Ardito et 
al. (2007) identify time as having a critical role to play in the users’ consciousness. 
Furthermore, they emphasise the importance of designing actions so that users are not only 
satisfied with the outcome of their actions, but also with the feelings that ensue from 
executing them. Hassenzahl and Tractinsky (2006) and Roto (2007) believe that UX is 
influenced by several factors, including the users’ internal state (e.g. expectations, needs, 
motivation and mood), the characteristics of the designed system (e.g. complexity, usability) 
and the context surrounding the interaction (e.g. organisational or social setting).  
 
From a commercial perspective, UX design is a specialised discipline that combines product 
strategy with usability engineering. It is concerned with the interactions between the end-
users and a company, its products or services (Nielsen-Norman group, n.d). To achieve this, 
it is first necessary to meet the precise needs of the consumers. The aim of UX design is to 
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make the product or service useful, elegant and simple to use. The overall experience when 
interacting with the product or service should be established on the feelings of enjoyment, 
satisfaction and anticipation (users actions should result in their intended expectations). This 
will, in turn, drive competitive advantage and profitability. UX is defined as the following 
(ISO 9241-210, 2010, p. 3): 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5.1 User Experience Elements 
Garrett (2000) created a conceptual model of considerations for designing successful user 
experiences for websites. His conceptual model was founded upon his own work and 
practical experience in the subject area. Within the model he defines elements for UX. In 
figure 2.4, five layers of elements can be identified.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: The UX elements (Garrett, 2000) 
 
―UX is a person’s perceptions and responses resulting from the use and/or anticipated 
use of a product, system or service.‖ 
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Layers two, three and four are divided vertically. The right-hand side of these divided layers 
represents the Web as a hypertext system, while the left-hand side represents the Web as a 
software interface. Of interest in these layers are the left-handed ones because they represent 
the Web as it is being used today: as sophisticated front- and back-end technologies (Garrett, 
2000). When considering these elements in the development of a website/application, they 
begin at an abstract point. As they move higher up through the levels, concrete artefacts will 
be built. According to Garrett (2000), the purposes of each layer include the following: 
 Layer 1 – The user needs and the site objectives are identified.  
 Layer 2 – The functional specifications of the site are analysed. This is concerned 
with describing the functionality of the site in order to meet the user needs that were 
derived in Layer 1.  
 Layer 3 – This is referred to as interaction design and is interested in how the user 
interacts with the functionality of the site. Creating the application flows and user 
tasks are critical for this layer.  
 Layer 4 – This is comprised of two components: the information design element 
focuses on presenting the information to the users in an understandable format, while 
the interface design element investigates the design of the interface elements in order 
to accommodate user-interaction with functionality.  
 Layer 5 – The visual design element is applied. This focuses on the graphic treatment 
of interface elements and their ―look and feel‖. 
 
It is apparent from figure 2.4 that there is no element in any of the layers representing 
usability. This could be explained by defining the element of ID in Layer 3. Hence, 
interaction design is the process of designing interactive products to support the manner in 
which people communicate and interact in their everyday and working lives.  
 
Achieving UX is the driving force behind ID. Furthermore, UX is highly dependent on 
achieving usability goals. Accordingly, these goals need to be considered when designing 
websites/applications, as they contribute significantly towards the design of a successful 
product or service. Usability goals are concerned with meeting specific usability criteria such 
as efficiency, effectiveness, learnability and safety (Rogers, Sharp & Preece, 2008). Based on 
this, it can be concluded that usability is reflected within the element of ID at Layer 3, as 
illustrated in figure 2.4. 
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2.5.2 User Experience Honeycomb 
On the basis of an analysis of the UX elements, Morville (2004) then developed the facets of 
UX, which are referred to as the UX Honeycomb. Currently, there are seven facets and, 
according to Morville (2004), new facets should be added to the currently existing ones. The 
seven facets are displayed in figure 2.5 and include the following (Morville, 2004): 
1. Useful – It is important that the products developed are useful and that innovative 
solutions are implemented. 
2. Usable – This relates to the usability of the product or service (e.g. ease of use). 
3. Desirable – This focuses on the emotional design aspects of a product or service (e.g. 
images, identity, brand, etc.). 
4. Findable – This relates to the design of the navigation structure. Users need to find 
the objects that they require easily. 
5. Accessible – This highlights the fact that people with disabilities will also need to be 
considered, as they too can be users of the product or service.  
6. Credible – This analyses the design elements that will contribute to gaining user trust.  
7. Valuable – The product or service will need to offer value to both the customers and 
to the organisation/sponsor. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: The seven facets of the UX Honeycomb (Morville, 2004) 
 
As a result of the development of the USec HE, this research will recommend the addition of 
a new facet to the UX Honeycomb. The eighth facet being recommended for the UX 
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Honeycomb is Secure. This facet should be equally considered in the development of 
websites/applications and is demonstrated in figure 2.6. It is important to emphasise the 
difference between the Credible facet that already exists and the Secure facet, which is not 
yet included in the UX Honeycomb. The Credible facet focuses on aspects of persuasion and 
is interested in determining whether users believe what they read on a website, how users 
evaluate whether an online source is credible and what the design factors and elements are 
that influence their opinions of credibility (Web Credibility Project, 2007).  
 
The Secure facet will be concerned with the users’ ability to perform security actions easily 
and to protect their privacy and data when interacting with a website and other users. This 
becomes even more crucial in websites that utilise end-users’ personal information. The 
objective is to build security tools on websites/applications that will not only protect users 
and be effective, but which are also easy to use. The security tools will need to be developed 
in a manner that end-users will understand, so that they may continue to use them. The 
developers’ responsibility is not only to create security tools that work, but also to ensure that 
their security tools are usable products that can also be applied by novice users. Being able to 
use the security tools correctly and easily will provide the users with satisfaction, trust and a 
sense of security. As subjective attributes are essential for UX, including the eighth facet of 
Secure to the Honeycomb is a legitimate argument. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: The recommended “Secure” facet that will be added to the UX Honeycomb 
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2.5.3 User Experience Basis Process Model 
The UXBasis process model (http://uxbasis.hellogroup.com/) provides an industry 
perspective for UX design. This process comprises a toolbox that includes 24 different 
methods that can be used in various situations. The purpose of the toolbox is to promote 
design with UX at the forefront. It is an adaptive model that is used throughout the 
development process. The reason for presenting this process model in this research is to 
understand how UX design can actually be practised in industry and to determine whether 
there is a correlation with models and processes presented in the literature. 
 
It is evident that the impact of UX is being noted in industry (UXBASIS, n.d.). Hence, 
companies are trying to design products that provide a positive UX for users. The Hello 
Group has acknowledged this and has consequently developed the UXBasis process model to 
assist development teams in their quest for UX design. They state that not all 24 methods are 
required in a project; only the most relevant that will provide the most effective results for the 
business need to be utilised. Different methods will be used in different phases of the project, 
which will undergo constant iterative changes.  
 
The process model is divided into five sections: business intelligence, analysis, structure, 
interaction and sample and UX is reflected in all these sections. Other HCI disciplines that 
are continuously reflected in these sections include IA, ID and usability.  The methods that 
can be applied in each section of the UXBasis process model are displayed in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: The 24 methods of the UXBasis process model 
Business intelligence Analysis Structure Interaction Sample 
Stakeholder interviews Task analysis User journeys Wireframes Beta testing 
Competitor analysis Card sorting Site structure 
diagram 
Page flows Eye tracking 
HE User interviews Optimisation Prototypes User test labs 
Content audit Ethnography   Think aloud 
 Collaborative 
workshops 
   
 Web metrics    
 Online surveys    
 Personas    
 User stories    
 Concept model    
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The UXBasis process model relates to the respective literature in the research area. The most 
important characteristics that confirm this is the fact that it is based on an iterative process, it 
offers a variety of methods that can be used at different phases of a project and it identifies 
other disciplines within HCI that need to be reflected upon during design.  
 
Several methods have been considered from the UXBasis process model in this research to 
develop a new process for designing heuristics for SADs and the USec HE. In the business 
intelligence section, the HE method is considered, while in the analysis section, user stories, 
online surveys, and task analysis methods are considered and in the sample section, the user 
test method is considered. Regarding the task analysis method, a modified version is applied. 
It should be noted that tasks have not been measured against quantitative data; instead, 
security and privacy tasks have been formulated in combination with user stories to collect 
qualitative data from the participants. More detail will be provided in chapters 5 and 6 where 
the research methodology and case study respectively are discussed. 
 
2.6 USABILITY INSPECTION METHODS  
 
 
 
 
Usability inspection methods (UIMs) are applied to evaluate the usability of 
applications/websites in the field of HCI. This is achieved by identifying usability problems 
or violations using an interface. A usability problem is defined as ―any aspect of a user 
interface that is expected (or observed) to cause users problems with respect to some salient 
usability measure (e.g. learnability, performance, error rate, subjective satisfaction) and that 
can be attributed to a single design aspect‖ (Nielsen, 1993). Once usability problems have 
been identified, they can be prioritised for improvement by management and developers 
according to their severity. Hence, it is imperative that one can trust the validity of the ratings 
from the applied UIM. Otherwise, less urgent usability problems may be addressed ahead of 
the more severe and urgent ones (Law & Hvannberg, 2004). 
 
Other terms used interchangeably with UIMs are discount methods (Woolrych & Cockton, 
2001), usability evaluation methods/techniques (Dix, Finlay, Abowd & Beale, 2004) or 
usability evaluation approaches/methods (Rogers et al., 2008). The term discount methods 
are used because their main goal is to provide the best possible impact on interactive design 
―Would you fly in an airplane that hasn’t been flight tested? Of course not. So you 
shouldn’t be using software that hasn’t been usability tested‖ (Shneiderman, 1995). 
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at the lowest possible cost (Woolrych & Cockton, 2001). According to Dix et al., (2004) 
usability evaluation methods/techniques are either based on expert evaluation or user 
involvement. Likewise, the three types of usability evaluation approaches/methods include 
usability testing, field studies and analytical evaluation (Rogers et al., 2008). Usability testing 
measures users’ performance and satisfaction when conducting tasks in a laboratory setting 
on a system in question. Field studies are conducted in natural settings to understand what 
users do naturally with a system in question, while analytical evaluations are conducted by 
experts and do not involve users.  
 
From the various terms that can be used to define the methods that evaluate the usability of 
applications/websites, the term UIM is used in this study. This is supported on the basis that 
the most important sources referenced in the development of the USec HE refer to them as 
such. The selection and application of a particular method is mainly founded on determining 
if it will be conducted with experts or users. Thus, irrelevant of the term used to describe the 
methods, clarifying if the method is conducted with users or experts is important, and this 
will be done when discussing various methods in their relevant sections. 
 
Despite the higher-cost involved with using both users and experts in evaluations, it is 
beneficial. The continuous involvement of users in the design and evaluation phases must 
reflect the application of usability practices throughout in order to meet their needs (BoK-a, 
2005). In addition to user involvement, expert involvement will complement and enhance the 
design process. Thus, the user requirements will be combined with business requirements in 
order to achieve effective UX (BoK-b, 2005). UIMs are particularly fundamental for data 
collection and analysis within the HCI research field. 
 
Development teams can apply UIMs to evaluate different websites/applications. In doing so, 
they focus on different issues of the design and are conducted throughout the development of 
a product. A key consideration in this process is for the development team to know 
beforehand what type of information they are trying to obtain (Benyon et al., 2005). They can 
then select the most suitable UIM for the specific case. 
 
UIMs can be conducted with users or field experts. When conducting them with users it is 
recommended to have at least three to five users for a single user group. If there are more 
user groups identified, the development team will need to ensure that each user group is 
represented with three to five users. Context is another important consideration with users – it 
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will need to be recreated so that it matches the actual settings in which users are expected to 
interact with the product (e.g. usability laboratory). When conducting UIMs with experts, 
results are dependent on their personal experience and practical and theoretical knowledge. 
These evaluations require a considerable amount of time and close attention to detail in the 
design. Context is equally important here; however, it is more imperative when conducting 
evaluations with users. Overall, the best results are obtained by combining UIMs with and 
without users, as the methods will complement each other. Once the data have been collected, 
the design team can employ methods and models for the analysis. These are also helpful in 
communicating the material to the entire design team. Such examples include flow models, 
sequence models, artefact models, cultural models, physical models, affinity diagrams, 
storyboards, User Environment Design (UED), paper prototypes, and Graphical Presentation 
of User Profile (GUP) (Benyon et al., 2005; Kankainen & Parkkinen, 2001). 
 
When conducting UIMs with users, it is critical that the development teams observe, listen 
and engage with the users effectively. Richer results are obtained when the development team 
conducts onsite visits to the users’ natural environments. However, as previously stated, the 
context can be recreated in usability laboratories as well (Butow, 2007). Drawbacks can 
include bias from the development team due to the lack of adequate feedback from the users 
or a general lack of information from them and misunderstandings. These drawbacks result 
when there is confusion and when the development team interprets the users’ actions 
incorrectly. 
 
There are two main reasons for conducting UIMs without users. Firstly, the users’ time is 
valuable and the development team should not unnecessarily waste their time. Therefore, 
when users start evaluating the design, it should be as free as possible from problems and 
bugs. Secondly, as a result of the experts’ practical experience, a good expert evaluation can 
determine problems in the design that an evaluation with a few users may not expose (Butow, 
2007). UIMs without users are categorised into two groups: task-oriented evaluation 
techniques and task-free evaluation techniques. Task-oriented techniques evaluate an 
interface as applied to a specific task that the user would conduct with the actual interface. 
The advantages of task-oriented evaluation techniques are that they focus on interface 
problems that occur during the work the user does and that they provide an idea of the 
importance of problems in the context of the job. Their shortcomings are their coverage and 
their cross-task interactions. Coverage is difficult to achieve because there is never enough 
Chapter 2: Human-Computer Interaction 
 
33 
 
time to evaluate every task that the user may perform. Moreover, identifying cross-task 
interactions is not possible either because tasks are evaluated on their own and not as part of a 
system of interconnected tasks. On the other hand, task-free evaluation techniques are used to 
identify problems that task-oriented usability techniques tend to miss (Butow, 2007).  Table 
2.2 displays popular UIMs that can be conducted with users, experts or both. It also displays 
those that will be applied in this research. 
Table 2.2: Usability inspection methods 
# UIM Users Experts Users & 
experts 
Applied in 
research 
1 Usability roundtable     
2 Usability evaluation     
3 Focus group     
4 User survey     
5 Cognitive walkthrough     
6 Action analysis     
7 Claims analysis     
8 Contextual inquiry     
9 HE     
 
The UIMs from table 2.2 will be briefly presented and discussed. Detailed discussions will be 
provided for the usability evaluation and the HE UIM. This is because they will be applied in 
this research and will contribute significantly in the development of the new process and the 
USec heuristics. They are also regarded as the most frequently used UIM. 
 
2.6.1 Usability Roundtable 
In usability roundtables, customers (or users) visit the evaluators’ site and bring with them 
some of their work artefacts, which help create to a context for evaluating the products 
usability (Butow, 2007). This is an effective usability evaluation technique for discovering 
information about the users’ work, although it differs from other techniques in that a portion 
of the users’ work environment is recreated at the design team’s premises. As mentioned, 
users are required to bring their own work samples (e.g. data files, applications samples, hard 
copy printouts). They then sit around a conference table with the design team and explain 
their work on the basis of their work samples (Butler, 1996). 
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The fact that the users are describing their work by means of their work samples provides the 
design team with a thorough introduction into the users’ world. It helps identify the type of 
issues they are currently facing in their jobs and also provides initial indications as to how 
technology can improve their work. This ensures that the designs will suit their needs (Butler, 
1996). A usability roundtable generally has a usability person to moderate the session in the 
form of an informal discussion. 
 
Usability roundtables will need to be combined with other techniques as well. A critical 
consideration when conducting a usability roundtable is that the appropriate users are 
selected. The key advantages of this technique are that the sessions are efficient, users are 
enthusiastic about attending the sessions, design team members are better informed about the 
users’ needs and the user environments can be reconstructed effectively (Butler, 1996). 
 
2.6.2 Usability Evaluation 
Usability evaluation, also referred to as usability testing (Rogers et al., 2008), is a more 
expensive and time-consuming UIM. Yet, it tends to be more reliable in comparison to other 
UIMs (Cockton & Woolrych, 2001; Molich & Nielsen, 1990). The purpose is to predesign a 
usability test and then conduct it in a controlled environment (e.g. usability laboratory) 
(Butow, 2007). Usability evaluation helps to indicate where problems in the design occur or 
to compare alternative designs. Sometimes there is a need for more precise and statistically 
validated data based on quantitative and qualitative data gathered from the evaluation project. 
Quantitative data can reliably confirm, according to metrics, that one design is better than 
another. They can also show that error rates are at an acceptable and pre-agreed upon rate 
according to requirements. To achieve such results, controlled usability evaluations are 
needed, which can be analysed using statistical tests. This requires a basic understanding of 
probability theory, experimental theory and statistics (Benyon et al., 2005). 
 
A set of users is asked individually to complete tasks using an interface. During the testing, 
usability specialists observe and monitor the users, noting in particular aspects such as 
mistakes, frustration and time delays in completing tasks. Usability testing helps prioritise 
cost-benefit corrections to the system. In addition, the suggested design improvements are the 
result of the experts’ usability experience as well as the users’ experience when conducting 
the test (Straub, 2003; BoK-c, 2005).  
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To conduct a successful usability evaluation, guidelines should be followed. It is important to 
consider these as they will contribute to well-designed usability evaluations. In turn, these 
will provide the results that the development team have set out to achieve initially from the 
usability evaluation. The steps involved in conducting a usability evaluation include the 
following (Benyon et al., 2005): 
1. Select the techniques for the usability test. 
2. Define the tests to determine what information is needed from the users and how this 
information will be collected. 
3. Design an initial test and conduct a pilot study. When satisfied with the pilot study 
conduct the real test. 
4. Analyse the data and prepare reports and presentations for the stakeholders (the 
presentation of the analysis will depend on the intended audience). 
 
The second step in conducting a usability evaluation is to define the usability test (as 
mentioned in the steps above). Defining a usability test has its own steps, which will need to 
be considered. These include the following (Butow, 2007): 
1. Define the goals and concerns. 
2. Determine who the test participants are. 
3. Select, organise and create the test scenarios. 
4. Determine how usability will be measured. 
5. Prepare the test materials. 
 
2.6.3 Focus Group 
Focus groups help obtain attitudes, reactions and opinions about a company’s products and 
ideas. They are also useful for helping a development team to better understand its customer 
requirements (Butow, 2007). A focus group is an informal technique that assesses user needs 
and feelings before interface design and after implementation. Nielsen (1997) suggests that it 
is more effective when the group consists of six to nine users and the session last for about 
two hours. The session will also need to be administered by a moderator, who maintains the 
focus of interests. However, there still needs to be a free-flowing and relatively unstructured 
style to the session. 
 
Focus groups in particular cannot be used as the only evaluation technique and are relatively 
poor in evaluating interface usability. They can also possibly produce inaccurate data, as 
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users may think that they require one thing when instead they require another. The 
development team will need to consider a solution for this (e.g. prototypes, workshops and 
scenarios) (Benyon et al., 2005). Note that the main purpose of focus groups is not to assess 
the usability of the design but to discover what it is that the users need from the system. 
 
2.6.4 User Survey 
Development teams make use of user surveys (e.g. interviews, questionnaires) to determine 
what the users would like to see in the product. These are valuable for clarifying user 
reactions and perceptions. Information collected from the user surveys can also be applied to 
future versions of a product (Butow, 2007). Essentially, the design team will select a sample 
group of participants and administer a standardised survey to each of them (Babbie, 2005). A 
detailed discussion on surveys will be presented in chapter 5. 
 
2.6.5 Cognitive Walkthrough 
Cognitive walkthroughs are a task-oriented evaluation technique and therefore fit well with 
task-centred design. Although this technique tends to be conducted mostly without users, it is 
said to be more successful when the designers have worked closely with the users. This is 
because the designers can then build a mental picture of the intended users in their actual 
environments (Lewis & Rieman, 1994). The main disadvantages of this method are that it is 
time consuming if applied exhaustively to substantial systems. In addition, there can be 
difficulties in producing realistic scenarios and action sequences for novel products and there 
are limitations considering novice users. This is because assumptions are based on theoretical 
models of human action and goal-directed planning. 
 
Cognitive walkthroughs are a tool for developing the interface and not for validating it. 
Designers should expect to find aspects of the design that can be improved. This relates to the 
fact that often users are not thinking what the designers expect them to be thinking when 
interacting with the design. Therefore, it is a formalised method for imaging the users’ 
thoughts and actions when they use the interface for the first time. These walkthoughs are 
basically conducted with the assumption that the users are using the system for the first time 
and that they have no training on the system. 
 
2.6.6 Action Analysis 
Action analysis is a task-oriented evaluation technique and requires a detailed investigation of 
the sequence of actions a user will need to conduct in order to complete a task with an 
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interface. Action analysis is based on two phases. This first phase focuses on the physical and 
mental steps that a user will perform to complete one or more tasks with the interface. The 
second phase is to analyse the steps from the first phase and look for any problems (Lewis & 
Rieman, 1994). There are two methods for conducting action analysis: formal action analysis 
and back-of-the-envelope action analysis.  
 
Formal action analysis is also referred to as ―keystroke-level analysis‖. This method is 
characterised by extreme detail in the evaluation and is not easy to conduct. It allows the 
designer to predict time scales for expert users to perform tasks and forces the designer to 
take a detailed look at the interface (Lewis & Rieman, 1994). This analysis is conducted in 
the following manner: A basic task is divided into a number of subtasks; each of these 
subtasks is then divided into even smaller subtasks. This process continues until the 
description reaches the level of fraction-of-a-second operations. The end result is a 
hierarchical description of tasks and the action sequences needed to accomplish them. This 
method is only appropriate for special cases, as it is very complex. 
 
Back-of-the-envelope analysis does not provide the level of detail that formal action analysis 
does (e.g. predictions of task time and interface learnability). However, it can reveal large-
scale problems that may be lost in the details of formal action analysis. Moreover, it does not 
require much effort because there is no need to spend substantial time developing a detailed 
hierarchical breakdown and description of the tasks. This method is most useful when 
deciding on whether or not to add new features to a system or interface. 
 
2.6.7 Claims Analysis 
Claims analysis is a well-respected technique that should be initiated in the early stages of 
design. It is then used throughout the development process. Such analysis helps extend 
scenarios by documenting them with ―claims‖ about their design features. The claims 
document the envisaged positive effects of a feature, as well as the potential undesirable 
consequences of a feature (Benyon et al., 2005). 
 
Claims analysis is therefore used to analyse the relationship between the design features and 
the usability of the interface. A claim is a statement about a certain aspect of the design (e.g. 
location of a button, feedback provided in response to a user action) in terms of its 
psychological implications, which will reflect how capable a user is of using that aspect of 
the design. The outcome of claims analysis will be a list of all the design features of the 
Chapter 2: Human-Computer Interaction 
 
38 
 
interface and will include all positive and negative implications of the design features in this 
list. This is a useful approach for selecting among a number of alternative designs and will 
also provide a set of questions that can be analysed at a later stage when conducting usability 
evaluation techniques with users. These questions will state how the design should work on 
the basis of a well-defined set of claims. 
 
2.6.8 Contextual Inquiry 
Contextual inquiry is a type of semi-structured interview method used to collect information 
based on the context of use. At first, standard questions will be asked of the users, and then 
the interviewer will ask questions and observe the users as they work in their environments. 
Owing to the fact that users are being observed within their work context, the analysis data 
are more realistic, unlike laboratory data. This method is based on a set of principles and is 
generally used at the beginning of the design process. It is also useful for extracting a wealth 
of information regarding work practices, the social, technical and physical environments, and 
user tools (Gaffney, 2004; Holtzblatt, Wendell & Wood, 2005). 
 
2.6.9 Heuristic Evaluation 
A HE is regarded as an analytical evaluation method, which is undertaken by usability 
experts. The experts apply a specific set of heuristics or principles to evaluate the usability of 
a product. This provides an immediate analysis of the website/application, which helps to 
correct confusing elements in the current design and leads to enhanced UX. The method is 
widely used because it is an excellent method of diagnostic and perspective analysis for 
identifying individual problems in a short time period. Specifically, its purpose is to identify 
problems that are associated with the design of user interfaces. The results are dependent on 
the experts’ broader experience with usability (Nielsen, 2005a; Straub, 2003; Bernardo, 
2005). 
 
HEs are not well trusted owing to their unreliability at times. Yet, according to surveys, they 
are the most used method. It is believed that they will remain as the most popular UIM in the 
foreseeable future as well (Woolrych & Cockton, 2001; Law, 2007; Rosenbaum, Rohn & 
Humburg, 2000; Vredenburg, Mao, Smith & Carey, 2002; Baker, Greenberg & Gutwin, 
2001; Law & Hvannberg, 2004). An objective of the research is to define a process to design 
HEs for SADs. Therefore, it is required to have a comprehensive understanding of HEs. With 
regards to this study, the SAD is USec and the context that they address is the Online Health 
Social Networks (OHSNs). 
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A HE, also referred to as an expert review or a heuristic analysis technique, is a UIM that is 
conducted by experts in the field of usability engineering (Molich & Nielsen, 1990). It 
requires experts to use their practical skills in combination with their theoretical knowledge 
of guidelines and standards. Such practical skills would enable them to evaluate the 
conformance of a particular design. Nielsen (2005a) refers to it as one of the most popular 
UIMs that allows for quick, cheap and easy evaluation of a user interface design. Based on 
Nielsen’s remarks, it is evident why they remain extremely popular. 
 
Several experts working independently are considered adequate and very effective for 
identifying usability issues. Nielsen (2005b) is of the opinion that between three to five 
evaluators are sufficient, as they would be able to discover an average of 75% of usability 
problems on the user interface. The more evaluators that can be used, the better; however, 
this would have to be considered on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Figure 2.7 displays 
the percentage of usability problems that can be discovered based on the number of 
evaluators used. In figure 2.8 the ratio between the benefits and costs is described. Likewise, 
this is also dependent on the number of evaluators that are conducting the evaluation. From 
figures 2.7 and 2.8 it can be concluded that using more than five evaluators sees a decline in 
the ratio of benefits to cost. Therefore, the recommended number of evaluators is typically 
between three and five. 
 
           
 
 
 
 
Experts use a set of heuristics, which are similar to guidelines, to evaluate an interface or 
prototype. The outcome of their evaluation should be a list of violations and usability issues 
in accordance with the list of heuristics by which the interface is being moderated (Leventhal 
Figure 2.7: Ratio of discovering usability 
problems on a user interface based the number 
of evaluators used in a HE (Nielsen, 2005b) 
 
Figure 2.8: Ratio of benefits to costs based on 
the number of evaluators used in a HE (Nielsen, 
2005b) 
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& Barnes, 2007). The identified usability issues can then be addressed as part of an iterative 
design process. In this regard, severity ratings are used to measure the extent of the usability 
issues, as they help to determine the most serious problems with the interface and to estimate 
the need for additional usability efforts. Resources can then be allocated accordingly. 
Consequently, depending on the ratings, a product may or may not be released. For example, 
a product that is judged to have usability problems of a cosmetic nature can be released and 
those problems may then be solved at a later stage. The severity of a usability problem is a 
combination of three factors: frequency of problem occurrence, impact of problem when it 
occurs and persistence of the problem (Nielsen, 2005c). 
 
Two popular sets of heuristics that are widely accepted and adopted in an HE are those of 
Jacob Nielsen and the Xerox Corporation. Accordingly, Nielsen has developed the ―ten 
usability heuristics‖ (Nielsen, 2006) and Xerox the ―HE – system checklist‖ (Pierotti, 1995). 
From here on these will be referred to as well-known heuristic sets. Although the two are 
recognised as separate sets, in essence, the Xerox checklist operationalises Nielsen’s usability 
heuristics (Ballard, 2010). In many cases, it is possible and sufficient to use one of the well-
known heuristic sets and conduct a basic HE on a user-interface. This is very practical, as it is 
cost-efficient, time-efficient and effective in identifying the major usability issues that do not 
conform to the well-known heuristic sets of use. This does, however, lead to an argument 
being raised: that is, whether or not the well-known heuristic sets are considered as a ―one-
size-fits-all‖ approach for an HE. Research studies have proven that this is not always the 
case, as there are cases where heuristics need to be designed for a SAD in order to fit the 
specific context of use. Currently, there is no literature describing a systematic process that 
can be followed in an attempt to develop new heuristics, even though HE is an area in the 
HCI research community that has been well studied. At present, there are two main themes 
within this space (Sim, Read & Cockton, 2009):  
1. Improving the effectiveness of a HE  
2. Developing new and novel heuristic sets for specialised domains  
 
This research considers both of these themes. Firstly, it attempts to develop a USec HE that 
corresponds to the theme of developing new heuristic sets for specialised domains. Secondly, 
it will provide a new process for creating an HE for a specialised domain. This corresponds 
with the theme of improving the effectiveness of the HE method. A proficient and systematic 
process for developing specific heuristic sets will help reveal covert problems with an 
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interface, especially during the initial evaluation phases (Somervell & McCrickard, 2005). 
This, in turn, will improve the overall effectiveness of this UIM.  
 
There is no consensus about the most effective process for developing heuristics for SADs 
(Sim, Read & Cockton, 2009). A review of five previous studies that were readily accessible 
to the researcher points out several methods for doing this: 
 The first study suggests two main methods (Paddison & Englefield, 2004). These 
include examining the literature and analysing data of prior studies.  
 The second study suggests three main methods (Ling & Salvendy, 2005). These 
include examining previous research literature, modifying existing heuristics (referred 
to as tailored made heuristics) and evaluating the results. The tailored-made method is 
more common and has been used in the development of heuristic sets for ambient 
displays and shared workspace groupware applications (Baker et al., 2001). The need 
to create tailored evaluation tools for other domains is well supported (Somervell & 
McCrickard, 2005; Hvannberg, Law & Larusdottir, 2007). 
 The third study was done by Jacob Nielsen who used two methods to devise his well-
known heuristic set (Sim et al., 2009). These methods include factor analysis and an 
explanatory coverage process. However, his heuristics are regarded as too general in 
content and limited in scope to address SADs (Law & Hvannberg, 2004). With regard 
to the design of heuristics, Nielsen states that ―it is possible to develop category-
specific heuristics that apply to a specific class of products as a supplement to the 
general heuristics‖ (Nielsen, 1994).  He further recommends that this could also be 
done by performing competitive analysis and user testing to create abstract categories 
of specific heuristics. Nonetheless, this remains a complicated process that always 
raises questions regarding validity. 
 The fourth study used a more systematic approach to develop heuristics for SADs 
(Somervell & McCrickard, 2005; Sim et al., 2009). The approach includes identifying 
examples in the system class, extracting design knowledge from each representative 
system, grouping and labelling heuristics and deriving the final heuristics (Somervell 
& McCrickard, 2005). The work of these researchers is referred to as Study D in table 
2.3. Based on this approach, the three key aspects of study are the system class (large-
screen information exhibits), the design technique (scenario-based design and 
usability evaluations) and the knowledge storage approach (claims analysis).  
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 In common with the previous study, the fifth study used a more systematic approach 
to develop heuristics. It used an evidence-based or mixed-method approach to create a 
heuristic set for computer assisted assessment applications (Sim et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, its design and evaluation process included determining the effectiveness 
of Nielsen’s heuristics within the specialised application domain, building a corpus of 
usability problems by conducting student surveys, HEs, literature review and 
synthesising the corpus into a set of SAD heuristics (Sim et al., 2009). The work of 
these researchers is referred to as Study E in table 2.3. 
 
Studies D and E both used a more systematic approach in developing their heuristics. 
However, their approach for heuristic development required a significant amount of time. The 
most time-consuming aspect in Study D was the claims analysis and for Study E was the 
filtering and merging of the data sets to create the corpus. Both studies support the 
effectiveness of their heuristics with quantitative data methods. A comparison of these studies 
with the new process being proposed in this research is presented in table 2.3. The 
comparison is based on a set of elements, as displayed in table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Comparison of studies D and E with the new process proposed in this research 
Element Study D Study E New Process 
Time More time 
consuming due to 
the claims analysis 
technique. 
More time consuming due 
to filtering and merging of 
data sets into a corpus. 
Less time consuming. A 
validation tool to assess 
heuristics is provided. However, 
the experience, knowledge and 
effectiveness of reviewers and 
their willingness to contribute 
make a significant impact. 
Approach Quantitative Quantitative with some 
aspect of qualitative 
techniques 
Qualitative  
Methods Mixed method Mixed method Mixed method. This allows for 
data triangulation and differs 
from the other two studies 
because it includes the methods 
from previous researchers and 
integrates them into the process. 
SAD Large-screen 
information 
exhibits (non-
controversial) 
Computer-assisted 
assessment applications 
(non-controversial) 
USec (highly-controversial). 
Therefore a subjective consensus 
is required. 
Evaluations Usability problems 
were purposely 
introduced into the 
prototypes and 
HEs were conducted in the 
application domain to build 
the corpus of usability 
problems. 
Users apply the high-level 
heuristics on the 
website/application and are also 
provided with relating tasks to 
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Element Study D Study E New Process 
systems. demonstrate the applicability. 
Experts will use the validation 
tool to evaluate the high-level 
heuristics. 
Severity 
ratings 
None needed 
because no HEs 
were conducted. 
Customised severity ratings 
were introduced for 
assessments because 
Nielsen’s were deemed 
insufficient for the SAD. 
Customised severity ratings that 
assess the degree of usability 
violations with regard to the 
SAD may need to be introduced. 
 
 
 
 
It must be mentioned that the comparison is limited to studies D and E owing to their 
systematic approach, which is aligned with the systematic approach proposed in this research. 
In comparison, the other studies recommended isolated methods for developing heuristics. It 
should be noted that all methods, excluding the factor analysis method, are integrated into the 
new three-phase process that is presented in chapter 4. 
 
Despite their drawbacks, HEs still have inherent value and the need to improve upon these 
remains strong (Law & Hvannberg, 2004). When well planned and with an astute selection of 
evaluators (in terms of numbers and expertise), HEs are appropriate for directing design 
iterations (Cockton & Woolrych, 2002). However, their value should not be underestimated 
as they can identify errors that can be more costly in various contexts (e.g. OHSNs) (Cockton 
& Woolrych, 2002). An added strength of HEs is that they often yield problems that 
designers did not consider. It is also stated that there is still a place for reliable UIMs, based 
on the original rationale for their development, which is to save valuable resources. 
Eliminating risk and saving time and money are the most appealing virtues that they offer. 
Therefore, instead of trying to eradicate the use of UIMs, the focus should rather be on how 
to improve their quality, without increasing costs. They should also have the ability to be 
applied in more contexts and become more practical and effective. 
 
To our knowledge, no heuristics address the usability limitations specific to the security and 
privacy of websites/applications. Therefore, guidelines, principles, policies and standards 
from the security, privacy, usability and USec fields have been considered to develop high-
level heuristics for USec assessment. The outcome is a USec HE designed to identify 
usability problems specific to the security and privacy features of OHSNs. The USec 
heuristics are presented in chapter 4. 
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2.7 SUMMARY  
This chapter discussed the HCI research field and disciplines.  Once HCI had been defined, 
its characteristics were discussed. These included the human, the machine and the use and 
context. Following HCI was a discussion on UCD and the fact that the term HCD is used 
interchangeably with UCD and both focus on development, with the user being at the core of 
design. Consequently, the activities required for HCD were also presented. 
 
Usability is another key discipline in this field. Based on this fact, a discussion on its 
objectives was provided. Additionally, the usability framework, the model of usability and 
the principles and guidelines for usability were presented. A discussion on UX, an equally 
key and relatively new discipline, followed. The UX elements and the UX honeycomb 
provided a thorough overview of the considerations surrounding UX design. Subsequently, 
the UXBasis process model was discussed. This model provides an industry perspective for 
UX design.  
 
The chapter concluded with a discussion on evaluation methods in HCI, which included 
methods conducted with users, experts or both. In terms of the various UIMs mentioned, HE 
was the one of particular interest, and therefore discussed in more detail. With regard to the 
HE UIM, research is currently focused on improving its effectiveness and on the 
development of new and novel heuristic sets for specialised domains. These areas of research 
highlight the need of a process that can be applied to develop new heuristics, which is one of 
the sub-questions that this study will address. In chapter 3 the field of USec is investigated.
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CHAPTER 3: USABLE SECURITY  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on the field of USec. It is concerned with enhancing the usability and 
UX of security and privacy features on websites/applications for the intended users. This is a 
relatively new research field, which requires an understanding of the two fields of 
information security and HCI. It should be noted that this research study is positioned in the 
field of HCI. Consequently, it investigates and considers security and privacy as the external 
field in order to provide the USec HE. 
 
Section 3.2 will introduce the field of information security. Subsequently, privacy is 
discussed in section 3.3. Section 3.4 explains how the field of USec originated and in section 
3.5, the paradox that exists in USec will be discussed. Following this, is a discussion on the 
types of applications that require USec designs. This is presented in section 3.6. Section 3.7 
provides a definition for USec. Existing evaluation tools for USec are mentioned in section 
3.8 and the summary is presented in section 3.9.  
 
3.2 INFORMATION SECURITY 
A secure application is required to conceal information and resources and to ensure that the 
data and resources are trustworthy. It should also reassure users that they are able to utilise 
required information or resources whenever they desire (Rozinov, 2004). Based on this, the 
three core properties that define information security are confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005; NIST Special Publication 800-53, 2009; ISO/IEC 27799, 
2008). An official definition for information security is provided here (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, 
p. 1): 
 
 
 
 
 
It is widely agreed that security remains a problem domain for UI design. The reason for this 
is that security has inherent properties (Whitten & Tygar, 2005). These properties need to be 
considered by developers during design, as they focus on understanding the users and their 
―InfoSec is the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information; 
in addition, other properties, such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation, and 
reliability can also be involved‖. 
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behaviours, with regard to how they perceive and understand security. These properties 
include (Whitten & Tygar, 2005; Straub & Baier, 2004; Herzog & Shahmehri, 2007): 
 Users are not motivated to use security because it is usually a secondary goal. 
Security is rarely a primary task for the user. Consequently, security features are 
executed only when needed. Users do not pay attention to them and are unwilling to 
read manuals relating to their use. 
 Security and privacy policies remain abstract properties that are alien to most users. 
It is difficult to find real-world objects that will accurately and intelligibly 
communicate metaphors for security. This becomes even more difficult in certain 
security applications, such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and cryptography 
 For effective security management, users require good feedback. Security should be 
presented in a faultless manner. Where user intervention is required, the necessary 
feedback needs to be provided in order for the user to make the correct decision. This 
feedback needs to be in the user’s language and be accurate in terms of accomplishing 
the task at hand. Failing to understand security messages and features results in the 
users’ privacy being at risk. 
 Unawareness of a security violation. Immediate consequences for a security violation 
or insecure behaviour are not always apparent. The effects of such consequences may 
be long term, while it can also be difficult to link a causative event. Equally, it is also 
possible that users do not suffer any consequences, despite their insecure behaviours. 
Therefore, users need to be protected from making any dangerous or irreversible 
mistakes from the start. This property emphasises that it is difficult for the user to 
know if the security has been compromised in the case where a mistake or dangerous 
action took place. Users need to understand the importance of security because they 
will remain unaware of a possible violation when the system is left unprotected, even 
for a short time.  
 Guidance for users to ensure that they attend to all aspects of their security. This is 
referred to as the ―weakest link‖ property. Security is regarded as a chain and in this 
chain; it is the weakest link that determines the strength of the whole system. Hence, 
it is important that all users configure the security settings of an application/website 
comprehensively (e.g. passwords). All aspects of security need to be attended to as the 
security of a networked computer is only as strong as its weakened component. If 
users are to make decisions that are security-critical, they need to make the correct 
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decisions from their first attempt. Making the correct decisions and correctly 
configuring the security settings is based on the guidance that is provided to the users 
via the application/website itself. 
 
Users underestimate the importance of keeping their systems at work and at home secure. In 
relation to this, Furnell (2005) points out that a compromise of responsibility exists between 
the developers and users. In certain cases the blame resides with the users because they are 
using the applications in an irresponsible and careless manner. In other cases, the blame 
resides with the developers’ because they have developed technology with poor usability.  
 
Developers need to consider that users often tend to overlook their security obligations 
(Furnell, 2004). Developers have gone through great efforts to design suitable and effective 
security on their software; however, they still depend on the users to use the security features 
to ensure the security of the system (Furnell, 2004). 
 
As identified in the inherent properties of security, users are not motivated or interested in 
educating themselves about the security of a software product. Hence, they will only seek this 
knowledge if a certain situation demands it. Furthermore, they will only take these steps if 
there is no system administrator to solve their security problems (Furnell, Jusoh & Katsabas, 
2006). It is also possible for system administrators to have difficulties with understanding the 
security of a product. If this can happen, it should not be a surprise that the users are 
struggling with the security as well (Furnell, 2004). 
 
A major obstacle that prevents users from understanding security options is the language and 
terminology used to describe them. This is an issue that can be easily overcome with research 
that can assist developers with regard to security language. Additional help functionality 
needs to be implemented, as well as training the users in how to address security-related 
decisions of the product of use (Furnell et al., 2006). 
 
3.3 PRIVACY 
Information security was discussed in the previous section. However, it should be added here 
that another criterion that needs to be considered from the user perspective is privacy. This is 
the area where different parties collide with regard to information rights, as they have 
different preferences regarding the flow of information and how it should be utilised (Brunk, 
2005). Privacy is a difficult term to define because its understanding depends on culture, 
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emotions and technical meanings. One definition is provided by Ackerman and Mainwaring 
(2005, p. 382): 
 
 
 
 
This definition sufficiently describes the types of issues that users will confront during their 
interactions with applications and websites. Accordingly, they must have the ability to control 
what they consider to be personal data within a particular social situation. Based on their 
definition, Ackerman and Mainwaring (2005) identify the following key points about 
privacy: 
 Privacy depends on the information and on the effectiveness of the individuals who 
control its flow. This point supports the fact that privacy has a natural relationship 
with concerns in HCI and information security.   
 Privacy has similar concerns to security. These are mainly to do with risk, perception 
and management. 
 Privacy is about trust, control and power in social situations. This implies ethical, 
political and legal issues. Individual freedom and autonomy are expressed through 
these notions, yet, it is constrained and in certain transactions it can even be a trade-
off. 
Developing privacy features that are usable requires an iterative design process and testing 
with users. Only through successive refinement can the developers meet the users’ 
requirements, capabilities and expectations. Usability methods and considerations that can aid 
this process include the following (Ackerman & Mainwaring, 2005): 
 Privacy is not the users’ primary task even though it is valued by most. According to 
Westin, users’ privacy concern index can be divided into three distinct categories; 
fundamentalist, pragmatic and unconcerned (Kumaraguru & Cranor, 2005). 
Fundamentalists are the most concerned about their privacy, the pragmatic less so, 
while the unconcerned are generally trustful in providing their personal information. 
Based on results from a survey conducted on the American public between 1995 and 
1999, 25% of the respondents were classified as fundamentalists, 55% as pragmatic 
and 20% as unconcerned (Kumaraguru & Cranor, 2005).   
 Designs need to embrace different types of users with different skills. 
―Privacy is the ability of individuals to control the terms under which their personal 
information is acquired and used.‖ 
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 Privacy is critical and, therefore, badly designed features can lead to user rejection 
and increased development costs. 
 Privacy features must respond to the legal and regulatory environment. 
 Privacy is contextual. The use of an application’s privacy features is based on 
specifics, such as who the user is, what is privacy being used for, and where, why and 
when is it being used.  
 
Technology has a strong influence on humans’ attitudes towards privacy. This is as a result of 
the decrease in costs of mass surveillance and data retention technologies. Organisations’ 
desire to collect large amounts of information has increased owing to the affordability. The 
use of online communication and information is now commonplace. Therefore, it is 
imperative that users have the ability to control the dissemination of their personal 
information. One approach is to provide users with technological privacy solutions and tools. 
These allow users to extend their knowledge in the cyber world and become more aware of 
the flow of their personal information in this space (Brunk, 2005).  
 
Privacy frameworks have been proposed with the intention to educate and protect individuals.  
Two examples are the Codes of Fair Information Practice (FIP) and the International 
Security, Trust and Privacy Alliance (ISTPA) Privacy Framework. The Codes of FIP focus 
on privacy and ethical data usage. The ISTPA Privacy Framework attempts to build a global 
alliance for business and technology providers. Its objective is to conduct research and 
evaluate privacy standards, tools and technologies and to derive new standards for 
information handling.  
 
The problem with most privacy frameworks is that their design is not based on a user-centred 
methodology. Brunk (2005) investigated the Codes of FIP, the ISTPA Privacy Framework 
and Schneier’s Security Process Framework in order to develop his own privacy framework; 
the Privacy Space Framework. By making sense of existing privacy solutions, he could then 
develop a more user-centred privacy framework. The Privacy Space Framework attempts to 
classify user experiences as well, in addition to just understanding the features of privacy 
solutions. Table 3.1 displays the categories, along with their descriptions, that have been are 
incorporated into the framework (Brunk, 2005). 
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Table 3.1: Privacy Space Framework (Brunk, 2005) 
Category Description 
Awareness Any type of information that does not require user interaction. These features are 
informative and help users monitor what is happening. They provide the basis for 
all privacy-protective behaviours. 
Prevention These features are used as a precaution, such as digital signatures or encryption or 
secure deletion of electronic documents. However, it is necessary to first have 
awareness in order to inform users about prevention techniques and current 
problems. 
Detection 
 
These features scan for and actively monitor any potential problems. They usually 
run in the background, such as in the form of a virus scanner. Information at this 
stage should provide users with the ability to respond to an identified problem.  
Response This implies taking an action once a problem has been detected, such as blocking 
networking traffic from certain IP addresses. The violation should then stop. 
Recovery Features that help the user return the system to a normal state, such as patching or 
restoring to the last good state or reinstalling corrupt files. Response always 
precedes recovery. 
 
It is useful to consider this framework when attempting to design privacy solutions that users 
can understand. Much can be gained from the structure of its processes, as these can be 
applied in the design of privacy features for applications and websites.  This framework 
provides a model for understanding the way users think about privacy solutions.  
 
3.4 ORIGINS OF USABLE SECURITY FIELD 
The USec field embraces the fact that most applications have security features that end-users 
have to interact with. These interactions include configuring security and making security-
related decisions. However, the manner in which security aspects are presented, in terms of 
design and usability, makes it a complicated process, which users prefer to avoid and in most 
cases even ignore (Furnell et al., 2006).  
 
Reports identify human error as one of the most common causes of security configuration 
errors. The reason for this is primarily due to the non-usable design of the systems (Furnell et 
al., 2006; Whitten & Tygar, 2005). A decade of research in the field of USec illustrates that 
users avoid using complex security mechanisms. Researchers have noted that using security 
systems that lack usability results in users making mistakes that undermine security (Flechais 
& Sasse, 2007). It is evident that there is a problem in the interaction between the human 
element and the technology (design of the interface). This problem relates to the research 
discipline of HCI as much as it does to the discipline of security. In essence, developing 
security that is usable has become a necessity. 
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3.5 THE PARADOX IN USABLE SECURITY  
The need to improve the usability of security features is evident, based on previous reports 
(Furnell et al., 2006; Whitten & Tygar, 2005).  However, a paradox exists between security 
and usability. This paradox has resulted in a debate within the research community about 
whether these two separate fields can be merged. The majority of researchers believe that this 
is possible while others disagree (Flechais et al., 2007). Those who disagree state that a trade-
off exists; that by improving security, usability is degraded and vice versa (Hertzum, Juul, 
Jorgensen & Norgaard, 2004).  
 
Several user studies relating to USec have determined the categorisation of different security 
usability issues. These issues include the following (Muller, 2006):  
 Usability problems that do not jeopardise the security of the system. 
 Usability problems that position the security of the system at risk. This occurs even 
though the users have adequate security competence. 
 Usability problems that arise as a result of the users’ insufficient security knowledge. 
 Security problems that are not caused by any user interaction.  
 
Figure 3.1 portrays the area of overlap between security and usability issues in system design. 
In this figure, one can identify usability issues, security issues and security-critical usability 
issues. The security-critical usability issues are the area where the overlap between usability 
and security issues are propagated and where some researchers support the notion that a 
trade-off exists. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The paradox between usability and security issues (Muller, 2006) 
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Yee (2002, p. 279) is a firm supporter of the idea that usability and security are not at odds 
with each other. He states his position as follows: ―a system that is more secure is more 
controllable, more reliable and hence more usable; a more usable system reduces confusion 
and is thus more likely to be secure‖. In addition, he states that there is a common goal 
between usability and security advocates, as they both want the computer to carry out the 
users tasks correctly (Yee, 2002). 
 
An example illustrating the paradox that exists between security and usability is that of the 
password feature. If the password is based on personal data (e.g. name, date of birth, ID 
number), usability is enhanced because it is easier to remember. However, there is a risk of a 
security breach because the password is also weak. Alternatively, using a strong password 
that combines upper and lower case characters with special characters (e.g. j!8%20C4) 
improves the security. Yet, it is difficult to remember, thus reducing usability. This becomes 
even more evident when the user is subscribed to multiple user accounts with different 
passwords (Hertzum et al., 2004). 
 
It is the users and their passwords that are regarded as the most vulnerable aspect of a secure 
system. It is clear that a paradox exists: the password must be easy for the user to remember 
but difficult for another person to guess. Edwards and Petrie (2005) conducted an interesting 
experiment relating to the memorability and security of passwords. They created five groups 
of password types, which are presented and described in table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Password classes tested (Edwards & Petrie, 2005) 
Group Class Description Examples 
1 Random The eight characters of the password were 
automatically chosen entirely at random. 
ap4AEp£p,  
djs843nd 
toc&201! 
2 Nonsense Letters were randomly chosen – but in alternating 
pairs of vowels and consonants, thereby creating 
non-words that are to some extent pronounceable. 
mejadoro, 
gitekaba, 
bekumufi 
3 Concatenated 
pairs 
This algorithm constructs a password by 
concatenating two four-letter words. 
rungself, fastlace, 
banebong 
4 Free choice The user was allowed to choose any eight-character 
password they wanted. 
 
5 Guided 
choice 
This was done as in (4), except that the user was 
given advice on the choice of a good password. 
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In order to make the measurement of strength fair, all passwords had to be exactly eight 
characters long. The results from this experiment showed that the ―random‖ passwords are 
the most secure but the hardest to remember (only 25% of the participants could remember 
their passwords). The next most secure was the ―guided choice‖ passwords, which had 
relatively high memorability rates (81%). ―Nonsense‖ passwords are quite secure but 
memorability is only at 55%. ―Free choice‖ passwords had high memorability (85%) and 
were the fourth most secure. ―Concatenated pairs‖ passwords had the lowest levels for 
security and were fairly memorable (75%) against the rest of the passwords (Edwards & 
Petrie, 2005). The conclusion was drawn that it is essential for a password to be usable as 
much as it is secure.  
 
Ideally, security tools (e.g. passwords) should be designed with a 100% strength rate in terms 
of security and a 100% strength rate in terms of usability. However, this is very difficult to 
achieve. The important thing is to acknowledge is that both security and usability are equally 
critical in the design and that the paradox between them can be overcome.  
 
3.6 SYSTEMS/APPLICATIONS FOR USABLE SECURITY  
The security tools and features implemented in software are not restricted to the more 
recognised systems, which are security critical (e.g. antivirus, firewall, operating system etc.). 
These are embedded in most end-user applications as well (e.g. MS Word, Firefox, MS 
Outlook etc.) (Furnell, 2005). This emphasises the fact that all users need to be able to 
understand and effectively configure the security features of the applications they use.  
 
Security in end-user applications may not be equally as critical as those of security 
applications. However, they do have a level of importance and by making their security 
features usable, useful practices may be derived. These can then be incorporated into the 
design of security applications as well. It is also worth considering that most end-users have 
some type of security application with which they need to interact in order to protect their 
files and data. 
 
There are a number of potential threats facing end-users today. This alone emphasises the 
importance of the proper use of security in end-user systems and applications. Yet, a great 
deal of work still needs to be done in order to make users embrace a security culture. 
Moreover, the usability of the security tools may be regarded as a significant hurdle in 
achieving this. Therefore, it is critical that these tools are usable if the users are to benefit 
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from them. In most software, the protection needed is available. Nonetheless, issues such as 
locating the security features, and understanding and using them effectively are falling 
considerably short in terms of making these systems usable for the end-user (Furnell, 2005).  
 
The case of security tools being difficult to locate is more prominent in applications where 
security is not the main purpose (e.g. MS Word). Therefore, security will usually not be 
transparent to the user. This can potentially lead to a misconception that security is not 
needed for the specific application (Furnell, 2005). 
 
Users are constantly confronted by security decisions that they need to make when using IT 
systems. This is largely due to the ever-expanding number of probable threats. These security 
decisions are not only restricted to specific security tools (e.g. antivirus, firewalls) but also 
general applications (e.g. MS Word, MS Outlook, and MS Windows). Taking this into 
account and depending on the context of the software, end-users may be required to configure 
security-related settings, respond to security-related events and messages, and specify policy 
and access rights (Furnell, 2007).  
 
Another interesting experiment for USec was conducted on Microsoft’s applications Internet 
Explorer 7 (IE7) and Word 2007 by Furnell (2007).  The applications were evaluated against 
Nielsen’s usability heuristics. The purpose of the experiment was to determine usability 
violations with regard to the security features of both applications. The results are displayed 
in table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: Comparison against Nielsen’s usability heuristics (Furnell, 2007, p. 442) 
 
Nielsen Heuristic IE7 Word 2007 
Visibility of system 
status 
 
Improved attention to the visibility of 
the security status in comparison to 
previous versions (e.g. in custom 
settings; certificate warning bar).                                                  
Good indications if security has been 
set low, but no warning in cases 
where it may be restrictively high. 
 
No status indicators are provided on 
the main interface to remind the user 
of security-related aspects (e.g. 
password protection or Trust Centre 
settings). 
 
Match between 
system and the real 
world 
Technical terms still dominate many 
of the settings and dialogues. 
Potential for users not to understand 
how their actions link to consequent 
security measures (e.g. setting 
passwords and encrypting 
documents). 
User control and Good options for cancelling actions Some actions within the Document 
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Nielsen Heuristic IE7 Word 2007 
freedom within the security settings, and for 
resetting to defaults. 
Inspector cannot be undone. 
Consistency and 
standards 
The features considered in this 
discussion are satisfactory in this 
respect. 
Configuration changes made in the 
Trust Center are not consistent in 
scope. 
There are differences in the password 
settings depending upon the route 
used to access them. 
Error prevention The design of the custom settings 
does not lend itself to prevention of 
errors, as the available options are 
not explained. 
The presentation of the password 
options is potentially ambiguous. 
Users may inadvertently remove 
important content (e.g. headers and 
footers) in response to Document 
Inspector warnings. 
Recognition rather 
than recall 
Lack of context-sensitive help means that users may make uninformed 
decisions. 
Flexibility and 
efficiency of use 
The security related functionality is accessed in the same way, regardless of 
user ability. 
Aesthetic and 
minimalist design 
If anything, some of the interfaces contain insufficient description, which 
(combined with the lack of context-sensitive help) potentially leaves users 
uninformed rather than overloaded with information. 
Help users 
recognise, diagnose 
and recover from 
errors. 
Various warning messages have been 
improved when compared to the 
previous version. Features are 
provided to automatically rectify 
weak security configuration settings. 
The Document Inspector allows users 
to remove elements from their file, 
but does not offer the option to see 
exactly what will be removed. 
Help and 
documentation 
Absence of context-sensitive help for 
custom settings. Lack of description 
for the individual security settings. 
The potential for available help to be 
suppressed by ―high‖ security 
settings. 
Several context-sensitive help 
controls simply link to the top-level 
Help page. Lack of explicit 
information (e.g. the scope of Trust 
Center settings is not explained in 
several cases). 
 
3.7 DEFINING USABLE SECURITY  
The research area of USec is founded on the overlap of two well-established fields in the 
Information Technology (IT) domain. These fields include HCI and InfoSec. The key focus 
from the HCI perspective is to consider usability and UX in the design of security and 
privacy features. Accordingly, the needs of the intended users must be met as this will ensure 
that the interaction experienced is one of a high quality. The key focus from the InfoSec 
perspective is to ensure that the security and privacy features do indeed protect the users’ 
information as expected. Properties that define InfoSec, such as confidentiality, privacy, 
integrity, availability and trust, need to be instilled in the users. Instilling these properties 
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goes beyond the technical capabilities of the product’s security; it is also expressed through 
the design of the security and privacy features that users need to interact with via a UI. 
 
An inspection of the term USec will assist in understanding its definition. The two 
components of this term are ―usable‖ and ―security‖. Therefore, usability is paramount for 
USec, as it is related to the first component of the term, which is to make the design usable. 
This is determined by means of users’ achieving their goals; hence their satisfaction is a 
priority (Rogers et al., 2008). Usability is a discipline that originates from the field of HCI, as 
discussed in chapter 2. Security, which is the second component of the term, is concerned 
with the technological and managerial procedures applied to systems/applications/websites to 
ensure that the properties of information security are managed by the application (Rozinov, 
2004). Information security was discussed in section 3.2. By introducing the two terms, 
usability and security, properties that define USec have been determined. These are based on 
the cumulative knowledge available in this research field. For an application/website to be 
usable from a security and privacy perspective, the following is required of the users who are 
expected to use it (Yee, 2002; Hertzum et al., 2004; Whitten & Tygar, 2005):       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The properties for USec indicate that the application of use must be secure and the intended 
users of it must be able to acknowledge the security and privacy vulnerabilities that exist. 
They can therefore protect themselves by utilising the security and privacy features of the 
application correctly and effectively because these are easy to use, learn, understand and 
apply. 
 
 
 
1. Users must be consistently and reliably made aware of the security-related tasks 
they need to perform. 
2. Users must be able to easily determine how to accomplish the necessary tasks 
successfully. 
3. Users must not be prone to making any dangerous errors. 
4. Users must be comfortable with the user-interface if they are to continue to use it. 
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3.8 EVALUATION TOOLS FOR USABLE SECURITY 
People who are most likely to suffer from ―un-USec‖ are SMEs and domestic users, as they 
do not have the luxury of ICT support, such as network or system administrators. Nor do they 
have a help desk as the larger enterprises and organisations usually do (Furnell, 2005). This 
group of people generally operate without any assistance and are themselves responsible for 
configuring and protecting their information and resources (Furnell et al., 2006). 
 
It has been determined that there is a need to establish new evaluation methods in order to 
develop UI architectures for USec. This is determined on the basis of three human 
characteristics that have been identified among end-users (Muller, 2006). The first 
characteristic is openness: users want to join or leave the systems at their own will. The 
second characteristic is adaption: users have their own special requirements, technologies and 
needs that have to be deployed so that the system continues to evolve. Third is emergence: 
this relates to adaptation, which leads to new behaviours that have not been seen before. This 
is a fundamental part of future usability concepts. 
 
Despite the fact that USec is an area of ample interest in the IT community at present, there 
are limited guidelines, standards or practical solutions that explain how it can be achieved. 
An interesting argument raised is that users are not the only ones that require USec. 
Developers have also been identified as a target group that requires USec education and tools 
(Flechais & Sasse, 2007). Thus, more efforts must be made to ensure that developers are 
provided with the appropriate development methods to deploy USec in their designs.  
 
Table 3.4 presents an overview of research conducted in an attempt to provide guidelines for 
USec. The research outputs shown in the table will be discussed in more detail in the 
subsequent sections. The problematic properties of security were discussed in section 3.2. 
Table 3.4: USec literature 
Authors Research output 
Whitten & Tygar Problematic properties of security 
Yee Ten principles for secure interaction design 
Johnston, Eloff & Labuschagne Six criteria for achieving HCI-S (Human Computer 
Interaction applied in the area of computer Security) 
Katsabas, Furnell & Dowland Ten preliminary guidelines for USec 
W3C Web Security Context: UI Guidelines 
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3.8.1 Usable Security Guidelines 
Various researchers have proposed guidelines for USec. Well-acknowledged and referenced 
guidelines in the literature include those of Yee (2002), Johnston, Eloff and Labuschagne, 
2003 and Katsabas et al. (2005). The works of these researchers provide a foundation on 
which more evaluation methods for USec can be designed. Accordingly, these were 
considered in the development of the USec HE, which is presented in chapter 4. Yee’s (2002) 
ten principles for secure interaction design are displayed in table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Ten principles for secure interaction design (Yee, 2002, p. 280) 
# Principle Description 
1 Path of least resistance The most natural way to accomplish a task should also be the 
most secure one. 
2 Appropriate boundaries The UI should expose, and the system should impose distinctions 
between objects and between actions along boundaries that are 
relevant to the user. 
3 Explicit authorisation The user’s authorities may only be applied to other actors as a 
result of an explicit user action, which is understood to imply 
granting. 
4 Visibility The UI should always permit the user to easily check any active 
actors and authority relationships, which may impact on decisions 
that are security-related. 
5 Revocability The UI should permit the user to easily revoke previously user-
granted authorities, wherever revocation is possible. 
6 Expected ability The UI must never provide the user with the impression that it is 
possible to complete a specific task that cannot actually be 
accomplished. 
7 Trusted path The UI needs to provide a trustworthy communication channel for 
interaction between the user and the entity, which is trusted to 
manipulate authorities on the user’s behalf. 
8 Identifiability The UI must enforce that distinct objects and distinct actions have 
strictly identifiable and evident representations. 
9 Expressiveness The UI must provide adequate expressive power so that it 
describes a security policy without unnecessary difficulty and so 
that users may express security policies in a manner that suits 
their goals. 
10 Clarity The effects and consequences of any security-relevant action must 
be clearly apparent to the user before the actual action is taken. 
 
An underlining objective of USec is to reduce the possibility of a user being the weakest link 
in the system, as discussed in section 3.2. This will largely be achieved by following a UCD 
process when developing the interface, which needs to guide the user appropriately. 
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However, in combination with the interface, policies are also needed. These ensure that users 
are forced to interact with security applications or the security and privacy features of the 
application of use (Johnston et al., 2003).  
 
HCI applied in the area of computer security (HCI-S) is defined as that part of a UI which is 
responsible for establishing the common ground between a user and the security features of a 
system (Johnston et al., 2003). Its purpose is to make the application user-friendly, which will 
in turn improve its integrity. HCI-S is composed of six criteria that have been developed on 
the basis of the usability guidelines from Jakob Nielsen. Johnston et al.’s (2003) six criteria 
for HCI-S are displayed in table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Six criteria for HCI-S (Johnston et al., 2003, p. 678) 
# Criterion Description 
1 Convey features The interface needs to convey the available security features to 
the user. 
2 Visibility of system 
status 
Users must be able to observe the security status of the internal 
operations. 
3 Learnability The interface needs to be non-threatening and easy to learn.  
4 Aesthetic and 
minimalist design 
Only relevant security information should be displayed. 
5 Errors Error messages need to be detailed and to state and, if necessary, 
explain where to obtain help. 
6 Satisfaction The interface must help the user to have a satisfactory experience 
with the system. 
 
The criteria for HCI-S will help build a trust relationship between the user and the interface. 
Trust is regarded as one of the most essential aspects in a security environment. From the 
user perspective, an application will only be used to its full potential if the user can trust it. 
Trust represents the users’ belief or willingness to believe the security of the application 
(Johnston et al., 2003). Users need to trust the system and be assured that security and 
privacy are available when needed and that they have the ability to both use and understand 
them without becoming frustrated. 
 
Research has also identified ten preliminary guidelines, which will ensure that developers 
follow effective and usable presentation methods for security functionality in applications 
(Katsabas et al., 2005). These are general guidelines that provide developers with 
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considerations and directions for the design of security in their applications. Yet, more efforts 
are necessary for USec evaluation methods (Flechais et al., 2007). The guidelines are 
presented in table 3.7 (Katsabas et al., 2005). 
Table 3.7: Ten preliminary guidelines for USec (Katsabas et al., 2005) 
# Guideline 
1 Visible system state and security functions 
2 Security should be easily used 
3 Suitable for advanced as well as first time users 
4 Avoid technical vocabulary or advanced terms 
5 Handle errors appropriately 
6 Allow customisation without risk of being 
trapped 
7 Easy to setup security settings 
8 Suitable security help and documentation 
9 Make the user feel protected 
10 Security should not reduce performance 
 
Katsabas et al.’s (2005) guidelines are closely related to the key points identified by Furnell 
et al. (2006) for the usability of security tools. Furnell (2004) mentions two key requirements 
that need to be considered by the developers. These requirements represent the user as the 
main component around which security should be built. The first requirement is that the 
security options have to make sense and the second is that the systems must provide 
meaningful security-related feedback to the users. Additional key points that extend the two 
requirements are the following (Furnell et al., 2006): 
 Understandable. Options and descriptions should speak the ―human language‖. 
Jargon should be eliminated so that the most novice users are able to use the 
technologies. It is essential that sufficient help and support is always available. 
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 Locatable. Security features should be easy to find. Where this is not the case it is 
most likely that users will give up and remain unprotected. 
 Visible. There should always be indicators (e.g. status indicators, warnings) showing 
whether security is being applied on the system. This will assist users in applying the 
appropriate safeguards that were forgotten. 
 Convenient. The importance of visibility was highlighted; however, it should not be 
so prominent that it starts to become an inconvenience for the user. If this is the case it 
is most likely that the user will disable these features. 
Apart from the guidelines presented, it is suggested that developers consider USec during the 
initial stages of design, as they do for usability and security (Balfanz, Durfee, Smetters & 
Grinter, 2004). This is a major concern because neither security nor usability may be applied 
to the systems once the primary design work is complete (DiGioia & Dourish, 2005). Making 
security transparent to the users, designing security user-interfaces that are easy to use and 
better training for users help promote USec (Brustoloni, 2005; Furnell et al., 2006; 
Brustoloni, 2006). 
 
Enabling default security on applications is a delicate technique. It ensures that users do not 
confront any security issues or decisions because it is hidden from them. At the same time, 
this is not always preferable and is dependent on the specific scenario. Not all default settings 
can be expected to cater for the security needs of all users. In addition, it is good usability 
practice to make security transparent. It is vital that security is seen and used, considering the 
threats available to the user, and it should also be presented in a manner that is intuitive and 
easy for the user to use. Furnell (2005) questions default security as a technique to promote 
USec.  
 
3.8.2 Usable Security Standard 
The lack of guidance for developers has resulted in the first attempts to provide a USec 
standard. The first standards effort in this area is provided by the W3C’s Web Security 
Context Working Group (Roessler & Saldhana, 2009).  The goal of the standard is to make 
security usable and to specify user actions for security. The specification is based on known 
best practices in the area and intends to provide UI guidelines. Most sections assume the 
audience to contain a certain level of understanding of the core PKI, as applied on the Web. 
However, there are also sections that do not require thorough PKI knowledge. 
 
Chapter 3: Usable Security 
 
63 
 
The specification addresses potential trust decisions for online users. It extends on this by 
suggesting ways in which to support them so that users can make safe and informed decisions 
where possible. To achieve this, recommendations are provided for the presentation of 
identity information by user agents (e.g. Identity Signal). Recommendations are also provided 
on how error situations in security protocols can be conveyed. Error-handling 
recommendations will minimise the trust decisions for users and represent best practices in 
inducing users towards safe behaviour in circumstances where these decisions must be made. 
The specification acknowledges the need to communicate context information in a robust 
manner against attacks, in an attempt to complement decision making. Recommendations are 
provided for this type of interaction. 
 
The specification states that it is written in a manner that explains the requirements and 
options for conforming to it as a standard. This structure does not exist for UI guidelines that 
are not intended to be used as a standard. If the specification is intended to be used as the 
latter, it can be used as a way to avoid known mistakes in USec. 
 
3.8.3 Usable Security Practical Solutions 
There have been some practical applications for USec. Even though these are few, they are a 
good example of how to improve the usability of security for the user. Hopefully, more USec 
implementations can follow in the future.  
 
Focus areas for implementing UI design implementations for USec are passwords and logins. 
User passwords are regarded as the most vulnerable aspect of a secure system. It is difficult 
to implement usability in them as they need to be easy for the owner to remember, yet 
difficult for another person to guess. To achieve these conflicting goals new solutions have 
been proposed and implemented. Several practical solutions for passwords and privacy 
include: 
 UsableLogin. Designed by USec Systems and launched in 2009 (http://usable.com/). 
This is a Web service that allows users to use a simple word (codeword) and combine 
it with a personal picture for authentication and it provides the user with the ability to 
log into all websites with one codeword. This codeword will be impossible for anyone 
else to guess but very easy for the user to remember. 
 Usable PKI. Designed by PARC (Palo Alto Research Centre), it makes PKI 
deployment much simpler. It takes the user a total of four easy steps and less than two 
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minutes to add a new device to the secure wireless corporate network. The original 
method of deployment took the user about 140 minutes and a total of 38 steps 
(Balfanz et al., 2004).  
 Click-based graphical passwords. Most of the best practices referring to USec context 
information presume visual display (Zurko & Johar, 2008). Also referred to as visual 
passwords, click-based graphical passwords can be classified into three distinct 
categories; searchmetric, locimetric and drawmetric systems (Renaud & De Angeli, 
2009). Searchmetric systems require users to search a number of images in a 
challenge set and then select the target images via an input technique. Locimetric 
systems require users to identify a series of positions within an image and drawmetric 
systems require users to sketch a drawing (Renaud & De Angeli, 2009). There are a 
number of examples for each of three categories. PassPoints is an example of a 
locimetric system. It consists of an ordered sequence of five click-points on an image. 
In order to login, the user must click within a system-defined region for each click-
point. The image is used as a cue to assist the users in remembering their password 
click-points (Chiasson, Forget, Biddle & Van Oorschot, 2008). 
 Privacy and Identity Management for Europe (PRIME) (Pettersson, Fischer-Hübner, 
Danielsson, Nilsson, Bergmann, Clauss, et al., 2005). This research demonstrates the 
implementation of privacy policies into UI design. The process for the study 
investigates privacy legislation and then works through derived privacy principles, 
examines HCI requirements, and concludes with specific design solutions (Patrick & 
Kenny, 2003). Three alternative UI paradigms for privacy-enhanced identity 
management are compared, as legal privacy issues derived from the EU directive are 
mapped onto suggestions of UI solutions. The solutions themselves are grounded in 
three UI paradigms: a role-centred paradigm, the TownMap-based paradigm and the 
relationship-centred paradigm (Pettersson et al., 2005). Furthermore, the importance 
of retaining an individual’s right to informational self-determination as a critical 
element for democracy and society is also emphasised. Once again, the usefulness of 
their suggested UI solutions depends on the acceptance and application of them by the 
intended end-users. The point of departure for their UI design solutions is privacy. 
This is in contrast to this research, where the point of departure is HCI and, in 
particular, the disciplines of usability and UX. Methods according to which to apply 
and integrate security and privacy are subsequently considered. 
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UI design implementations for USec are still limited. However, the existing solutions do pro-
vide a foundation for implementing new solutions.  Future work in this research could focus 
on developing UI design implementations for the USec heuristics proposed, based on existing 
solutions.  
 
A principle that can be considered when creating UI design implementations for the USec 
checklist items relating to privacy, is the principle of proportionality. This principle 
originated within the legal and data protection communities and acknowledges that threats to 
privacy are time, society and culture dependent. The principle states than an application, 
system, process or tool will need to balance its utility by considering the rights to privacy of 
the individuals involved. This principle therefore establishes a balance between usefulness 
and its effects on privacy (Iachello & Abowd, 2005).   
 
Previous research on designing for privacy includes awareness of video-conferencing 
services, guidelines based on fair information practices (FIPS) to drive privacy-enhanced 
design and design patterns to privacy problems in ubicom. Expanding on this prior research 
by attempting to incorporate the principle of proportionality into a design framework resulted 
in a three-stage method: legitimacy, appropriateness and adequacy, which is displayed in 
figure 3.2.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Proportionality design method at a glance (Iachello & Abowd, 2005, p. 93)  
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The three stages will contribute to achieving the goals of a new application. The legitimacy 
stage is used to establish whether the application will be useful, while the appropriateness 
stage determines the best alternative for building the application from a variety of technology 
solutions and the adequacy stage determines whether the technology is being built properly 
(Iachello & Abowd, 2005).  
 
Another advantage of the proportionality design method is that it adds minimum overheads to 
existing user-centred design process models (Iachello & Abowd, 2005). This alone supports 
its implementation. This design method would be useful when considering the user, context 
and cultural backgrounds of the intended users of an application. This could then help 
determine which privacy heuristics are relevant and how they can be applied in design. 
 
A critical factor contributing to research into the implementation of privacy policies and 
security in UI design is trust. It is essential, if users are to use a system, whether it is e-
commerce or a computer program, that it is used to its full potential. User surveys in Europe 
show that users do not trust network data processing to preserve privacy (Pettersson, & 
Fischer-Hübner, 2004). Instead, Internet users are concerned about divulging personal 
information online and are worried that they are being tracked as they use the Internet. 
Moreover, users are failing to register on www sites because they feel that they cannot trust 
the Internet with personal or financial information (Kobsa, 2002). 
 
Herzog and Shahmehri (2007) have researched the deployment of USec from a different, yet 
equally important, perspective. They acknowledge the need for new guidelines and 
evaluation tools for USec, but nevertheless claim that little has actually been done with 
regard to how applications may help users in security decisions and tasks. For that reason, 
they investigate the various help techniques that will better suit users with their security-
related tasks. These help techniques include online documentation, context-sensitive help, 
wizards, assistants, safe staging, social navigation and built-in hidden security.  
 
Security applications should be provided with a combination of built-in security and user help 
technique(s) (Herzog et al., 2007). In order to determine which help techniques should be 
used for a specific security application, user questions have been identified. Depending on 
whether or not the particular user help technique addresses the questions, a decision may be 
made as to whether it is usable, thereby making it suitable for the users. The question types 
with an example are provided in table 3.8. 
Chapter 3: Usable Security 
 
67 
 
Table 3.8: User questions for determining user help techniques (Herzog et al., 2007) 
Question type Example 
Informational What can I do with this application? 
Descriptive What is this? What does this do? 
Procedural How do I do this? 
Interpretive What is happening now? Why did this happen? What does this mean? 
Navigational Where am I? Where have I come from and gone to? 
Choice What can I do now? 
Guidance What should I do now? 
History What have I done? 
Motivational Why should I use this program? How will it benefit me? 
Investigative What else should I know? Did I miss anything? 
 
As with Furnell (2005), Herzog et al. (2007) question the approach of building in security and 
automating it, as this prevents any user interaction with the security of the system. They also 
stress that user help is just one component of the overall security application. 
 
3.9 SUMMARY  
This chapter discussed USec. It pointed out the need to design applications for security that 
are usable for the respective users. Insight into information security was first provided and 
the inherent properties of security that make it a difficult domain for UI design were 
presented. A discussion on privacy and the frameworks that exist for it then followed. Special 
interest was devoted to the Privacy Space Framework, as it is one of the more user-centred 
frameworks for privacy available. 
 
A brief overview of how the field of USec originated was then given. This emphasised that 
the human being is usually the main cause of security errors and breaches. This supplemented 
the argument that security designs are lacking in terms of usability. Relating to this is the 
paradox in USec, which was subsequently discussed. This paradox debates whether usability 
and security can coexist during design. A definition for USec was then provided on the basis 
of prior research. 
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The focus then fell on the existing evaluation tools for USec. A decade into this field, the 
design and evaluation tools for implementing USec solutions in practice are still limited. 
These are required to assist software developers in their designs. The guidelines that were 
presented for this included the ten principles for secure interaction design, the six criteria for 
HCI-S and the ten preliminary guidelines for USec. The first standard in the field, W3C’s 
Web Security Context: UI Guidelines, was also mentioned. In addition, practical solutions for 
USec were presented, as well as several examples including UsableLogin, Usable PKI, click-
based graphical passwords and PRIME.  
 
The need for USec solutions is emphasised in this chapter. However, to provide such 
solutions it is required that developers are provided with design and evaluation tools for 
USec. This is addressed by one of the sub-questions in this study, with the development of a 
HE for USec. In Chapter 4 the process for developing heuristics for a SAD and the USec HE 
is presented. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE HEURISTIC EVALUATION DESIGN PROCESS 
AND THE USABLE SECURITY HEURISTIC 
EVALUATION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will start by presenting a modified version of the human-centred design (HCD) 
approach. The modified version has a significant contribution to make because it provides a 
blueprint for the new three-phase process. This process can be applied when developing 
heuristics for specific application domains (SADs) and is presented and discussed here in 
detail. Following this, the usable security (USec) heuristic evaluation (HE) will be presented. 
This is the outcome from phase 1 of the process and includes 13 high-level heuristics for 
USec and their checklist items.  
 
Section 4.2 will focus on how the original HCD approach has been considered and 
consequently modified. In section 4.3, the three-phase process to developing heuristics for a 
SAD is discussed. Following this is the USec HE, which is presented in section 4.4. The 
summary is presented in section 4.5 and the structure of the chapter is displayed in table 4.1. 
 
4.2 CONSIDERING THE HUMAN-CENTRED DESIGN APPROACH 
The HCD approach was introduced in chapter 2 and involves four activities, as presented in 
section 2.3.1. The approach itself provided a template for the design of a new process to 
develop heuristics for SADs. The modified HCD approach, which provides the foundation for 
developing the new process, is displayed in figure 4.1. There are four main reasons why the 
new process is based on the HCD approach: 
1. The new process must provide a purely qualitative approach towards heuristic 
development, as this will differentiate it from previous attempts. 
2. Experts from the SAD have a substantial contribution to make in terms of developing 
the respective heuristics in the new process. 
3. Users can contribute to the design of the heuristics by addressing their concerns, 
based on their personal experiences, when interacting in the SAD context. 
4. The approach determines the types of activities that should be included in the new 
process to ensure that it follows a qualitative approach and that the approach itself 
considers the human element (e.g. experts and users) during the development of a new 
heuristic set.  
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Figure 4.1: The modified HCD activities for the new process to develop heuristics for SADs 
It should be noted that activities in the modified HCD approach correspond to those in the 
original HCD approach. Similar to the original approach, activities in the modified approach 
will only initiate once it has been confirmed that there is a need to develop a novel set of 
heuristics for a SAD. This is confirmed when there are no existing heuristic sets for the SAD 
or when the sets that do exist are too general and therefore limited in scope to effectively 
evaluate interfaces in the SAD.  Once initiated, the following activities will need to be 
conducted: 
 Understand and specify the context of use. Context of use encompasses the 
characteristics of the intended users who use the application/website and the type of 
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tasks that participants will need to perform to evaluate the applicability of the new 
heuristic set.  
 Specify the user and application domain requirements. This activity determines and 
specifies the major requirements for the new heuristic set. These requirements are 
dependent on the intended users (includes domain experts), type of 
application/website and requirements representing the SAD. Identifying the 
requirements requires a thorough literature review. 
 Produce high-level heuristics and checklist items. Potential high-level heuristics and 
checklist items for the SAD are produced as part of this activity. The heuristics are 
based on themes that emerge from the requirements, which are determined in the 
previous activity. 
 Evaluate high-level heuristics with users and experts. User-centred evaluation (from a 
user and expert perspective) is essential in determining if the new heuristic set is a 
success. Moreover, new information regarding user requirements may be collected 
and baselines can be established for modifying heuristics and checklist items. This 
can provide feedback, which then can also be used to improve the heuristic set to 
ensure that user and application domain requirements have been fulfilled.  
 
The modified HCD approach concludes when users and experts are satisfied with the new 
heuristic set (―Heuristic set satisfies SAD requirements‖). This includes improving the set 
according to the recommendations and comments that were provided during the evaluations. 
Iterations will be required between activities to ensure that suggested improvements have 
been completed, as displayed in figure 4.1. This completes and confirms the transformation 
from high-level heuristics for the SAD to heuristics for the SAD. 
 
4.3 THE THREE-PHASE PROCESS 
In chapter 2, the methods that have been applied in previous research to develop heuristics for 
a SAD were discussed.  These are summarised in table 4.1. A criticism of those methods 
relates to the validation of the novel heuristics. Additionally, by relying on a single method 
for developing heuristics, important aspects can be overlooked and a bias can result from the 
creator of those heuristics (Sim et al., 2009). Researchers have also stressed the need for a 
tool to create taxonomies of problems within various application contexts. This will result in 
a selection of more effective and context-specific heuristics (Hvannberg et al., 2007; 
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Somervell & McCrickard, 2005). In alignment with these views, this research introduces a 
new three-phase process to create heuristics for a SAD. 
Table 4.1: Methods to develop heuristics for a SAD 
Heuristic 
development  
Authors/researchers Methods 
Study A Paddison and 
Englefield (2004) 
1. Literature review 
2. Prior studies analysis 
Study B Ling and Salvendy 
(2005) 
1. Literature review 
2. Tailored made heuristics 
3. Evaluation results 
Study C Nielsen (1994) 1. Factor analysis 
2. Explanatory coverage process 
Study D Somervell and 
McCrickard (2005) 
1. Identify system class examples 
2. Extract design knowledge 
3. Group and label heuristics 
4. Derive final heuristics 
Study E Sim et al. (2009) 1. Determine effectiveness of Nielsen’s well-known 
heuristic set 
2. Build corpus of usability problems 
3. Corpus synthesis into heuristics 
 
The proposed three-phase process is presented in figure 4.2, which highlights the way 
methods from prior research studies are incorporated into each phase of the new process 
(Yeratziotis, Pottas & van Greunen, 2011a). Each of the studies along with their methods for 
heuristic development is displayed. The studies are represented by capital alphabetical letters 
that match those in table 4.1. The colour of a method corresponds to the colour of the phase 
in which it is incorporated. All the methods are incorporated into the new process except for 
Nielsen’s factor analysis method, as this is a quantitative method (Nielsen, 1994). The 
process envisaged in this research is founded on a qualitative approach for heuristic 
development. In some instances, a method is used in multiple phases of the process. In this 
case, the outline colour of the method corresponds to the colour of the phase in which it is 
incorporated with a lower impact degree. The inline colour of the method corresponds to the 
colour of the phase in which it is incorporated with a higher impact degree. 
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Figure 4.2: The three-phase process to develop heuristics for a SAD (Yeratziotis et al., 2011a). 
The process initiates in phase 1, where the focus is on designing high-level heuristics for the 
SAD. Once this is completed the process continues into phase 2. At this point experts will be 
provided with a validation tool to assess the proposed high-level heuristics. The emphasis 
here is purely on assessing these heuristics. Once this phase is complete the process continues 
to the next phase, phase 3, which focuses on applying the high-level heuristics in context (in 
this research the context is the OHSNs). To achieve this, suitable websites/applications are 
identified and evaluated with the novel high-level heuristics, as developed in phase 1. These 
evaluations are conducted by users.  
 
The analysis of phases 2 and 3 will determine the number of iteration cycles that will need to 
follow and between which phases the iterations need to occur. The iterations are required in 
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order to modify and improve the high-level heuristics according to the experts’ and users’ 
recommendations and observations. The revised high-level heuristics will then be re-
evaluated by the experts in phase 2, where they will use the same validation tool. Cost and 
time will determine whether users are required to re-evaluate as well in phase 3. Their 
recommendations have been provided in the initial evaluation and, at this point, it is the 
experts’ assessments that are more significant, as they have the necessary knowledge and 
experience to determine if the new high-level heuristics meet the requirements of the SAD. 
Once the experts are satisfied with the revised high-level heuristics, the process will conclude 
with a final set of heuristics. This proves acceptance, and the ―transformation‖ of high-level 
heuristics for a SAD to heuristics for a SAD is therefore confirmed. However, if the experts 
are unconvinced, the process will need to iterate back to the relevant phases and the high-
level heuristics need to be revised accordingly. These modifications are now based on the 
experts’ recommendations from their second round of assessments. This iteration process 
continues until the experts are satisfied with the suggested improvements to the high-level 
heuristics. 
 
Figure 4.3 presents a more comprehensive representation of the process. It combines high- 
and low-level detail regarding the process of developing heuristics for SADs. The high-level 
representation is based on figure 4.2 and represents the three phases as circles within a 
funnel. The flow and iteration cycles between the circles has been discussed above in the 
description of the process. The low-level representation decomposes each of the three phases 
and displays the tasks that are involved in each of them. A detailed discussion of each phase 
follows in the subsequent sections. 
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Figure 4.3: High- and low-level detail of the three-phase process to develop heuristics for SADs (Yeratziotis et 
al., 2011a). 
It is important that experts confirm the suitability of the high-level heuristics for the SAD. By 
acknowledging this, they are ensuring that software developers can use the heuristics to 
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develop more usable user interfaces for the SAD. As a result, users of the intended 
website/application will benefit, as the overall usability and user experience is enhanced. 
Simultaneously, developers will also benefit because the probabilities of users accepting their 
designs are equally enhanced. They therefore become the typical users of it and do not 
abandon it. 
 
4.3.1 Phase 1: Design High-level Heuristics 
Phase 1 consist of five tasks, as displayed in figure 4.4.  One will notice that in figure 4.3, 
phase 1 consists of four tasks. This is because tasks 4 and 5 are separated in figure 4.4, 
whereas in figure 4.3 they are combined. Section 4.4 will demonstrate how phase 1 was 
conducted. 
 
Prior research refers to this phase as the meta-analysis approach (Sim et al., 2009). Sources 
that are used for evidence include guidelines, journal papers or grounded theory based on 
primary research. However, the issue of credibility and the validity of the data to ensure 
corpus quality remains a key concern.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: The five tasks for Phase 1 
The five tasks in phase 1 include the following (Yeratziotis et al., 2011a): 
1. Review literature. An extensive review of the literature for the SAD must be 
conducted. For example, in this research study the fields that were investigated 
include usability, security, privacy and USec. The literature is considered and 
analysed to determine the requirements that represent each field and to identify the 
themes that emerge. 
2. Name high-level heuristics according to themes identified. Wording is implemented to 
transform the themes into high-level heuristic names with descriptions. These 
descriptions need to provide a brief understanding of what the themes represent and 
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address. Existing heuristics need to be referenced in order to understand the level of 
generality needed in the wording (Sim et al., 2009). This is achieved by applying the 
tailored made method in the next task. Nevertheless, the new high-level heuristics 
should not copy existing models too closely and should be specific to the SAD. 
3. Tailor existing heuristics to fit the SAD. The tailored made method is applied to create 
checklist items based on the heuristic names. This method is based on modifying 
existing well-known heuristic sets through the specification of relevant checklist items 
to address the SAD requirements (Somervell & McCrickard, 2005). 
4. Group checklist items based on high-level heuristic names. Checklist items that were 
created when applying the tailored made method are grouped under corresponding 
high-level heuristics names. This grouping is based on determining which high-level 
heuristic name better represents the checklist item. 
5. Review grouping of checklist items. This task focuses on the tool (including all high-
level heuristics and checklist items) as a whole, as opposed to task 4, where individual 
high-level heuristics were populated with checklist items. This implies moving 
checklist items under a different heuristic name where necessary. 
 
4.3.2 Phase 2: Validation of High-level Heuristics 
The issue regarding the credibility and validity of the data to ensure corpus quality is now 
addressed in phase 2 of the process. Phase 2 consist of four tasks, as displayed in figure 4.5. 
Section 7.2 will demonstrate how phase 2 is conducted.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: The four tasks for phase 2 
The four tasks in phase 2 include the following (Yeratziotis et al., 2011a):  
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1. Identify and select experts. It is critical that the most suitable experts conduct the 
assessments. They need to have the necessary theoretical knowledge and practical 
experience with regard to the SAD, which ensures that the high-level heuristics 
address the necessary requirements. For example, experts that will be used to assess 
the USec heuristics originate from the fields of Security, Usability and USec. 
2. Apply validation tool to validate high-level heuristics. Experts are provided with a 
validation tool to assess the high-level heuristics. The validation tool will use rating 
scales to measure various characteristics of the new HE. These include importance, 
clarity and completeness of heuristics and checklist items, grouping of checklist 
items, and ease of application and relevance of new severity ratings. In addition, 
relevance and novelty of material that was used to formulate the heuristics is also 
assessed. Other characteristics measured include ease of use, length, effectiveness and 
quality of the overall HE. All these will have an impact on the adoption of the new 
heuristics for the SAD.  
3. Analyse review results. The results from the validations must be analysed. Based on 
the characteristics that were validated in task 2, it is possible to determine the type of 
modifications required in order to improve the high-level heuristics in the next 
iteration cycle. 
4. Iterate and re-design high-level heuristics. The modifications needed based on the 
results from task 3 will also determine where iteration is necessary between the 
phases. For example, if the analysis shows that experts are not satisfied with the 
relevance of the material used to develop the high-level heuristics, the process will 
need to iterate back to phase 1. This essentially shows that the requirements for the 
SAD are not represented within the high-level heuristics. Therefore, all tasks in phase 
1 would need to be repeated. In another example, if the analysis shows that the 
experts are not satisfied with the grouping of the checklist items alone, the process 
will only need to iterate back to tasks 4 and 5 respectively of phase 1. 
 
4.3.3 Phase 3: Application/Usage of High-level Heuristics 
 
In phase 3, the heuristics must be applied in a context setting. Phase 3 consists of six tasks, as 
displayed in figure 4.6. It should be noted that the improvements required from the analysis 
of phase 2 must have been done at this point. Application of the heuristics in context can now 
proceed. Section 6.3 will demonstrate how phase 3 is conducted 
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Figure 4.6: The six tasks for phase 3 
The six tasks in phase 3 include the following (Yeratziotis et al., 2011a): 
1. Identify and select appropriate website/application for evaluation. As with the 
previous phase where appropriate experts needed to be identified, the same applies in 
this task. However, at this point the focus is on identifying appropriate 
websites/applications for the SAD. Accordingly, the new high-level heuristics must be 
applied to the selected websites to determine their applicability. This entails 
determining whether the high-level heuristics serve their intended purpose, which is to 
detect usability violations with regard to the SAD. Identifying websites for the SAD is 
generally straightforward. For example, if heuristics are being developed to assess the 
usability of security and privacy features on banking websites, the context will be e-
banking websites. However, cases do exist where selection is more complicated, as 
was the case for this research study. The high-level heuristics created will evaluate the 
usability of security and privacy features on OHSNs. A plethora of OHSNs exist; 
however, not all provide social network capabilities. Therefore, a selection procedure 
was required to determine the websites that would be used in this research study.  
2. Develop scenarios and tasks for the evaluation. Scenarios and tasks must be identified 
at this point. These will be executed during formative usability evaluation sessions 
and are tasks that typical users will experience during their interaction with the 
website/application. Scenarios will help formulate a mental model for the users during 
the evaluation. The tasks that the users will undertake must demonstrate the 
applicability of the new high-level heuristics. For example, for this research study the 
heuristics developed examine the usability of security and privacy features of OHSNs. 
Therefore, all tasks will relate to the security and privacy of the website. 
3. Identify and select users. Once the scenarios and tasks have been developed for the 
formative usability evaluations, users will need to be selected. There are no criteria 
for selecting the users. Preferably, one would approach potential users of the 
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website/application. For this research study, six postgraduate students from the fields 
of usability and UX, InfoSec and health informatics conducted the user testing. 
4. Apply high-level heuristics to evaluate the website/application. While users are 
progressing through the scenarios and conducting the related tasks they become more 
familiar with their environment and continue to develop their mental model. They 
also start developing experiences during their interactions. This provides them with a 
foundation of knowledge which helps them to better understand the high-level 
heuristics and checklist items (developed in phase 1), which will be applied to 
examine the website/application. For example, in this study users will be conducting 
security and privacy tasks and during the course of this will identify usability issues 
(if they do exist) through their experiences.  By applying the new heuristics and 
checklist items they will determine if their usability concerns have been addressed. 
Once the users have completed the tasks and applied the high-level heuristics to 
evaluate the website, they will complete a user satisfaction questionnaire. The 
questionnaire focuses on their overall experience and recommendations regarding the 
application/usage of the new high-level heuristics and their checklist items. 
5. Analyse user feedback of using heuristics. The results from the evaluations must be 
analysed. Based on the results, it is possible to determine the types of modification 
required in order to improve the high-level heuristics. 
6. Iterate and re-design high-level heuristics. As with this task in phase 2, the 
modifications needed are based on the results, which will also determine where 
iteration is necessary between the phases. 
 
4.3.4 Integrating the Modified HCD Activities into Phases of the Process  
 
The modified HCD activities and the three phases of the new process have been introduced. 
Accordingly, it is required that the modified HCD activities be incorporated into the new 
three-phase process. This ensures that the approach envisaged for heuristic development can 
be achieved based on the reasons mentioned in section 4.2. It should also be noted that there 
are four activities in the modified HCD approach, while there are only three phases in the 
new process.  
 
It is important to state that the purpose of the HCD approach and, consequently, the modified 
HCD approach, is to identify the types of activity that should be incorporated into the new 
process to ensure that it is a human-centred process. Consequently, all modified activities 
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have been considered in the process and are represented as tasks within a phase. Figure 4.7 
displays the phases in which the modified HCD activities are considered. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Occurrence and correspondence of HCD activities in the new process to develop heuristics for SADs 
In figure 4.7 it is noteworthy that an activity from the modified HCD approach can be 
incorporated into multiple phases of the process. In essence, the figure illustrates an 
occurrence of an activity within a specific phase or a correspondence between an activity and 
a phase from the process. Firstly, there is a need to create a novel set of heuristics. Once 
confirmed, based on figure 4.7, the following apply: 
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 Phase 1: Design high-level heuristics – In phase 1 there are occurrences of the 
modified HCD activities ―Specify the user & application domain requirements‖ and 
―Produce high-level heuristics and checklist items‖. 
 Phase 2: Validation of high-level heuristics – In phase 2 there are occurrences of the 
modified HCD activities ―Specify the user & application domain requirements‖ and 
―Evaluate high-level heuristics with users & experts‖. 
 Phase 3: Application of high-level heuristics – In phase 3 there are occurrences of the 
modified HCD activities ―Understand & specify the context of use‖, ―Specify the user 
& application domain requirements‖ and ―Evaluate high-level heuristics with users & 
experts‖. 
 Final heuristics for SAD – Correspondence with modified HCD activity ―Heuristic set 
satisfies application domain requirements‖. 
 
4.4 THE USABLE SECURITY HEURISTIC EVALUATION 
This section discusses the development of the USec high-level heuristics and their checklist 
items. It is based on phase 1, Design high-level heuristics, from the three-phase process to 
develop heuristics for a SAD. The tasks that are conducted in phases 2 and 3 of the process 
will be discussed in more detail in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
4.4.1 Phase 1: Design High-level Heuristics for Usable Security 
 
Phase 1 is based on five tasks, which are presented in figure 4.8. The figure also displays the 
literature that was considered for the development of the high-level heuristics and the themes 
that emerged from it. Figure 4.8 illustrates how the USec and usability guidelines and 
security and privacy standards contributed to the USec high-level heuristic themes using 
colour-coding. 
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Figure 4.8: Phase 1: Design high-level heuristics 
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The five tasks that were followed to design the high-level heuristics for USec include: 
1. Conduct a literature review in the fields of usability, UX, USec, security and privacy 
to identify relevant secondary data sources. In this study, the secondary data focuses 
on four sets of USec guidelines, the Xerox HE checklist and six security and privacy 
guidelines and standards that are subsequently discussed. The USec guidelines 
include the following: 
 Web security context. User Interface Guidelines of the W3C (Roessler & 
Saldhana, 2009) – The purpose of the specification is to define requirements 
and guidelines for Web security context in-formation. Its focus is on the 
communication and presentation of such information to users. 
 Ten principles for secure interaction design (Yee, 2002) – The paper describes 
the use of a model for secure interaction design and suggests ten principles. 
 Six criteria to achieve Human Computer Interaction applied in the area of 
computer Security (HCI-S) (Johnston et al., 2003) – The paper attempts to 
promote and enable security awareness for users that interact with computer 
systems. It uses criteria for successful HCI within a security specific 
environment. 
 Ten preliminary guidelines for USec (Katsabas et al., 2005) – The paper 
describes the use of standard HCI principles to develop ten guidelines that 
support the inclusion of security features within applications.  
 Xerox HE checklist (Pierotti, 1995) – A popular HE that contains sets of 
checklist items for assessing the usability of a system. Moreover, it helps 
achieve usability because it operationalises Nielsen’s widely accepted 
heuristics for usability (Ballard, 2010).   
The following security and privacy standards and guidelines were considered: 
 EU data protection regulations (Centre for Democracy and Technology, 2009) 
- The EU Directive incorporates the seven principles of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which relates to the 
privacy of personal records. It forms legislation for EU countries. 
 Security-inherent properties combined with ISO (International Organization 
for Standardization) 9241 (Ergonomic requirements for office work with 
visual display terminals) (Straub & Baier, 2004) – These properties need to be 
considered by developers during implementation. They focus on 
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understanding users and their behaviour when interacting with security. These 
are considered in combination with selected principles from the ISO 9241 
standard – specifically, Part 10 of the standard; Dialog Principles. 
 Privacy space framework (Brunk, 2005) – This is one of the more user-centred 
frameworks for privacy. In addition to understanding the features of privacy 
solutions, it attempts to classify the users’ experiences. This user-centred 
approach derives from the inclusion of the ―awareness‖ stage into the 
framework. 
 Privacy guidelines of Cranor (Cranor, 2005) – These privacy guidelines 
attempt to assist software developers with their designs. 
 ISO/IEC 27002 (Information technology — Security techniques — Code of 
practice for information security management) (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005) – This 
document contains guidelines for achieving integrity, confidentiality and 
availability. 
 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 
800-53 (Information Security) (NIST Special Publication 800-53, 2009) – The 
document provides recommended security controls for federal information 
systems and organisations. It was valuable in determining confidentiality, 
integrity and availability concerns. 
The literature selected for the review may raise concerns regarding relevance. This 
refers to whether the correct literature was selected and why other literature was 
excluded from the selection. The belief is that the literature selected adequately 
represents the research fields. This is validated in phase 2 of the process to develop 
heuristics for SADs, as shown in figure 4.1.  
1. Using the literature identified in task 1, identify broad themes that are 
representative of usability, security, privacy and USec requirements. For example, 
Yee (2002), Katsabas et al. (2005), and Pierotti (1995) emphasise easy-to-learn 
applications as a requirement for usability. 
2. Implement wording to transform the themes into high-level USec heuristic names 
with descriptions. These descriptions need to provide a brief understanding of 
what the themes represent and address. Figure 4.9 provides an example of a novel 
high-level heuristic from the USec HE. It illustrates the resulting components 
based on completing the tasks described above. The high-level heuristic consists 
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of a representative theme (heuristic name) and opening statement (description), 
followed by several supporting and specifying high-level design issues (checklist 
items). These assist the experts to understand the application of the heuristic in 
context. The wording applied to the checklist items of the USec high-level 
heuristics is based on security, privacy and usability terminologies and 
requirements. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: The components of a USec high-level heuristic 
It should be noted that novel heuristic names and descriptions have been 
formulated from the selected literature, yet are still based on the literature. For 
example, the requirement for ―easy to learn applications‖ is represented in the 
sources as ―Identifiability‖ (Yee, 2002), ―Security should be easily used‖ 
(Katsabas et al., 2005) and ―Match between system and the real world‖ (Pierotti, 
1995). After applying transformative wording, the requirement is represented in 
the USec HE as ―Learnability – The security features must be easy to learn and to 
remember how to use them. This implies ease of use‖. An initial set of sixteen 
high-level heuristics emerged. These are discussed in more detail in the next 
section.   
3. Use the tailored made method (Ling & Salvendy, 2005) to create checklist items 
based on the heuristic names. The tailored made method is based on modifying 
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existing heuristics through the specification of relevant checklist items to address 
the SAD requirements. This is one of the more common methods applied when 
developing heuristics (Ling & Salvendy, 2005). The Xerox HE checklist provides 
a platform for creating the tailored made heuristics through the provision of 
possible checklist items. Centred on the themes of the USec high-level heuristics, 
it is possible to identify checklist items from the Xerox HE list that can be tailored 
to meet the security and privacy requirements identified in task 2. This resulted in 
the formulation of checklist items for the high-level heuristics for USec. These are 
discussed in section 4.4.4. 
4. Review the grouping of checklist items under high-level USec heuristic names. 
The focus in this task is on the USec HE tool as a whole, as opposed to task 4, 
where individual high-level heuristics were populated with checklist items. This 
implies moving checklist items under a different heuristic name where necessary. 
A relevant example is provided in the next section. 
 
4.4.2 The Sixteen High-level Heuristics 
 
The result from following the tasks of phase 1 is 16 high-level heuristics that help examine 
USec on a website. The high-level heuristics are presented in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: The high-level heuristics for USec 
# Heuristic name Heuristic description 
1 Visibility Users should be able to observe the security status of the internal 
operations, so that they always feel a sense of protection. 
2 Revocability Users should be able to revoke actions that they previously 
granted, if they wish to do so. 
3 Clarity The effects and consequences of any security-related actions must 
be clearly apparent to the users before the action is actually taken. 
4 Expressiveness/Convey 
features 
The users should be guided on security matters, yet at the same 
time need to have the freedom to express their security ideas and 
actions. 
5 Learnability The security features must be easy to learn and to remember how 
to use them. This implies ease of use. 
6 Aesthetic and minimalist 
design 
Only the relevant security information should be displayed to the 
users. 
7 Errors The error messages need to be detailed and focused on the exact 
point of error. Information on where to get additional help, if 
needed, should be provided. 
8 Satisfaction Users should have a satisfactory experience when using the 
security tools. Security should not reduce performance or irritate 
users by interfering with their tasks. 
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# Heuristic name Heuristic description 
9 User suitability Users should have the option for an advanced- or novice-level 
security interface. This would entail easy customisation of security 
options and easy setup of security settings. 
10 User language The use of technical and advanced vocabulary should be avoided. 
This applies to the error messages as well. 
11 User assistance Security help and documentation must be available and easy to 
locate, when needed. 
12 Identity signal Information regarding the identity of a Website that users may be 
interacting with should always be provided. 
13 Privacy Users’ rights to privacy must be protected. It is necessary to ensure 
that informational consent practices are followed. 
14 Integrity The system will need to reduce the chance of users making 
mistakes (e.g. limit the areas where they enter data input manually 
into fields). 
15 Availability The system needs to be constantly available. It needs to be capable 
of evaluating whether users have the necessary information to use 
the system optimally. 
16 Confidentiality Users’ personal or private information should be protected. 
 
Although 16 heuristics were initially identified, the final set of heuristics comprises a total of 
13 high-level heuristics, each with its own associated checklist items. The decrease in 
heuristics from 16 to 13 is due to the fact that the Privacy, Availability, Integrity and 
Confidentiality high-level heuristics are integrated into a single high-level heuristic in the 
HE, called Security and Privacy. This is because the natural tendencies of the properties 
overlap and became evident when formulating the checklist items for the heuristics during 
task 5 of phase 1.  For example, to determine whether a checklist item should be grouped 
under the Integrity or Availability high-level heuristic is not always obvious because it is 
possible that it meets both requirements. Additionally, if the high-level heuristics were not 
integrated, they would have been rightly open for criticism. The intention is not to define 
checklist items for security properties but rather to provide a set of high-level USec heuristics 
that will assist software developers to improve their designs for security and privacy by 
considering the users. Therefore, it does not make practical sense to separate these properties 
but rather to combine them under the collective heuristic of Security and Privacy. 
 
4.4.3 The Literature 
 
A critical factor of the HE is that the heuristics meet the criteria of both security and usability 
experts alike. Therefore, each high-level heuristic needs to maintain usability and security 
requirements. It is important to note that each high-level heuristic tests a security/privacy 
element for its usability. The heuristics do not test the security and usability of the elements 
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as separate entities, but rather test both aspects as one unified entity. The literature used as a 
foundation to create the high-level heuristic themes is subsequently discussed with a view to 
showing adequate representation of the usability and USec and security and privacy fields. 
 
Usability and Usable Security 
 
The achievement of usability is essential when developing USec solutions. Hence, the 
literature selected for the USec field attempts to adhere to this from a usability perspective in 
an information security application domain. To reiterate, usability is defined as ―the extent to 
which a system, product or service can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals 
with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use‖ (ISO 9241-210, 
2010).  
 
In this research, usability needs to ensure that users can effectively complete their security 
and privacy tasks in a manner that does not frustrate them but provides them with a feeling of 
satisfaction. Widely accepted criteria within the HCI field have been reflected upon to 
achieve this (Molich & Nielsen, 1990; Nielsen, 1994; Pierotti, 1995). These have 
consequently been acknowledged and typified within the themes for the USec high-level 
heuristics. Accordingly, eight of the 16 USec high-level heuristics from table 4.3 and figure 
4.8 originate from the usability and USec literature. These are learnability, revocability, user 
suitability, user language, errors, clarity, satisfaction, and aesthetic and minimalist design. 
 
Security and Privacy 
 
The idea behind the literature selected for this field is that it should help extract the 
requirements and expectations for the users’ security and privacy concerns. This is difficult 
because most security and privacy standards are focused at the organisational perspective. 
Therefore, they are concerned with applying security and privacy standards within an 
organisational structure. This structure does, however, not exist in OHSNs. Nevertheless, a 
set of well-recognised security and privacy standards were selected. It is not an aim of this 
research to conduct an extensive analysis and comparison of the security and privacy 
standards and it should be noted that all standards tend to focus on the same issues and, 
therefore, information becomes repeatable at some point. Within the selected standards, 
aspects were identified that would contribute to the formulation of the high-level USec 
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heuristics. Accordingly, a range of well-acknowledged security and privacy standards and 
models was identified. These include: 
 Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) (http://www.hitrustalliance.net) 
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (AICPA, 2005) 
 Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPP) (AICPA, 2005) 
 Australia’s Privacy Act (AICPA, 2005) 
 Canada Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 
(AICPA, 2005) 
 EU Directive (AICPA, 2005) 
 OECD guidelines (Centre for Democracy and Technology, 2009) 
 US Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace (FTC) (AICPA, 2005) 
 US Safe Harbor (AICPA, 2005) 
 Privacy Maturity Model (PMM) (IAPP, 2011) 
 US Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) (AICPA, 2005)  
 
Other renowned institutions that publish standards, including security and privacy standards 
are 
 ISO (http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html) 
 NIST (http://www.nist.gov/index.html) 
 
As previously stated, the connection between all these standards is that they focus on the 
business perspective and the organisation (AICPA, 2009). In addition, they all tend to focus 
on similar principles with the main difference pertaining to the level and country of their 
implementation; local, national or international privacy regulations. Another interesting 
aspect is that much of their development is founded on existing standards, which are 
modified to comply with the context and regulations of the country in which the new standard 
is being implemented. If it is unnecessary to develop a new standard, the existing standard is 
implemented. For example, the PMM is based on GAPP and outlines the expectations of each 
level of the 73 criteria in GAPP (IAPP, 2011). HITRUST has established the Common 
Security Framework (CSF). This framework considers the requirements of existing standards 
and regulations, among others, HIPAA, NIST and the Control Objectives for Information and 
related Technology (COBIT) (http://www.hitrustalliance.net/about/). The EU data 
regulations, which are incorporated into the EU Data Protection Directive (known as 
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Directive 95/46 /EC), are based on the seven principles of the OECD relating to the privacy 
of personal records (Centre for Democracy and Technology, 2009).  
 
A comparison conducted on nine of the aforementioned standards shows that most of the 
criteria correspond, while they may have different nomenclature (AICPA, 2005). The fact 
that the standards correspond and that most are developed from existing standards provides 
further evidence that the security and privacy standards and guidelines considered in this 
research adequately represent the field. 
 
The three core properties that define information security are confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005; NIST Special Publication 800-53, 2009; ISO/IEC 27799, 
2008). Additionally, for an application to be regarded as secure it needs to conceal 
information and resources; the data and resources have to be trustworthy; and the users must 
be able to utilise the required information or resource whenever they desire (Rozinov, 2004). 
Another criterion that needs to be considered is privacy. It is essential that the privacy rights 
of patients are strictly adhered to in health SN environments. Privacy is defined ―as the area 
where information rights of different parties collide; it is fundamentally about the flow of 
personal information between parties that have different preferences in the manner in which 
that information should be utilized‖ (Brunk, 2005). This definition sufficiently describes the 
type of activities expected in health SN environments; the sharing of PHI; and the integration 
of services with third-party websites. 
 
From the analysis of the security and privacy literature, it was determined that awareness, 
guidance, trust and feedback are equally important characteristics together with the core 
properties of information security. These have consequently been acknowledged and typified 
within the themes for the USec high-level heuristics. Accordingly, eight of the 16 USec high-
level heuristics from table 4.3 and figure 4.8 originate from the security and privacy 
literature. These are visibility (characterises awareness and feedback), privacy, identity signal 
(characterises trust), availability, confidentiality, user assistance (characterises awareness and 
guidance), integrity and expressiveness/convey features (characterises guidance). 
 
4.4.4 The High-level Heuristics and Checklist Items for Usable Security 
 
As previously stated, the outcome from phase 1 of the process is 13 high-level heuristics for 
USec. Each heuristic has its own set of checklist items that assist experts to apply the 
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heuristic in practice. These heuristics and their associated checklist items, which are the 
outcome of the first iteration, are presented in table 4.3 (Yeratziotis, Pottas & van Greunen, 
2012). 
Table 4.3: The USec HE after first iteration 
1. Visibility – the system should keep users informed about their security status 
1.1 If there are observable delays in the system’s response time to a security-related action, is the user 
kept informed of the system’s progress? 
1.2 If pop-up windows are used to display security-related error messages, do they allow the user to see 
the field in error?  
1.3 After the user completes a security action, does the feedback indicate that the next group of actions 
may be started? 
1.4 Is there some form of feedback for every security-related action? 
2. Revocability – the system should allow users to revoke any of their security actions 
2.1 Do security options in menus make obvious whether de-selection is possible? 
2.2 Can users easily reverse their security actions? 
2.3 When prompts imply a necessary security action, are the words in the message consistent with that 
action? 
2.4 Has the system been designed so that keys with similar names do not perform opposite (and 
potentially dangerous) security actions? 
2.5 Can users cancel out of security operations in progress? 
2.6 Is there an ―undo‖ function at the level of a single security action or for a complete group of 
security actions? 
3. Clarity – the system should inform users in advance about the consequences of any 
security actions 
3.1 Are users prompt in confirming security actions that have drastic, destructive consequences? 
3.2 Are the function keys that can cause the most serious consequences in hard-to-reach positions? 
3.3 Does the system warn users if they are about to make a potentially serious security error? 
3.4 Does the system prevent users from making security errors whenever possible? 
4. Convey Features/Expressiveness – the system should guide users on security in a manner 
that still gives them freedom of expression 
4.1 Are users’ initiators of security actions rather than respondents? 
4.2 Does the system correctly anticipate and prompt for the users’ probable next security-related 
activity? 
4.3 By looking, can the user tell the security state of the system, and the alternatives for security-related 
actions, if needed? 
4.4 Is there a clear understanding of the system’s security capabilities? 
5. Learnability – the system should ensure that security actions are easy to learn and 
remember 
5.1 Have security items been grouped into logical zones, and have headings been used to distinguish 
between the zones? 
5.2 Does the system provide mapping: that is, are the relationships between security controls and 
security actions apparent to the user? 
5.3 Are security operations easy to learn and use? 
5.4 Are there security selection defaults?  
5.5 Do GUI menus make obvious which security items are selected?  
5.6 Does the system protect users from making severe errors? 
5.7 Is security-related information presented in a standardised manner? 
6. Aesthetics and Minimalist Design – the system should offer users relevant information 
relating to their security actions 
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6.1 Is only the security information essential to decision making displayed on the screen? 
6.2 Are all security icons in a set visually and conceptually distinct? 
6.3 Are security labels brief, familiar and descriptive? 
6.4 Are security prompts expressed in the affirmative? 
7. Errors – the system should provide users with detailed security error messages that they 
can understand and act upon 
7.1 Are security-related prompts stated constructively, without overt criticism of the user? 
7.2 Do security-related error messages inform the user of the error’s severity? 
7.3 Do security-related error messages suggest the cause of the problem? 
7.4 Do security-related error messages indicate what action the user needs to take to correct the error? 
7.5 Are the security-related error messages accurate in their descriptions? 
8. Satisfaction – the system should ensure that users have a good experience when using 
security and that they are in control 
8.1 Is each individual security setting a member of a family of security options? 
8.2 Has colour been used specifically to draw attention and indicate status changes for security-related 
actions and information? 
8.3 Do security-related prompts imply that the user is in control? 
9. User Suitability – the system should provide options for users with diverse levels of skill 
and experience in security 
9.1. If the system supports both novice and expert users, are multiple levels of security error message 
detail available? 
9.2 Can users choose between iconic and text display of security information, where appropriate? 
9.3 If the system supports both novice and expert users, are multiple levels of security detail available? 
9.4 Can users easily change the level of security detail? 
9.5 Can users easily change between novice and expert levels? 
9.6 Can users customise security to meet their individual preferences? 
10. User Language – the system should use plain language that users can understand with regard 
to security 
10.1 Are security actions named consistently across all prompts in the design? 
10.2 Are security objects named consistently across all prompts in the design? 
10.3 Is security information accurate, complete and understandable? 
10.4 Are security questions stated in clear and simple language, where used? 
10.5 Is privacy jargon avoided? 
10.6 Is security jargon avoided? 
11. User Assistance – the system should make security help apparent for users 
11.1 Is there a security help function visible (e.g. a key labelled ―Security Help‖)? 
11.2 Is the security information provided relevant? 
11.3 Can users easily switch between security help and their work? 
11.4 Do instructions follow the sequence of user security actions? 
11.5 Does the system provide users with updated security educational opportunities, if they desire it? 
12. Identity Signal – the system should have valid certificates and the information should be 
available on the browser of use 
12.1 Does the system notify the users when they are interacting with non-trustworthy sources (non-
trustworthy is a source that has no information about its identity)? 
12.2 Is the information displayed in the identity signal derived from validated certificates? 
12.3 Does the identity signal include human-readable information about the certificate subject? 
12.4 Does the identity signal include the Issuer fields’ organisation attribute to inform the user about 
the party responsible for that information? 
12.5 Are there privacy indicators informing users about the privacy practices of the system? 
13. Security and Privacy – the system needs to consider integrity, availability, confidentiality and 
privacy 
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13.1 Are protected areas completely inaccessible? 
13.2 Can protected or confidential areas be accessed with certain passwords? 
13.3 Is it clear that the users give consent regarding the use of their personal information? 
13.4 Is it clearly stated for what purposes users’ personal information is used? 
13.5 Does the system grant access to a user based on valid authorisation? 
13.6 Can the user update or delete inaccurate personal information? 
13.7 In the case where the user must provide sensitive personal information, does the system state what 
measures are used to protect this data? 
13.8 Does the system notify users on their access privileges? 
13.9 Does the system initiate a session lock after a period of inactivity or upon user request? 
13.10 Does the system enforce a limit of consecutive invalid access attempts by a user during a period 
of time? 
13.11 Are notification messages relating to security and privacy displayed to the user before access to 
the system is granted? 
13.12 Are there controls in place that will assist the user in making sharing/collaboration decisions? 
13.13 Does the system ensure that publically accessible information does not contain non-public 
information? 
13.14 Does the system install required software updates automatically and notify the user about this 
action? 
13.15 Does the system employ automated tools that provide notification to the user upon discovering 
discrepancies during integrity verification? 
13.16 Does the system notify the user about the procedure to be followed in the case of duplication or 
loss of personal information? 
13.17 Does the system employ automated mechanisms to assist in the reporting of security incidents? 
13.18 Does the system notify the user of any information system weaknesses or vulnerabilities 
associated with reported security incidents? 
13.19 Does the system notify the user about the conduct of backups relating to their personal 
information? 
13.20 Is there a backup policy that regulates how copies of information should be taken and tested 
regularly? 
13.21 Does the system provide awareness and educate the user on how to complete tasks? 
13.22 Does the system enforce minimum password complexity of defined requirements? 
13.23 Does the system encrypt passwords in storage and in transmission? 
13.24 Does the system enforce password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions? 
13.25 Does the system prohibit password reuse for a defined number of generations? 
13.26 Does the system employ cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorised disclosure of 
information during transmission? 
13.27 Does the system require users to confirm statements indicating that they understand the 
conditions of access? 
 
4.5 SUMMARY  
This chapter had two main intentions: firstly, to present the new process to develop heuristics 
for a SAD, and secondly, to present the USec heuristics and their checklist items. These were 
developed by following the proposed process. It should be noted that the heuristics presented 
in this chapter are the outcome of phase 1. The application and validation of the USec 
heuristics will be presented in chapters 6 and 7.  
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The chapter started with a discussion on a modified version of the HCD approach. In essence, 
the HCD activities were modified for the purpose of the new three-phase process. Yet, they 
still remained true to a human-centred approach to development. The modified activities are 
to understand and specify the context of use, specify the user and application domain 
requirements, produce high-level heuristics and checklist items and evaluate high-level 
heuristics with users and experts. The goal for this approach is to ensure that the heuristic set 
satisfies SAD requirements. A discussion on the three-phase process followed, with each 
phase and its associated tasks being introduced. The purpose of phase 1 is to design high-
level heuristics and the required tasks for this phase include reviewing literature, naming 
high-level heuristics according to themes identified, tailoring existing heuristics to fit the 
SAD, grouping checklist items based on high-level heuristic names and reviewing the 
grouping of checklist items. The purpose of phase 2 is to validate the high-level heuristics 
that were developed in phase 1. The required tasks for this phase include identifying and 
selecting experts, applying the validation tool to validate the high-level heuristics, analysing 
review results and iterating and re-designing the high-level heuristics. The purpose of phase 3 
is to apply the high-level heuristics in context. The required tasks for this phase include 
identifying and selecting appropriate applications/websites for the evaluation, developing 
scenarios and tasks for the evaluation, identifying and selecting users, applying high-level 
heuristics to evaluate the application/website, analysing user feedback of using the heuristics 
and iterating and re-designing the high-level heuristics. Once the three-phase process had 
been discussed, the 13 high-level heuristics for USec were presented. Each high-level 
heuristic consists of several checklist items. The high-level heuristics include Visibility, 
Revocability, Clarity, Expressiveness/Convey features, Learnability, Aesthetic and 
minimalist design, Errors, Satisfaction, User suitability, User language, User assistance, 
Identity signal and Security and privacy.  
 
Based on the discussion in chapter 4, two sub-questions have been addressed. Firstly, a UIM 
has been adapted for USec in the form of a USec HE. Secondly, an approach that can be 
followed to create the USec HE has been developed in the form of a three-phase process to 
develop heuristics for SADs. The validity and applicability of both the method and the 
approach is tested in chapters 6 and 7, while the framework to evaluate USec is constituted in 
chapter 8. In chapter 5, the research design and methodology that were applied in this 
research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the theoretical investigation and chapter 4 presented the new 
process and the USec heuristics and checklist items. The purpose of chapter 5 is to discuss 
the research design and methodology that will be applied in this study. This discussion is 
aligned to the research questions proposed in chapter 1. The way in which these are addressed 
will be elaborated on in this chapter. The chapter initially discusses theory regarding various 
research methodologies (sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). Following the theoretical investigation is 
a discussion on the research design and methodology that have been applied to this study 
(sections 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7).  
 
Section 5.2 will focus on the various research paradigms in HCI research and section 5.3 
introduces a research model. In section 5.4 frameworks will be discussed, while the research 
model in section 5.3 is then adapted for this research and is discussed in detail in section 5.5. 
This section emphasises how the model is applied in the context of this study. Following this, 
section 5.6 contains a detailed discussion on the data triangulation process. An overview of 
the research design, based on the previously discussed sections, is presented in section 5.7. 
Ethical considerations are mentioned in section 5.8 and the summary is presented in section 
5.9. The summary also includes a diagram (figure 5.16) illustrating the research 
methodological process, which clarifies the flow of the research design and methodology for 
this study. 
 
5.2 HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION RESEARCH 
Research in the field of HCI is the focus of this section. This discussion extends to the types 
of paradigm in terms of which the research can be undertaken. 
 
5.2.1 Research Paradigms 
HCI is described as a multidisciplinary science and field (Carroll, 2003; De Villiers, 2005). It 
is defined as the following (Hewett et al., 1996, p. 5): 
 
 
 
 
 
―HCI is the discipline concerned with the design, evaluation and implementation of 
interactive computing systems for human use and with the study of major phenomena 
surrounding them.‖  
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In order to conduct research within the HCI field, one will first need to consider the paradigm 
in which the research process will be undertaken. Established and non-established paradigms 
will be introduced and briefly discussed in the subsequent sections. Established paradigms 
refer to those which have been commonly used in HCI research to date. Non-established are 
those that have been recently introduced in order to improve HCI research, although they lack 
the recognition of the established ones. The established paradigms applied, which cater for 
the multidisciplinary nature of HCI research include, 
 traditional science 
 design science  
 engineering.  
As mentioned previously, new paradigms are constantly being introduced for research in the 
HCI field. They attempt to accommodate the weaknesses that are inherent in the established 
paradigms. Nonetheless, it must be noted that they should not be regarded as replacements or 
disproval of the established paradigms. Instead, they are alternative ways in which to observe 
and think about, and consequently, conduct HCI research (Harrison, Tatar & Sengers, 2007). 
In fact, this is the purpose of all paradigms in any research area. Recently introduced or non-
established paradigms for HCI research include 
 phenomenological matrix  
 experience-centred design.  
The research paradigm that was chosen for this study is mentioned in section 5.5.2. 
 
5.2.1.1 Traditional Science 
When applying the paradigm of traditional science, the focus is on producing engineering-
style theories and tools for designers (Newell & Card, 1986; Van Greunen, 2009). The 
resulting HCI knowledge will need to be expressed in engineering-style models of the user. 
Hence, empirical methods and quantitative data collection methods are used. Criticisms of 
these methods are their cost and lengthy time durations (Clark & Sasse, 1997; Van Greunen, 
2009). The practice of design in the traditional science paradigm is based on scientific inquiry 
(Zimmerman, Forlizzi & Evenson, 2007). 
 
5.2.1.2 Design Science 
Zimmerman et al. (2007) refer to design science as design research. The impetus of this 
paradigm is to generate theories that address design challenges. This is accomplished by 
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examining design in order to improve processes and by analysing design artefacts.  A critical 
consideration for this paradigm is the relevance of the new knowledge to be generated. 
Theories are developed by exploring the interactions between humans and machines and by 
employing qualitative data collection methods. The fact that system design must consider 
issues beyond usability results in ideas that are less robust than those derived from more 
formal experimental paradigms (Clark & Sasse, 1997; Van Greunen, 2009).  
 
5.2.1.3 Engineering 
For an engineering paradigm, the foundation of research is built upon the accretion of 
knowledge and the formulation of engineering principles. Accordingly, user interface design 
and evaluations are conducted in accordance with research results. A blend of data collection 
methods, including quantitative and qualitative ones, is employed. Thus, the shortcomings of 
the traditional science and design science paradigms are compensated for. The main 
drawback of this paradigm is that the newly developed engineering principles are based on a 
notion that requires consent within the discipline. However, this consensus does not exist at 
present (Clark & Sasse, 1997). 
 
Design as engineering is a substitute name for the paradigm. In this case, design is 
manipulated by means of a three-phase process. It begins with a problem statement or 
requirements. Then an abstract specification of the solution will pursue. Ultimately, an 
implemented solution results via a sequence of predefined steps. This paradigm ensures that 
the accumulated knowledge is independent of individual designers and that the research 
process may be replicated (Wright, Blythe & McCarthy, 2006). 
 
5.2.1.4 Phenomenological Matrix 
The focus of the phenomenological matrix rests solely on embodied interaction, even though 
it is also considered in other paradigms as well. When investigating human factors, issues 
such as readable font sizes or the fit of a mouse in the human hand are of interest, while 
cognitive-based work in HCI will examine physical constraints and improve interface design 
by measuring actions (e.g. the times to complete a task on the user interface). Embodiment in 
this paradigm is observed from a different perspective and is based on the phenomenological 
stance. Humans are considered embodied actors, and the manner in which they understand 
the world, themselves and interactions, is highly dependent on their location in the physical 
and social world. By focusing primarily on embodied interaction, what is fundamental to 
interaction substantially changes (Harrison et al., 2007). 
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Meaning and its creation, a key point in research, is derived on the fly via collaboration, by 
people in a particular context and situation. As a result, the interaction itself becomes a vital 
component in meaning construction. Owing to the paradigm’s reliance on phenomenology, it 
is referred to as the phenomenological matrix. However, the name of the paradigm has caused 
distress in the research community. For this reason, the authors themselves have invited 
alternative names to be proposed by the research community, which they will subsequently 
consider (Harrison et al., 2007). 
 
5.2.1.5 Experience-Centred Design 
The key motivation for HCI research is the experience of the users. This has been repeatedly 
emphasised over the past few years and has raised considerable questions, the most 
prominent being: What is user experience and how should it be designed for? In order to 
answer this type of questions it is necessary to explore interdisciplinary literature. 
Furthermore, experience and technology should be placed at the heart of theory and design 
practice (Wright et al., 2006). Wright et al. (2006) characterise the paradigm in terms of three 
themes: 
1. Experience must be considered as a holistic approach in which intellectual, sensual 
and emotional stands are equal partners in experience. 
2. Oneself forms the centre of experience and promotes constant engagement and sense 
making. This results in a history of meanings and anticipated futures, which will assist 
in completing the experience using acts of sense making. 
3. A relational approach based on the assembly of several centres of value, including 
self, object and setting, and multiple perspectives. This assembly permits an action, 
utterance or thing to be designed and produced. However, finalising it is not probable, 
since the experience of it is always concluded in dialogue with those other centres of 
value. 
Design as radically interdisciplinary dialogue is the concept supporting the paradigm. The 
point being that HCI has developed vastly, and usability alone cannot solve challenges 
effectively on its own. Radical interdisciplinary research is necessary so that the arts and 
sciences can be merged. This is essential and will lead to solutions of ―wicked problems‖. 
Wright et al. (2006) define wicked problems as those that are ill-formulated, potentially 
unbounded, open to alternative formulations with no obvious means of choice or stopping 
rule and are particular to a situation, setting or context. An example of a wicked problem is 
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designing for experience. To summarise, HCI can be better understood by integrating 
radically interdisciplinary research and practice. 
 
5.3 RESEARCH MODEL 
The theory supporting the research paradigm is better understood by examining a research 
model, referred to as the research onion (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007). This provides a 
suitable foundation for understanding the research process and may be customised 
accordingly to be applied in any research domain.  
 
The model is comprised of six levels. The research process begins at the exterior of the onion 
ring. As it moves through the various levels, the interior core of the ring will be reached. This 
is the area where the data will be collected. The levels, stated from the exterior of the ring and 
moving towards the interior core of it include research philosophy, research approach, 
research strategy, choices, time horizons, and techniques and procedures. All levels will need 
to be considered, as they will direct the research process. The six levels and their related 
options are displayed in figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The research onion model (Saunders et al., 2007) 
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5.3.1 Research Philosophy 
In figure 5.1, the research philosophy is represented in the first layer of the model, starting 
from the exterior of the ring. The research philosophy essentially describes the development 
of knowledge, as well as the nature of it (Saunders et al., 2007). In basic terms, it focuses on 
the path that one follows in an attempt to solve a specific problem. It contains important 
assumptions on how the researcher views the world. Therefore, the researcher takes a stance, 
which will direct the research strategies and methods to be employed. 
 
Selecting a philosophy is influenced by the practical considerations of the research, as well as 
the researcher’s view on the development of new knowledge and the process that it should 
follow. Hence, a researcher who is concerned with facts would use a different philosophy to 
one who is concerned with attitudes or feelings of people in a particular context and it is 
likely that their research strategies and methods would also differ. There are numerous 
philosophies that can be applied. Some are displayed in the research philosophies layer of the 
research onion in figure 5.1.  
 
Two extreme philosophies will be examined in terms of this research: positivism and 
interpretivism. It is important to understand that one research philosophy is not superior to 
another. Rather, one should consider philosophies as better in doing different things. 
Deciding on which philosophy to deploy depends on the research questions and how they can 
be answered effectively. Although the onion portrays research as fitting into one of the 
philosophies, this is not always the case (Saunders et al., 2007). Instead, a mixture of 
philosophies is also commonly used. The research philosophy that was chosen for this study 
is mentioned in section 5.5.3. 
 
5.3.1.1 Positivism 
A positivist philosophy is aligned to the physical and natural sciences. Hence, it considers 
knowledge from a purely objective standpoint (Olivier, 2009). According to this philosophy, 
the researcher is independent and does not influence or get influenced by the research subject. 
In following positivist principles in the collection of credible data it is necessary to observe 
phenomena. The researcher will then need to use a research strategy to extract this data. Such 
a strategy is commonly based on analysing existing theory in order to develop hypotheses. 
Consequently, the hypotheses will be tested for their validity in an attempt to develop new 
theory (Saunders et al., 2007).  
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Complete independence from the research subject is also questioned, as it is regarded as near 
impossible task for researchers to be absolutely liberated from endorsing their own values 
within the research process. Positivism emphasises quantitative data collection methods that 
include statistical analysis. However, it is possible to adopt a positivist philosophy and 
combine qualitative data collection methods as well (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
5.3.1.2 Interpretivism 
Unlike a positivist philosophy, where research needs to be objective, researchers may be 
required to take a more subjective approach. A philosophy that adheres to this is that of 
interpretivism, which states that it is necessary for the researcher to comprehend differences 
between humans in their roles as social actors. This is not just based on understanding objects 
(e.g. computer), but rather on how humans would interrelate with such an object.  
 
Interpretivism originates from two scholarly traditions, phenomenology and symbolic 
interactionism. Phenomenology focuses on understanding how humans make sense of the 
world around them, while in symbolic interactionism the researcher has to interpret the 
actions of the subjects, as they interact with each other and other objects. This will guide the 
researcher to adjust personal meanings and actions (Babbie, 2005). To successfully employ 
an intepretivist philosophy, it is critical that the researcher adopt a considerate attitude during 
the entire process. The challenge is to enter the world of the subjects and understand their 
perspectives in terms of actions and meanings (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
5.3.2 Research Approach 
In figure 5.1, the research approach is represented in the second layer of the model, starting 
from the exterior of the ring. The research onion provides two alternatives with regard to the 
research approach – inductive and deductive reasoning. The research approach to be selected 
depends on how theory is used in the study. It also addresses important aspects relating to the 
design of the research project. In essence, in deductive reasoning, theory and hypotheses are 
developed. Subsequently, research strategies will be selected to test the hypotheses. In 
contrast, in inductive reasoning, data are collected and theory is developed based on the 
analysis of the data (Saunders et al., 2007). More details on the two approaches are discussed 
in the following sections. 
 
Figure 5.2 compares the logic and the steps that are followed in the two approaches. Of 
significance is the theoretical component. Understanding how this is applied within each 
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approach will assist in determining which approach to apply. The main difference is that in 
deductive reasoning one will confirm theory, while in inductive reasoning one will develop 
theory from observation. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Logic supporting the two research approaches (Trochim & Donelly, 2006) 
The fact that there are clear distinctions between the characteristics of each approach can be 
misleading. Thus, it is possible to combine the approaches within the same research. In point 
of fact, it is considered advantageous to do so. The research approach that was chosen for this 
study is mentioned in section 5.5.4. 
 
5.3.2.1 Deductive Reasoning 
Deductive reasoning relates more to the scientific approach. Theory will be subjected to 
rigorous testing, in an attempt to explain or confirm it. This is characterised by the following: 
explaining a relationship between variables, identifying a form of relationship between the 
variables, and testing hypotheses to confirm if the relationship assumption is correct. 
Quantitative data are used to test the hypotheses. 
 
Also referred to as the ―top-down‖ approach, this approach begins with a specific theory 
about a topic of interest. Once this theory has been investigated, it will be narrowed down to 
particular testable hypotheses. As a result, further observations are determined. These 
observations will then be employed to address the hypotheses (research questions or goals) 
for confirmation of the original theories (Saunders et al., 2000). The deduceive reasoning 
process is displayed in figure 5.2. 
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5.3.2.2 Inductive Reasoning 
Inductive reasoning is in contrast to deductive reasoning and follows a "bottom-up" 
approach. The process begins with specifics and proceeds towards generalisations (Merriam, 
2001). The researcher begins with specific observations and measures from which patterns 
and regularities are detected, which help formulate tentative hypotheses in the form of 
research questions or goals. These are explored in depth in order to develop some general 
conclusions or theories (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
In the inductive approach, theory follows the data. However, the opposite happens in the 
deductive approach. Representative of the inductive approach is research that considers 
context. Thus, the particular context in which an event occurs is of foremost importance 
(Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
Table 5.1 summarises deductive and inductive reasoning and focuses on the major 
differences between the two approaches, in terms of what they tend to emphasise during the 
research process. 
Table 5.1: Differences between the deductive and inductive approaches (Saunders et al., 2007) 
 
Deductive emphasises Induction emphasises 
Scientific principles Gaining an understanding of the meanings 
humans attach to events 
Moving from theory to data  
The need to explain causal relationships between 
variables 
A close understanding of the research context 
The collection of quantitative data The collection of qualitative data 
The application of controls to ensure validity of 
data 
 
The operationalisation of concepts to ensure 
clarity of definition 
 
A highly structured approach A more flexible structure to permit changes of 
research emphasis as the research progresses 
Researcher independence of what is being 
researched 
A realisation that the researcher is part of the 
research process 
The necessity to select samples of sufficient size 
in order to generalise conclusions 
Less concern with the need to generalise 
 
 
5.3.3 Research Strategy 
In figure 5.1, the research strategy is represented in the third layer of the model, starting from 
the exterior of the ring. There is a wealth of research strategies to select from and such 
strategies can be employed for exploratory, descriptive and explanatory research. Although 
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some of them belong to a deductive approach and others to an inductive one, as previously 
mentioned, it is misleading to allocate strategies to a single approach. In addition, there is no 
strategy that is superior to another. The best strategy to use is the one that will enable the 
researcher to answer the research questions addressed, as well as assist in achieving the 
research objectives. Hence, the factors that will influence the selection of the 
strategy/strategies include research questions, research objectives, existing literature, 
available time, and the researcher’s philosophical beliefs (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
A common way in which research strategies are categorised is as quantitative or qualitative 
research methods. The purpose of the quantitative methods is to measure (quantify) the 
relationship between two or more things and then attempt to present this in a statistical or 
numerical format. On the other hand, with qualitative data the intention is to identify the 
quality of the relationship that exists between two or more things. This relates directly to the 
researcher’s intentions to make sense of the interpretations, as well as to assign meaning to 
the way people do and understand things (Myers, 1997). Many researchers share the view 
that quantitative and qualitative methods should be used together in order to complement one 
another, rather than to rival each other (Trauth & Jessup, 2000). Qualitative and quantitative 
research methods are displayed in figure 5.3, which situates them on a positivism vs. 
interpretivism philosophy continuum. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Research strategies that are representative of the positivist and interpretivist philosophies (De 
Villiers, 2005, p. 112) 
In this section, four research strategies will be discussed in more detail. These are case study, 
ethnography, survey, and action research. The reason why these are further elaborated on is 
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because they are all suitable candidates, in terms of a research strategy, for addressing the 
primary and sub research questions, which were set out in chapter 1. In fact, more than one 
strategy can be combined. Nonetheless, other prominent strategies, which are used as part of 
positivist and interpretivist philosophies, are also defined in table 5.2. Furthermore, these 
strategies are classified as quantitative or qualitative realisations in the table. In some cases, 
the strategy may be applied in both realisations, as is displayed in figure 5.3. The research 
strategy that was chosen for this study is mentioned in section 5.5.5. 
Table 5.2: Qualitative and quantitative research methods (Saunders et al., 2007; Olivier, 2009) 
 
Method Description Realisation 
Experiment Used to test or prove a theory. Quantitative 
Focus group Similar to a brainstorming session, where a small group of people 
interact in order to stimulate thinking and creativity. 
Qualitative 
Archival 
research 
Uses administrative records and documents as the main source of 
data.  
Qualitative 
Action 
research 
Iterative process to determine the current situation of a focus area in 
order to make an intervention. 
Qualitative 
Ethnography 
and participant 
observation 
Participants are studied within their field of work over a specified 
period of time. 
Both 
Grounded 
theory 
Observation within the field of interest leads to the emergence of 
theory (contrast to the experiment). 
Qualitative 
Case study Used to explore entity/entities restricted by time and activity. Can 
employ multiple data collection methods during the process. 
Qualitative 
Survey Used to collect a large quantity of data from considerable 
populations in a highly economical way. 
Both 
Mathematical 
proofs 
One of the single ways to demonstrate the absolute truth of a 
statement. Basically used to prove assertions mathematically. 
Quantitative 
 
 
5.3.3.1 Case Study 
A case study is a very useful technique for extracting a lot of information about a specific 
member or subject. This method offers the researcher the possibility to study the subject in 
much more detail than most other research methods (Olivier, 2009). Robson (2002) provides 
the following definition: ―A case study involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence.‖ 
 
A significant aspect of a case study, which is constantly highlighted, is the importance of 
context (Yin, 2008; Saunders et al., 2007). This relates to the fact that the boundaries of the 
examined phenomenon and the context within which it is examined are not clearly apparent, 
unlike the experiment strategy, for example, in which the research process is undertaken in an 
extremely controlled context.  
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Four types of case study strategies can be determined according to two distinct dimensions:  
single vs. multiple case, and holistic vs. embedded case (Yin, 2008). A single case study 
focuses on a unique case. In contrast, a multiple case study strategy would entail examining 
more than one case. A multiple case study strategy is considered to be the preferable 
approach, as findings may be generalised (Yin, 2008). For the second dimension, a holistic 
case is employed when the research focuses on a single entity as a whole (e.g. the whole 
organisation). In the embedded case, the researcher explores different aspects within a single 
entity (e.g. sub-units or departments of the organisation). 
 
In terms of IT research, case studies can offer a complete representation of users’ experiences 
when interacting with a certain application, as they help in evaluating the effectiveness of the 
application by identifying its strengths and weaknesses. Hence, its successes and failures will 
provide a wide range of constructive information, which can then be analysed. Based on the 
analysis, patterns in the data will emerge. Once all the data have been collected, further 
analysis will be conducted. Once the appropriate changes identified by the case study have 
been recommended and implemented, the overall system should be improved (Patton, 1990). 
 
5.3.3.2 Ethnography 
Ethnography is derived from the anthropological practice of immersion in other cultures with 
the intent to understand and express social reality about the tested culture (Bhattacherjee, 
2011; Millen, 2000). In ethnography, the research participants are treated as a ―foreign tribe‖, 
while the researcher acts as an anthropologist who is studying the culture of this ―tribe‖ 
(Millen, 2000). The research participants are studied in their natural settings or fields 
(Olivier, 2009), despite the fact this can result in a biased understanding of the activities 
conducted from the informants’ perspective (Millen, 2000). 
 
In order to conduct ethnography, it is important that the researcher is part of the community 
that is being explored. Hence, the researcher will only understand how the community 
operates by experiencing that culture as a member (Olivier, 2009). Owing to the researcher’s 
immersion in the culture, their specific role and involvement in terms of the research process 
must be clarified during data analysis (Bhattacherjee, 2011). 
 
The primary method of data collection is participant observation. Accordingly, analysing the 
data requires researchers to ―make-sense‖ of it. Researchers support their ―sense-making‖ 
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approach with extensive field notes and by narrating their experiences in extensive detail. 
This allows readers to experience the culture via the researchers. The dual roles of 
researchers in ethnography are to generate theory by relying on their unique knowledge and 
engagement and to convince the scientific community of the nature of the studied 
phenomenon (Bhattacherjee, 2011).  
 
A classic example of ethnographic research is Jane Goodall’s study of primate behaviour. In 
order to understand them she had to live with chimpanzees in their natural habitat. Another 
example is Myra Bluebond-Langer’s study of the experiences of children with life-
threatening illnesses and their families. In this study the researcher followed 80 children for a 
period of over two years (Bhattacherjee, 2011).  
 
5.3.3.3 Survey 
A survey is a classic well-known research strategy commonly used as a form of observation 
in the social sciences. Essentially, the researcher will select a sample group of participants 
and administer a standardised survey to each one of them (Babbie, 2005).  
 
The survey will be used to count ―things‖ within some group. Such a group is also commonly 
referred to as the population group. In terms of this method, members of one population 
group, which share some common characteristics, will be compared to another population 
group that does not have similar characteristics (Olivier, 2009). This is a useful strategy to 
apply when determining correlations between characteristics. However, it does not show 
causation of a phenomenon, which an experiment does, for example.  
 
Surveys have to be well planned and done accurately. If not, the results can be skewed, which 
will lead to invalid conclusions. This is a drawback of a survey strategy and one that will 
need to be considered. There are various data collection techniques that belong to the survey 
strategy, for example questionnaires, structured observation and structured interviews 
(Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
5.3.3.4 Action Research 
A common characteristic of action research is that it concentrates on contributing a solution 
to a situation to those who are experiencing it directly. Accordingly, the solution is based on 
change and includes the involvement of both practitioners and researchers. Therefore, the 
researcher forms part of the situation in which the change process is occurring. It is also 
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based on an iterative process, which is comprised of the following steps: diagnosing, 
planning, taking action, and evaluating. The iterative process is displayed in figure 5.4.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: The action research spiral (Saunders et al., 2007) 
The strength of this strategy is its focus on change, the allocation of appropriate time for the 
iterative steps, and the involvement of subjects throughout the research process. There are 
many definitions for action research; Babbie (2005) provides the following one: ―Action 
research is an approach to social research in which the people being studied are given control 
over the purpose and procedures of the research; intended as a counter to the implicit view 
that researchers are superior to those they study.‖ 
 
Action research is an interactive method of inquiry that is well suited for investigating 
complex social phenomena. Consequently, these phenomena are better understood by 
introducing changes or actions and observing their effects. It is also a useful method for 
studying a social problem, as it provides learning and insights of how an action influences a 
phenomenon. An example of action research is to introduce organisational change 
programmes (e.g. new technology, processes or procedures) with the goal of improving 
profitability or performance. Theory must guide the researcher’s actions by explaining why 
and how the actions may bring forth the desired social change (Bhattacherjee, 2011). 
  
5.3.4 Research Choices 
As previously mentioned, there are both qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
Quantitative methods imply numeric data, while qualitative methods imply non-numeric data. 
The manner in which the researcher decides to combine the two techniques comprises the 
research choice. In figure 5.1, the research choice is represented in the fourth layer of the 
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model, starting from the exterior of the ring. The division of the research choices is displayed 
in figure 5.5. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: The research choices (Saunders et al., 2007) 
In the case of a single data collection technique and its analogous analysis procedures, a 
mono method is used. Accordingly, one will combine a quantitative data collection technique 
with quantitative data analysis procedures or a qualitative data collection technique with 
qualitative data analysis procedures. If more than one data collection technique and analysis 
procedures are applied, then the multiple methods choice is used. This infers the use of 
numerous techniques in a single research study. The research choice that was chosen for this 
study is mentioned in section 5.5.6. In terms of the multiple methods choice, there are four 
different possibilities that a researcher could explore. They include the following (Saunders et 
al., 2007): 
1. Multi-method quantitative studies. Implies the use of multiple quantitative data 
collection techniques and the use of quantitative procedures for the analysis. 
2. Multi-method qualitative studies. Implies the use of multiple qualitative data 
collection techniques and the use of qualitative procedures for the analysis. 
3. Mixed-method research. Implies the use of both quantitative and qualitative data 
collection techniques for the analysis. It is important to note that they are used 
either in parallel or in sequential order, but not in combination. Thus, quantitative 
data are analysed quantitatively and qualitative data qualitatively (Creswell, 
2009).  
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4. Mixed-model research. Implies the use of both quantitative and qualitative data 
collection techniques for the analysis. In this case, however, they are combined. 
Therefore, it is possible to ―qualitise" quantitative data and to ―quantitise‖ 
qualitative data.  
 
5.3.5 Time Horizons 
Following the decision of which research choice to use are the time horizons. In figure 5.1, 
the time horizon is represented in the fifth layer of the model, starting from the exterior of the 
ring. There are two options relating to the time horizons layer. Either a cross-sectional or a 
longitudinal study may be conducted. Based largely on the research questions, one of the two 
will be utilised (Saunders et al., 2007). The time horizon that was chosen for this study is 
mentioned in section 5.5.7. 
 
5.3.5.1 Cross-sectional Studies 
This type of study tends to focus on the examination of a phenomenon (or phenomena) 
during a particular time frame. Accordingly, researchers attempt to describe their incidence 
and the relationships that occur within them. These are commonly related to academic work 
where time constraints exist. Nonetheless, an academic course may provide sufficient time 
for a longitudinal study as well (Babbie, 2005; Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
Cross-sectional studies often use a survey strategy, as they are regarded as exploratory and 
descriptive studies; however, qualitative methods can also be employed. Because 
observations and generalisations are made during a single time only, bias becomes a concern. 
To counter this, revisiting the phenomenon at a different time and building on previous 
results is advised (Babbie, 2005). 
 
5.3.5.2 Longitudinal Studies 
This type of study tends to focus on the examination of a phenomenon (or phenomena) over 
an extended time frame. Its strength lies in the fact that it has the ability to examine change 
and development over time. This also assists the researcher in exercising more control over 
the variables being studied during the research process. 
 
In longitudinal studies, observations and analyses can be made over the course of events that 
are being examined or at one time only. Babbie (2005) identifies three special types of 
longitudinal studies. They include: 
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 Trend study. This is used to monitor a specific characteristic of a population over a 
period of time. 
 Cohort study. This is used to study a specific subpopulation (or cohort) over a period 
of time. The data may be gathered from different members during each set of 
observations. 
 Panel study. This is used to collect data from the same set of participants (specific 
sample) at different points in time. 
 
5.3.6 Data Collection Techniques  
Data collection techniques assist with collecting and analysing the data. These are 
represented as techniques and procedures in the research onion model and are used as part of 
the overall research strategy or strategies that are implemented. In figure 5.1, these are 
represented in the centre of the model. The main data collection techniques include literature 
review, observational techniques, sampling, questionnaires, interviews, and usability 
methods. Each one of these techniques can contain various options within them, as will be 
shown. The data collection techniques that were chosen for this study are mentioned in 
section 5.5.8. 
 
5.3.6.1 Literature Review 
Literature has a fundamental role to play in any study, as one has to examine the relevant 
existing information on the research topic. Thus a literature review provides a method for 
understanding and obtaining an insight into previous research on the topic (Olivier, 2009). 
The literature review technique can be divided into three categories (Saunders et al., 2007): 
 Primary literature. Also referred to as the grey literature. This is the first point from 
which a piece of work will originate. It includes published sources, like reports, and 
central and local government publications, such as white papers and planning 
documents. Unpublished manuscript sources, such as letters, memos, committee 
minutes also apply, as they can be analysed as data as well. 
 Secondary literature. There is a wealth of secondary data available that keeps on 
expanding rapidly, largely due to the Internet. Such resources include books, journals, 
publications of primary literature, newspapers, and certain government publications. 
Secondary literature is easier to locate than primary literature. 
 Tertiary literature. Also referred to as search tools. These are designed to assist one in 
locating primary and secondary literature or to introduce topics. The more popular 
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tools include indexes, abstracts, catalogues, encyclopaedias, dictionaries, 
bibliographies, and citation indexes.  
 
5.3.6.2 Observational Techniques 
When research questions and objectives are concerned with what people do, the observational 
technique can be employed. This will help the researcher discover this information by 
watching (observing) the research participants. In essence, observation includes systematic 
observation, recording, description, analysis and interpretation of human behaviour. Saunders 
et al. (2007) describe two types of observation technique: 
 Participant/user observation. This is a qualitative technique that focuses on 
discovering the meanings that people attach to their actions. It originates from the 
field of social anthropology and is an unstructured and unsystematic observation 
approach. In terms of this technique, the observer can adopt any of four different 
roles: complete participant, complete observer, observer as participant, and participant 
as observer. 
 Structured/fieldwork observation. This is a quantitative technique that focuses more 
on the frequency of people’s actions. Hence, it is concerned with quantifying 
behaviour and is based on a predetermined structured and systematic approach. This 
technique implies that the observer adopts a more detached stance. 
 
5.3.6.3 Sampling 
Sampling is a technique that may be required for any research study, irrespective of the 
research questions and objectives at hand. In certain cases it may be acceptable to collect and 
analyse data from every possible group member. However, there are cases where this is not 
possible. Factors that contribute to this include the restriction of time, money and access. In 
these particular cases, the sampling technique provides a useful solution, as it enables the 
researcher to reduce the amount of data that will need to be collected by focusing on a 
subgroup rather than all group members. This assists in generalising results according to the 
sample (also referred to as the population) that is selected. There are two types of sampling 
technique (Oates, 2006): 
 Probability/representative sampling. In terms of this type, the selected sample is 
based on the researcher’s belief that there is a high probability the sample is 
representative of the overall population being examined. Therefore, it is possible to 
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answer research questions and objectives that require the statistical estimation of 
characteristics relating to the sample population. 
 Non-probability/judgmental sampling. In terms of this type, the researcher is unsure 
whether the sample population is representative of the overall population. This is due 
to the fact that members have unique characteristics that are not shared with other 
members of the sample group. At best, this method provides for weak generalisations 
to the wider population. Consequently, it is not used to make statistical inferences 
about the characteristics of the population. 
 
5.3.6.4 Interviews 
A simple definition of an interview is provided by Kahn and Cannell (1957), which they 
describe as a purposeful discussion between two or more people. Interviews are regarded as a 
useful technique to collect valid and reliable data relating to specific research objectives and 
questions. In the case where there are no research objectives and questions defined as yet, 
they can also assist in establishing them. Figure 5.6 displays the categorisation of interviews. 
  
 
Figure 5.6: The categorisation of interviews (Saunders et al., 2007) 
There are different types of interview, which are defined by different typologies. A common 
typology that is used is the level of formality and structure that is associated with the 
interview. On the basis of the formality typology, there exist three categories of interviews 
(Saunders et al., 2007): 
 Structured interview. Questionnaires are used for the interviews in this category, and 
they are commonly referred to as interviewer-administered questionnaires. They 
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include predetermined and standardised questions, which focus on collecting 
quantitative data. Questions are answered according to a predefined structure. 
 Semi-structured interview. The questions in this category are not standardised and 
focus on collecting qualitative data. Rather, the interviewer may select what to discuss 
from a list of themes and questions, which tends to vary from interview to interview. 
The order of questions is not structured and can be varied depending on the 
discussion. 
 Unstructured or in-depth interview. As with a semi-structured interview, this category 
is not standardised and focuses on the collection of qualitative data. Such interviews 
are regarded as informal interviews and are used to explore a general area of interest 
in depth. A predetermined list of questions does not exist, yet the interviewer will 
need to have a clear idea of the aspects that will be explored. 
 
5.3.6.5 Questionnaires 
Babbie (2005) defines a questionnaire as a document that contains questions and other types 
of items to extract information appropriate for analysis. Questionnaire are used mainly in a 
survey strategy but can also be used in case studies, experiments, field research and other 
modes of observation (Babbie, 2005; Saunders et al., 2007). DeVaus (2002) states that a 
questionnaire includes all techniques of data collection that focus on a set of questions, which 
are presented in a prearranged order. Accordingly, each person (participant) will need to 
respond to the same set of questions. In terms of the interview technique discussed 
previously, a questionnaire could include a structured interview, a telephone questionnaire, 
and questionnaires that are answered without the presence of an interviewer. 
 
To develop a successful questionnaire, one will need to first consider the length of it. If the 
questionnaire is too long, the response rate could be low. The fact that they can be time 
consuming to develop is also a critical consideration. This is because pilot studies will need 
to be conducted first in order to eliminate potential misunderstandings in terms of the items 
of the questionnaire (Bernardo, 2005). Nonetheless, there are also key advantages with 
implementing questionnaires. The Internet provides a gateway to distribute them, which can 
result in a large response for a minimum cost. They also tend to be very versatile because 
they may be used at any stage of the design process. Moreover, the fact that they may be used 
anonymously can prevent researcher biases. Finally, they may be used repeatedly and for 
collecting subjective information regarding user preferences (Bernardo, 2005). 
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There are various questionnaire designs, which are based on the manner in which they are 
administered or the level of contact that interviewer has with the respondents. Therefore, two 
main categories can be identified, the subdivisions of which are displayed in figure 5.7. The 
two categories of questionnaire include the following (Saunders et al., 2007): 
 Self-administered questionnaire. This type is usually completed by the respondents. 
They are administered by various means, as is displayed in figure 5.7. 
 Interviewer-administered questionnaire. This type is usually recorded by the 
interviewer on the basis of responses from the respondents. It is administered in two 
ways, as is displayed in figure 5.7. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: The categorisation of questionnaires (Saunders et al., 2007) 
5.3.6.6 User-Centred Design Methods 
User-centred design methods or UIMs are techniques used for the evaluation and 
development of products and services (e.g. software, websites, mobile phones). They require 
the continuous involvement of users in the design and evaluation phases and emphasise the 
application of usability practices to meet the needs and abilities of the users (BoK-a, 2005). 
User needs will be combined with business requirements in order to achieve effective UX 
(BoK-b, 2005). UIMs are discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
 
5.3.7 Data Analysis Techniques  
Data analysis techniques are used to process data and transform it into information from 
which conclusions can then be made. There are a variety of techniques and approaches for 
data analysis available, which can offer better analysis, depending on the research domain 
(e.g. business, science, and social science). Data analysis has multiple facets and approaches, 
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encompassing diverse techniques under a variety of names, in different domains. Two 
techniques applied in HCI research are theme analysis and descriptive statistics. 
 
5.3.7.1 Theme Analysis Theory 
In an attempt to analyse the collected data in a qualitative research study, it is necessary to 
code the data. Creswell (2004) states that the purpose of the coding process is ―to extract 
meaning from the text data, divide it into text or image segments, label these segments with 
codes for overlap and redundancy, and collapse these codes into broad themes‖. The codes 
are the labels that will be used to describe a segment of the text (e.g. setting and context, 
participant, activity etc.). Furthermore, Creswell (2004) proposes several steps to code the 
data. The step that is of a particular interest to this research is the step involved in developing 
themes (or categories).  
 
Three common alternatives in selecting the format of analysis to follow include thematic 
analysis, content analysis and discourse analysis. Thematic analysis is the most approach 
suitable for this research. In this case, data are analysed according to theme and follow 
qualitative and inductive approaches as well. Data collection and analysis occur concurrently 
and research literature forms part of the analysis process. Thematic analysis is also connected 
to comparative analysis. In comparative analysis, data from various users is compared and 
contrasted until the researcher is satisfied with the results. On the other hand, content analysis 
tends to follow a quantitative approach; while discourse analysis resides somewhere between 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches and focuses on analysing patterns of speech. 
Therefore, the analysis is intuitive and reflective but may also involve some form of counting 
or measurement. Important considerations for all forms of analysis include the following 
(Creswell, 2004): 
 Consider the data from the moment the information is being collected. 
 Consider the value of the data (what or who the sources are). 
 As the research progresses, the data must be interpreted in a meaningful manner and 
in an understandable format. 
 Consider the mechanical processes that need to be undertaken to analyse the data 
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5.3.7.2 Descriptive Statistics Techniques and Methods 
Descriptive statistics assist the researcher to understand more about the research data by 
assisting him or her to organise and summarise it (McHugh & Villarruel, 2003). This can be 
accomplished by means of tables and graphical displays (Trochim, 2006a).  
 
Descriptive statistics are commonly used in two ways: firstly, in the form of an end point in 
the data analysis, which occurs in purely descriptive studies and, secondly, in the form of a 
starting point in the data analysis, which occurs before testing certain hypotheses with 
inferential statistics in the experimental research (McHugh & Villarruel, 2003). The 
difference between the two is that with inferential statistics one’s efforts attempt to reach 
conclusions that extend beyond the direct data alone, namely to the population from which 
the sample was drawn; while in descriptive statistics one is simply describing what the data 
portray. Both of these techniques are recognised as quantitative methods for analysing data 
(Trochim, 2006a). Methods that can be used in descriptive statistics include graphs, 
frequency tables, means, standard deviations, factor analysis and reliabilities.  
 
5.4 FRAMEWORKS 
The primary objective of this study is to develop a framework for evaluating USec in online 
social networking environments. As a result, we need to understand what a framework is and 
how it can be developed. The purpose of this section is to define frameworks in general and 
describe typical components.  
 
5.4.1 Definition  
The term theoretical (or conceptual) framework includes a system of concepts, assumptions, 
expectations, beliefs and theories, which support and inform a particular research. It 
represents an integral part of design. A definition provided by Miles and Huberman (1994), 
states that it is ―a visual or written product that explains, either graphically or in a narrative 
form, the main aspects to be studied. It includes key factors, concepts, variables and the 
presumed relationships among them‖.  
 
Lethbridge and Laganiere (2005) mention that a framework needs to guide the research and 
also help identify which variables must be measured and what relationships to be aware of 
and thus their definition is that a framework is ―an underlying set of ideas that includes, a set 
of ideas, principles, agreements, or rules that provides the basis or outline for something 
intended to be more fully developed at a later stage‖.  
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When conducting research to develop a theoretical framework, two realms exist – 
observation and theory. The researcher is required to work between these two realms to 
express their beliefs and ideas with regard to the phenomena that are being studied (Trochim 
& Donelly, 2006). Furthermore, a theoretical framework brings justification to the overall 
research (Maxwell, 2005). 
 
5.4.2 Types 
Conceptual frameworks are close to empirical inquiry and can take different forms depending 
on the research problem and the questions they need to address. Several types of conceptual 
framework include working hypotheses, descriptive categories, practical ideal types and 
methods of research, and formal hypotheses (Oates, 2006). These types of frameworks are 
associated with particular research purposes, such as exploration, description, quantitative 
analysis and qualitative analysis. The alignment of framework and purpose makes other 
aspects of empirical research more obvious. These include the choice of methodology and 
data analysis techniques. 
 
Existing theory and relevant research are influential for developing a conceptual framework, 
since they facilitate the understanding of the phenomena that are under investigation 
(Maxwell, 2005). The purpose of constructing a framework is both descriptive and critical: it 
will provide the researcher with the ability to understand and communicate problems and 
gaps that are identified in current theory and research and it makes the original contribution 
of the study more evident to comprehend. 
 
The purpose of this study is to develop a framework to evaluate USec in online social 
networking. It is based on a descriptive type of conceptual framework that explores the fields 
of HCI, InfoSec and USec and utilises qualitative and quantitative methods. The findings 
from the methods are aligned in a framework to evaluate USec.   
 
5.4.3 Typical Components 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the composition of a framework. Lethbridge and Laganiere (2005) 
portray it as process that moves between three cycles. At the first cycle, the components of 
interest, which are the main focus areas of the research, are identified. Thereafter, the process 
moves to the second cycle. At this point, various components are integrated by determining 
the relationships that connect them. Once all these relationships have been identified, the 
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process can move to the third and final cycle; the actual framework. This will include all the 
components along with their relationships. However, in this cycle they comprise one logical 
unit. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: The composition of a framework (Lethbridge & Laganiere, 2005) 
 
5.5 RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN FOR THE STUDY 
This section discusses the research model for the study. The research questions, primary and 
sub, will also be mentioned once again. 
 
5.5.1 Research Questions 
The primary research question is: 
 
 
 
The main research question gives rise to a number of sub-questions. These will need to be 
addressed first and include:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Research Paradigm  
Based on the overview of the paradigms in section 5.2.1, it is concluded that there is lack of 
consensus regarding HCI research (Ford, 2005; Van Greunen 2009). Consequently, it has 
become common practice to implement a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
1. Which usability inspection method can be adapted to evaluate usable security? 
2. Which approach can be followed to develop the method? 
3. How can the validity and applicability of the method and approach be tested? 
4. How can the method and approach be constituted into a framework? 
 
What are the components of a framework to qualitatively evaluate usable security? 
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strategies in HCI research. By considering this factor and by investigating the various HCI 
research paradigms, this research is based on the fundamental ideas that support the 
engineering paradigm, as discussed in section 5.2.1.3. 
 
There are two main reasons for maintaining the need to implement an engineering paradigm. 
However, that being said, the other paradigms should not be devalued or underestimated. It is 
in accordance to the nature of this research that the engineering paradigm is considered to be 
more efficient and suitable for answering the primary research question. The two reasons 
supporting its implementation include: 
1. It was previously stated that there are established and non-established paradigms. In 
order to avoid criticism, the preferred option would be to implement an established 
paradigm instead of a newly proposed or non-established paradigm. Defending a non-
established paradigm could impose further difficulties and require consensus, which is 
difficult to achieve even with the established paradigms.  
2. By comparing the various established paradigms that make use of quantitative and 
qualitative strategies, the one that is based on developing knowledge by examining 
interface design is engineering. 
 
5.5.3 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy and related methodologies to be followed in this study are based on 
an interpretivist approach, as discussed in section 5.3.1.2. This philosophy is well suited for 
this type of research because the main focus is to observe the patterns and behaviours of users 
interacting with security and privacy in OHSNs. 
 
Based on the philosophy, there are concerns regarding research bias. The foremost concern 
relates to the stance of the researcher in terms of the two fields being examined, usability and 
security. As mentioned, the study resides in the HCI field, so it leans more towards the 
usability component. In order to avoid bias, other perspectives are considered. The opinions 
and preferences of individuals purely from the InfoSec field (represents the security 
component) and HCI field alike will be independently considered. In addition, the opinions of 
a third perspective will also be examined. These are individuals from the USec field, whose 
knowledge crosses both fields, usability and security, and therefore have adopted a more 
USec perspective. 
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Collecting and analysing data from the three fields, HCI, InfoSec, and USec, will provide a 
wealth of information. Combining this information and extracting the most useful aspects of 
it will assist in the development of the USec framework for online social network 
environments. 
 
5.5.4 Research Approach 
The research approach will be based on inductive reasoning, as discussed in section 5.3.2.2. 
Accordingly, the final step will be the development of some general conclusions or theories 
in the form of a framework for USec. In essence, the particular literature will be analysed by 
identifying patterns, themes and regularities (Trochim & Donelly, 2006). Examining these 
patterns will ultimately assist in the development of new theory.  
 
5.5.5 Research Strategy 
In terms of the research method, it has to be determined which research strategy is better 
suited for this study. To decide this, a technique was adapted from the research of Van 
Greunen (2009) and Van der Merwe, Kotze and Cronje (2005). This technique matches the 
four research sub-questions against the characteristics of the four research strategies that were 
discussed in section 5.3.3. The results are displayed in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Research strategy characteristics and the research questions 
(adapted from Van Greunen, 2009; Van der Merwe et al., 2005) 
 
Research 
strategy 
Characteristics Sub-
question 1 
Sub-
question 2 
Sub-
question 3 
Sub-
question 4 
Case study Investigator has little control     
 Contemporary phenomenon 
in real-life context 
    
 Explores a single entity or 
phenomenon bounded by 
time and activity 
    
 Study life cycles     
Ethnography Active participation     
 Observational data     
 Social contact with 
participants 
    
 Extended depth study     
 Limited to one field study     
Survey  Aimed at producing reliable 
statistics on specific issue 
    
 Description of data     
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Research 
strategy 
Characteristics Sub-
question 1 
Sub-
question 2 
Sub-
question 3 
Sub-
question 4 
characteristics 
 Used to identify cause based 
on data 
    
Action 
research 
Focuses on what participants 
do 
    
 Explicit criteria     
 Practitioners and researchers 
with mutual goals 
    
 Apply theory with goal to 
enhance 
    
 
 
The results of the evaluation of the sub-questions against the research strategies’ 
characteristics confirm that this research study can be characterised as a case study problem. 
The case study follows an interpretivist research philosophy to develop a framework for 
evaluating USec. A case study, as was discussed in section 5.3.3.1, is a useful technique for 
extracting a wealth of information about specific subjects and it offers multiple purposes. 
Most importantly, it provides the platform for testing the process to develop heuristics for 
SADs. This process is then subsequently applied to developing heuristics for the domain of 
USec. By implementing the case study, the USec HE will also be improved. The data 
collection and analysis techniques to support the case study are discussed in sections 5.5.8 
and 5.5.9 respectively. 
 
The case study also serves to evaluate OHSNs. For this, two subjects are used: MedHelp and 
Google Health. The case studies will offer a holistic portrayal and representation of the users’ 
experiences when interacting with the OHSNs. Interactions of particular interest are those 
relating to security-related tasks. Such interactions will help evaluate the effectiveness of the 
security, by identifying its strengths and weaknesses in terms of usability. The identification 
of its successes and failures will provide a wide range of constructive information, which can 
then be analysed.  
 
Based on the analysis of the process application, the evaluation of the USec HE and the 
examination of the OHSNs, patterns in the data will emerge. Once all the data have been 
collected, further analysis will be carried out. Patton (1990) states that the results of the case 
study should improve the overall system, once the appropriate changes have been 
recommended and implemented. Similarly, the results from the case study in this research 
will demonstrate the applicability of the process for developing heuristics for SADs and 
Chapter 5: Research Design & Methodology 
 
127 
 
improving the USec HE. In this research, recommendations will only be made to improve the 
USec of the OHSNs. 
 
The purpose of the data gathered from case studies is to reveal and evaluate theories resulting 
from the differences that have been observed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of interaction 
theory can be demonstrated to the implementers themselves (Markus, 1983; Van Greunen, 
2009). Six steps for case study research have been proposed by various researches (Yin, 
2008; Soy, 1997). The six steps have been adapted to the context of this research in table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Implementing Soy’s six steps of case study research in this study (Soy, 1997) 
 
Steps Guidelines for the researcher 
1 Determine and define the 
research questions 
Primary and sub research questions are displayed in section 
5.5.1. 
2 Select the cases and determine 
data gathering and data 
analysis techniques 
A case study will be applied to develop a USec HE by 
implementing the process to develop heuristics for SADs. A 
case study will also be conducted on two OHSNs. 
 
Data gathering techniques include secondary data, FUE, HE 
and questionnaires. Data analysis techniques include theme 
analysis and descriptive statistics. 
3 Prepare to collect the data Pilot studies will be conducted in order to remove any 
problems with the FUE scripts. Participants will then need to 
be identified and letters of introduction created. Rules for 
confidentiality must also be established. 
 
For the HE with experts, a tool must be developed to validate 
the USec HE. Experts from the field of InfoSec, HCI and USec 
must then be identified. Letters must be provided explaining 
the purpose of the HE and how their assistance is required. 
4 Collect data in the field All sources of data must be sorted in a format that can be 
analysed. All documents from the FUE with users and the HE 
of experts with the validation tool are in Word or Excel 
documents. Comments are also provided on both. 
 
The data should provide a means to identify patterns within 
them. 
 
Keep participants and experts informed about the course of the 
study and the data as the study progresses. Therefore, if there is 
a need to have additional meetings with the participants or 
experts it can be arranged.  
5 Evaluate and analyse the data By identifying patterns within the data, it is possible to answer 
the questions defined in step 1. Linkages can be identified in 
the raw data of the various data gathering techniques. Data 
triangulation will be applied to strengthen the research findings. 
6 Prepare the report Complex data must be reported in a form that can be 
understood by readers. The main source of report will be the 
thesis. Additional forms of report will include papers for 
conferences and articles for journals. 
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5.5.6 Research Choices 
The research choice will be based on mixed methods; hence employing a mixed-model 
research choice, as discussed in section 5.3.4. This model implies the use of quantitative and 
qualitative data collection techniques for analysis. A critical aspect of this model is that the 
quantitative and qualitative techniques are used in combination and not in sequential order. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data will be collected by means of the questionnaires and 
HE. Moreover, qualitative data will also result from the overall case study and from the 
experts’ validations and the participants’ formative usability evaluations (FUEs). The manner 
in which the quantitative and qualitative data collected from the mixed-model research choice 
will be analysed is mentioned in more detail in section 5.5.9.2. 
 
5.5.7 Time Horizons 
A longitudinal study, as discussed in section 5.3.5.2, will be preferred, as the study will be 
completed over an extended period of time. Specifically, the research must be completed 
within a period of three years. The purpose of the research is to develop a USec framework. 
This will require an analysis of OHSNs and USec theories over longer periods of time 
(Saunders et al., 2000). 
 
5.5.8 Data Collection Techniques 
All selected techniques will contribute to the success of this research and will assist with the 
collection of the required information. A combination of qualitative and quantitative data 
collection techniques will be applied. These include secondary data (as discussed in section 
5.3.6.1), questionnaires (as discussed in section 5.3.6.5), FUE and HE (as were discussed in 
section 5.3.6.6). Figure 5.9 displays the research onion model that will be implemented and 
which has been adapted from the original version of the research onion model (displayed in 
figure 5.1) in order to accommodate this specific research study. All six levels of the model 
are displayed, along with their selected options. In the following sections the data collections 
techniques are discussed. 
 
Chapter 5: Research Design & Methodology 
 
129 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: The research onion model to be applied for this study  
 
5.5.8.1 Secondary Data (Literature Review) 
The literature review will be based on the examination of relevant papers, journal articles, 
white papers, and books. The Internet will provide a platform on which much of the literature 
will be found. This literature will relate to the fields of USec, HCI, InfoSec, OHSNs and 
frameworks. 
 
5.5.8.2 Questionnaires 
Questionnaires are used to extract certain information from the participants. They will be 
used in the form of user satisfaction questionnaires in the FUE and in the validation tool that 
experts will use to assess the USec HE. The purpose is to determine participant and expert 
satisfaction with regard to the application and usage of the USec HE. 
 
5.5.8.3 Formative Usability Evaluation 
The purpose of the FUE is to collect data while participants perform security-related tasks on 
the OHSNs. In this case, they will be provided with scenarios and tasks.  An FUE is used 
because the OHSNs are already developed. If the system were new, a different type of 
evaluation technique would be used to collect the user requirements. It is important to clarify 
that the FUE does not investigate the overall UX on the selected OHSNs. For that reason 
usability metrics are not considered in the evaluation, but are used when evaluating the 
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performance of participants against tasks using quantitative measures. The focus is purely on 
testing the USec HE in context.  The feedback received is the outcome of the security and 
privacy tasks that the participants performed on the websites. Based on this feedback, 
recommendations are made to improve the level of USec for the selected OHSNs. 
 
In this research, the participants who conducted the FUE were postgraduate students. More 
detail on the participants and the scenarios and tasks they conducted is provided in chapter 6. 
This section will focus on the development of criteria to select the OHSNs for the case study 
and the procedure that was followed to implement them. 
 
There are many OHSNs on the Web that offer different functionalities and services, as will be 
discussed in chapter 6. Therefore, an important consideration for the FUE was to determine 
the key components of OHSNs in order to select the most appropriate OHSNs for the case 
study. This will ensure that the websites selected for the case study adhere to specific 
requirements. The requirements for selection were determined on the basis of four sets of 
requirements; each comprising its own criteria. The four sets include  
 social networking components  
 health application domain 
 scope of functionality  
 supplementary factors 
Social networking components 
In order for websites to be considered as social networking tools, it is necessary that they 
contain certain architectural components. These architectural components are assesses as 
being commonly accepted practices and provide a template for the baseline criteria of social 
network sites. The minimum key characteristics that are identified and which need to be 
incorporated into such websites include (Boyd & Ellison, 2007): 
 Profile. This will need to be visible and within a bounded system. It is used to 
describe the actor (user). 
 Connections. This includes both public and semi-public connections. These 
connections will be between the actor (a profile representing the particular actor) and 
his/hers relations (e.g. friends, employees etc.). 
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 Navigate. This relates to the navigation of the actual connections. Users that have 
profiles should also have the ability to traverse their connections (e.g. view their 
connections’ profiles or pictures). 
The Burton Group expanded on the minimum key characteristics identified by Boyd and 
Ellison (2007) and included additional capabilities as criteria as well. They suggest that these 
capabilities should also be considered as core functions of a social network site. The 
additional capabilities include the following (Gotta, 2008; Hogben, 2007):  
 Multiple means for connections. There must be alternative means for members to 
participate, interact and contact a particular actor (e.g. e-mail, instant messaging, chat 
rooms etc.). These tools also provide a platform for posting personal data on a profile 
(e.g. the actor’s personal interests). 
 Visibility controls. The actor should have the ability to manage his/her own visibility, 
via a set of controls (e.g. search, profile viewing etc.). 
 Tools for interaction. The actor should have the ability to manage the manner in 
which they prefer to interact or to be contacted by other members, via a set of controls 
(e.g. messages). These tools provide personalised, socially-focused interactions that 
are based around the profile (e.g. recommendations, reports of events etc.). 
 Access controls. These are tools that are used to define social relationships and to 
determine permissions as to who has access to the actor’s data via their profile and as 
to who can communicate with the actor. 
The attributes discussed above, in the form of key characteristics and additional capabilities 
will need to be mapped onto the architectural components of profiles, social graphs, 
participation models, social presence and relation controls. This will assist all the related 
parties (e.g. application developers, infrastructure planners etc.) in designing a social network 
website (Gotta, 2008). Figure 5.10 displays the architectural template of a social network 
website. 
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Figure 5.10: The architectural components of a social network website (Gotta, 2008) 
Health application domain 
The second requirement is focused on defining the application domain of the site, in this case, 
with regard to its health context. Several criteria are identified, in which one may define the 
health application domain of OHSNs: 
 Free-standing or integrated. Free-standing would refer to an autonomous health 
website. An example of such a site is SugarStats. Although a patient may share their 
personal health information with their health care provider, it is not necessary for the 
health care provider to have any particular system in its own premise to view or 
analyse that information. Instead, integrated refers to a health website that is also 
incorporated into a system that is owned by the health care provider. Thus, it has the 
capabilities to import and export medical information from different sources (Alder, 
2006). Integrated sites provide patients with more options when interacting with their 
health care providers. In addition, they allow them to take their information with them 
when changing health care providers. In addition, they also provide for networking 
with other patients. Google Health can be categorised as an integrated site. However, 
the integration in this case is done via third-party companies. Patients are able to 
import their medical health records into Google Health through a third-party site, such 
as Allscripts. This would entail that the health care provider has an Electronic Medical 
Record solution in place (e.g. Allscripts Professional). The networking between the 
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health care providers and their patients would then happen through the Allscripts 
Professional Patient Portal. 
 Patient-specific or health care provider-specific. This distinguishes the sites users as 
either being health care providers or patients. An example of a health care provider’s 
site is Sermo, while an example of a patient-specific site is PatientsLikeMe. There is 
also the possibility that a health social network site accommodates both the patients 
and the health care providers. In this research, such a site is defined as a hybrid-
specific site and an example of it would be MDLinked. 
 General health or disease-specific. In this context, disease specific refers to a site 
targeting patients suffering from a specific disease. An example of a disease-specific 
site is I’m too young for this! cancer foundation. This site targets patients suffering 
from cancer or those who seek cancer-related information or help. In contrast, general 
health site refers to a site that caters for a number of different conditions or 
symptoms, one example being Daily Strength. This site offers multiple and diverse 
support groups. 
Scope of functionality 
To determine the conditions to select the OHSNs for the case study, an additional 
requirement needs to be considered. This focuses on the actual scope of functionality that is 
provided by the website. These are functionalities associated more with the health social 
networks, unlike the first requirement, which discusses key characteristics and components of 
general social network sites. These functionalities can contribute significantly to the 
development of good health social network site. However, some of the functionalities will not 
be available in other general online social network environments. These include the following 
(Boulos & Wheelert, 2007; Purdy, 2008; Hughes, Joshi, & Wareham, 2008; Eysenbach, 
2008): 
 The website must empower end-user participation. It needs to provide the abilities to 
facilitate participation from the respective end-users. This should be either the 
patients, caregivers, health care providers or all three user types.  
 The website must provide ongoing medical education and information regarding the 
area of focus (e.g. OHSNs for cancer patients should provide the analogous medical 
information and education regarding cancer). 
 The website must instil trust to the users. This is achieved by considering security and 
privacy issues with Web 2.0 services. Credible information on the website also has a 
Chapter 5: Research Design & Methodology 
 
134 
 
significant role to play in contributing to trustworthiness. This is important in the 
context of health social network sites where shared patient information intrinsically 
requires proper protection. 
Supplementary factors 
This set may be debated as to whether it justifies the principle of a requirement. However, it 
can have an impact in the selection process. For this reason alone it has been accepted and 
defined as one of the requirements, which are discussed in the form of supplementary factors. 
These factors are the following: 
 Number of users – a site with more members would be more popular and its features 
would have been utilised more than those of unpopular sites. 
 Number of support groups – a site with a larger number of support groups would 
incidentally attract a higher number of users. 
 Brand – the name of the site or the organisation which owns the health site could also 
be an influential factor (e.g. Google Health and MS HealthVault). 
To summarise, four sets of baseline requirements have been determined; social networking 
components, health application domain, scope of functionality and supplementary factors. 
These requirements are used as a template for selecting the OHSNs for the case study. The 
websites will then be assessed by means of the USec HE. The requirements to be used, as 
well as their criteria, are displayed in figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.11: The requirements to select the OHSNs for the case study 
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Figure 5.11 displays the four requirements and their criteria, which were used to select the 
OHSNs for the case study. The purpose is to identify which of the criteria for each 
requirement are apparent on the site. In the case of the health application domain 
requirement, the purpose is to determine the type of health site. In essence, each criterion will 
be associated with a specific weight or value. The sites with the highest accumulated values 
will be the ones selected for the case study. This is necessary because a plethora of OHSNs 
exist. Once evaluated by the criteria, the websites will be determined. The OHSNs to be 
considered are displayed in table 5.5 and figure 5.12. 
Table 5.5: Possible OHSNs that will be evaluated by the specified requirements 
OHSNs/URL OHSNs/URL 
Daily Strength: 
www.dailystrength.org 
TuDiabetes:       
www.tudiabetes.org  
Healthline:      
www.healthline.com 
WEGO health: 
www.wegohealth.com  
Healia: 
http://communities.healia.com  
Keas:                               
www.keas.com  
Cochlear Community: 
www.cochlearcommunity.com  
Wellsphere:             
www.wellsphere.com  
Hope Cube:             
www.hopecube.com 
Google Health: 
www.google.com/health/  
Icyou:                           
www.icyou.com  
Microsoft HealthVault: 
www.healthvault.com  
iMedix:                       
www.imedix.com  
PatientsLikeMe: 
www.patientslikeme.com  
MDJunction.com: 
www.mdjunction.com  
Sermo:                          
www.sermo.com  
I’m too young for this! cancer 
foundation:                      
http://i2y.com  
MDLinked:             
www.mdlinked.com/  
MedHelp:                 
www.medhelp.org  
Medscape Physician Connect: 
www.medscape.com/connect  
SugarStats:            
www.sugarstats.com  
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Figure 5.12: Logos of the OHSNs 
Procedure for selection  
Since the requirements for selecting OHSNs have been defined, a procedure must now be 
followed to implement them. The procedure for selecting the websites was based on four 
stages. These include the following: 
 Stage 1 – Research and literature review. A background literature review was 
conducted in the fields of online social networking environments and OHSNs 
specifically. This resulted in identifying characteristics and components for these 
types of website. The investigation also assisted in identifying a total of twenty-one 
possible websites for selection. These are displayed in table 5.6. 
 
 Stage 2 – Development and application of extensive set of requirements. To determine 
which of the twenty-one websites were appropriate for the case study, an extensive set 
of requirements was established. These requirements were based on work conducted 
in Stage 1 and were specific to the health context. Requirements were then 
categorised under four main groups; Social Networking Components, Health 
Application Domain, Scope of Functionality and Supplementary Factors. Thereafter, a 
three-point rating scale was used to determine the level of conformance of a website 
with regard to each requirement. The measurements for the three-point rating scale 
were defined as the following: 
o 0 = does not satisfy requirement 
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o 1 = moderately satisfies requirement 
o 2 = fully satisfies requirement 
An example illustrating the difference between a scale 1 and a scale 2 rating is 
provided. One requirement states that ―The user can express personal relationships by 
establishing various types of connections (e.g. with other patients, friends, family or 
doctors)‖. If a website were provided with a scale 1 rating for this requirement, it 
entails that a user may establish a relationship with a single type of connection only. 
A scale 2 rating would entail that the user can establish relationships with several type 
of connections.  Evidently, a scale 0 rating entails that the user is not able to establish 
any relationships on a website. By applying the extensive set of requirements in this 
stage, it was possible to eliminate six websites for various reasons. The application of 
the extensive set of requirements is presented in Appendix D.1: Extensive Set of 
Requirements. This result, a total of fifteen possible websites could now be assessed 
for selection in Stage 3. 
 Stage 3 – Development and application of minimum set of requirements. Once all the 
websites had been measured against the extensive set of requirements in Stage 2, a 
set of minimum requirements was established. These were derived from the extensive 
set of requirements, yet were marginally modified. Determining what the minimum 
requirements were was grounded on defining the type of website that would be more 
suitable to evaluate with the USec HE. This mostly depended on the features 
available and the target audience of a website. The purpose of the minimum 
requirements was to further eliminate websites in order to determine the two that 
would be selected for the case study. This process was aided by the fact that all 
websites had already been measured against the extensive set of requirements of the 
previous stage. It was consequently easier to determine if a website adhered or not to 
a minimum requirement. A total of eight minimum requirements were established. 
The application of the minimum set of requirements is presented in Appendix D.2: 
Minimum and Bonus Set of Requirements. For a website to be considered for 
selection in the case study, it had to adhere to all of the minimum requirements.  In 
addition to the minimum requirements, two bonus requirements were also 
established. These would only be considered in a case where more than two websites 
adhered to all the minimum requirements. At this stage, eight websites were 
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eliminated. As a result, a total of seven possible websites could now be assessed for 
final selection in Stage 4. 
 
 Stage 4 – Application of bonus requirements. A total of seven websites adhered to all 
of the minimum requirements in Stage 3. Therefore, the bonus requirements were 
then considered. The application of the bonus set of requirements is presented in 
Appendix D.2: Minimum and Bonus Set of Requirements. Only two of the seven 
websites adhered to both of the bonus requirements, however. Therefore, they were 
automatically selected for the case study.  These were MedHelp and Google Health.  
 
 If more than two websites had adhered to the bonus requirements then supplementary 
factors from figure 5.11 would have been considered (e.g. the two websites with the 
most registered users are selected for the case study).   
 
Figure 5.13 displays the four stages in the procedure to select the OHSNs for the case study. 
It also displays those that were eliminated at each stage. These can be identified by the red 
rounded rectangles surrounding them. The selected OHSNs are identified by the green 
rounded rectangles surrounding them. 
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Figure 5.13: The four-stage procedure for selecting the OHSNs for the case study 
5.5.8.4 Heuristic Evaluation 
The USec HE was used by users in the FUE to experience its usage and application. Their 
views were then collected using the user satisfaction questionnaires, which made it possible 
to determine whether the USec HE is successful in evaluating the level of USec on the 
OHSNs. It is then possible to make recommendations to improve the security and privacy 
features that are lacking from a usability point of view. 
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The USec HE was also reviewed by experts using a validation tool, which was developed in 
this study. The validation tool examined the heuristics and their related checklist items for 
USec. It also assessed two new sets of USec severity ratings and the material considered to 
develop the heuristics and checklist items.  It also included a user satisfaction questionnaire 
to measure the experts’ views with regard to the overall USec HE. 
 
The validation of the USec HE was conducted by experts from the fields of HCI, InfoSec and 
USec. Seven experts agreed to participate in the validation; of these four returned their 
assessments by the cut-off date and one did not complete the entire validation tool. Of the 
four experts, two were from InfoSec, one from HCI and one from USec. The panel of experts 
are representative of the related fields and the one from USec brings knowledge of HCI and 
InfoSec as well. Two of the experts were international and two were local. 
 
There are very few experts in the field of USec, making it difficult to find participants. 
Usually, these tend to be experts in the field of InfoSec, who understand and appreciate the 
importance of HCI. They have a basic understanding of the HCI field although their 
background remains InfoSec. However, selected experts have conducted research in both 
fields and can be classified as USec experts. These are the experts that we classify as USec 
experts in this study. The USec expert that participated in the validation is representative of 
such a group.   
 
5.5.9 Data Analysis Techniques 
Data analysis techniques assisted in analysing the data collected using the various data 
collection techniques. The two data analysis techniques that are used in this research study 
are theme analysis and descriptive statistics. 
 
5.5.9.1 Theme Analysis 
Data analysis in qualitative research is ongoing throughout the data collection process. It 
requires that the researcher constantly thinks and reflects on emerging themes, and then 
adapts and changes methods if needed.  
 
Thematic analysis was used to develop the USec HE. Based on the literature review of the 
USec, HCI and InfoSec fields, key themes were identified. These themes represented the 
main requirements of security and usability and were subsequently transformed into 
heuristics for USec. Within these resided their related checklist items. The themes are 
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presented in section 4.4.1.  Their transformation into high-level heuristics with checklist 
items for USec was discussed in detail in sections 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4. 
 
As soon as the results from the case study were collected, an exploratory analysis of the data 
was made before the actual data analysis process began. This provided the capacity to make 
more sense of the diverse information. To support this, the data collected were in a format 
that could be easily analysed. 
 
In the FUE, the results of the scenarios and tasks that participants conducted were in Word 
format. The HE that they conducted on the two OHSNs and the user satisfaction 
questionnaires they completed were also in Word format. At the end of the FUE, participants 
compared the two OHSNs and the results were recorded in Excel spread sheets. The FUE 
facilitated the process of determining usability shortcomings, concerning security and privacy 
features in OHSNs. When the issues have been resolved, it is then possible to provide 
recommendations for addressing the identified problems (Barnum, 2002). Additionally, once 
this process is complete, key information will have resulted that can contribute to the 
development of the OHSNs with improved USec. The results and analysis of the FUE are 
discussed in section 6.3.  
 
The experts assessed the USec HE with a validation tool. The validation tool was developed 
in Excel and included seven sheets. The results obtained from applying the validation tool are 
presented in chapter 7. The tool itself is described in section 8.4.  
 
5.5.9.2 Descriptive Statistics 
For the purpose of this research, descriptive statistics are used to summarise and explain the 
data. The methods that will be used for the descriptive statistics include graphs and frequency 
tables. Frequency tables are the simplest method by which one may represent categorical and 
ordinal data and are commonly used as an exploratory procedure when attempting to 
establish how the different categories of values are distributed within the sample. 
 
In the FUE, frequency tables were used to summarise the responses of the participants as 
frequency counts. This occurred where the security and privacy features of the two OHSNs 
were measured against usability criteria in section 6.3.1.4.1. It also occurred in section 
6.3.1.4.2 where the tasks that the participants performed were measured against USec ratings. 
Frequency counts were also used to summarise the participants’ responses in the user 
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satisfaction questionnaires. These are presented in section 6.3.3.  Graphs were used in the 
form of column charts. In section 6.3.1.4.1 these were used to compare the results obtained 
from evaluating the usability of security and privacy features of both OHSNs. Column charts 
were also used in section 6.3.1.4.2 to compare the results obtained from evaluating the level 
of USec when performing tasks on both OHSNs. 
 
To analyse the results obtained by the validation tool, frequency tables and graphs were again 
implemented. Frequency counts were used to express the experts’ ratings in terms of the 
importance and clarity of the USec high-level heuristics in section 7.2.3. Two sets of USec 
severity ratings were examined in section 7.2.5 and frequency tables are used to express the 
experts’ ratings in terms of the ease of application and relevance of both sets. In section 7.2.6 
the material that was used to develop the USec HE is assessed. Frequency counts are used to 
measure the novelty and relevance of usability and USec material and security and privacy 
material. Frequency counts were also used to summarise the experts’ responses in the user 
satisfaction questionnaires. 
 
Graphs in the form of column charts were used. In section 7.2.3, two column charts were 
used: the first represented a comparison of expert ratings regarding the level of importance of 
each USec heuristic and the second a comparison regarding their level of clarity. In section 
7.2.4.13 a column chart is used to display the checklist items that provided low ratings when 
measured against a set of criteria. The results represent the experts’ responses in terms of 
frequency counts and percentages. 
 
5.6 DATA TRIANGULATION 
Data triangulation requires the use of multiple sampling strategies to collect data with the 
purpose of obtaining it from different times, social situations and people. Denzin (1970) 
states that data triangulation is only one form of triangulation. The other forms are theoretical 
triangulation, investigator triangulation and methodological triangulation. Theoretical 
triangulation requires the use of more than one theoretical position when interpreting data, 
while investigator triangulation requires more than one researcher to gather and interpret data 
and methodological triangulation requires the use of multiple methods for gathering data, 
thus is also referred to as multi-method, mixed-method, or methods triangulation. Thurmond 
(2001) also lists data-analysis triangulation as another form that requires multiple methods for 
analysing data. In terms of this research study, the forms of triangulation that will be applied 
include data triangulation, methodological triangulation and data-analysis triangulation. 
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Data triangulation is defined as the combination of strategies in an attempt to study the same 
phenomenon. It ensures that the inconsistencies reflected are due to trait rather than actual 
research strategy. Results will then be valid and not the outcome of a methodological artefact 
(Jick, 1979). When combining primary data (data collected by researchers themselves) and 
secondary data (data collected from other resources) the outcome is data triangulation. This 
provides one with the opportunity to validate findings by applying several different research 
methods. This will in turn enhance the credibility of the findings (Driscoll, 2006).  
 
Reliability and validity of data are elemental for successful research. To achieve reliability, 
the data need to be consistent, precise and repeatable. Otherwise, the derived conclusions will 
be worthless. The same applies for invalid data, which will be of no value because it provides 
a fake representation of a social reality. Consequently, it does not provide a true measurement 
of what is actually occurring in society. Data triangulation provides one with the ability to 
instil the concepts of reliability and validity in their data. In addition, it offers the opportunity 
to only utilise strong points of different data collection techniques, before integrating them to 
collect the data. Furthermore, data triangulation promotes productive research. That being 
said, there are cases where data triangulation is not deemed suitable. This is due to 
constraints, such as cost and time (Jick, 1979). 
 
The research is subject to methodological triangulation as well because it combines 
quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques.  The consensus is that quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques are used collectively because they complement each other, 
instead of rivalling one another (Jick, 1979). In the regard, Hofstee (2008) mentions that 
quantitative techniques are used to measure the relationship between two or more items in a 
statistical format. When evaluating the relationship quality between two or more items, 
qualitative techniques are employed because they assist the researcher to make sense of 
people’s interpretations and understandings.  
 
Applying multiple data collection techniques within a single research study is well supported, 
yet it requires considerable preparation. Selecting the appropriate methods and combining 
them effectively requires great thought. This is critical for successful triangulation and will 
assist in the better convergence and interpretation of the data, which in turn will result in 
more clear and credible data. The data collection techniques or methods, as they are referred 
to in this form of triangulation, are literature review, FUE, user satisfaction questionnaires 
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and HE. The reasons for selecting these and the way they were individually applied, is 
elaborated on in section 5.5.8. 
 
Lastly, the data collected from applying methodological triangulation must be quantitatively 
and qualitatively analysed. Hence, the data are subjected to data-analysis triangulation. In 
considering the data collection methods that were applied, descriptive statistics and theme 
analysis will be used to analyse and interpret the data, as discussed in section 5.5.9. With 
regards to this research, the forms of triangulation – data, methodological and data-analysis – 
are suitable and demonstrate the reliability and validity of the collected data. Figure 5.14 
displays how the three forms of triangulation combine, in an attempt to collect more reliable 
and valid data. They are integrated to represent the triangulation process and to demonstrate 
their convergence.  
 
 
Figure 5.14: The convergence of the three forms of triangulation 
As shown in figure 5.14, it is noticeable that the data triangulation is divided into time, 
people and social situation. These are explained in terms of the three cases to which they 
were applied. Time represents the total period required to prepare, conduct and analyse the 
case. The methodological triangulation shows the data collection techniques that were applied 
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for each case and the data-analysis triangulation shows how the collected data were analysed 
for each case.  
 
5.7 RESEARCH DESIGN OVERVIEW 
This section will provide a brief overview of the research design and methodology that has 
been discussed thus far. Table 5.6 contains three columns. The first column notes the research 
aspect that is being discussed. Column two displays the options relating to the specific 
research aspect. Column three then displays the option that was selected in the context of this 
research study. 
Table 5.6: Overview of the research design for the thesis 
 
Research aspect Alternatives Selected alternative 
HCI paradigm  Traditional science 
 Design science 
 Engineering 
 Phenomenological matrix 
 Experience-centred design 
Engineering 
Research philosophy  Positivism 
 Realism 
 Interpretivism 
 Objectivism 
 Subjectivism 
 Pragmatism 
 Functionalist 
 Interpretive 
 Radical humanist 
 Radical structuralist 
Interpretivism 
Research approach  Deductive 
 Inductive 
Inductive 
Research strategy  Experiment 
 Survey 
 Case study 
 Action research 
 Grounded theory 
 Ethnography 
 Archival research 
Case study 
Choices  Mono method 
 Mixed method 
 Multi-method 
Mixed methods 
Time horizon  Cross-sectional 
 Longitudinal 
Longitudinal 
Data collection techniques  Data collection and data analysis 
methods. Data triangulation will 
also be applied. 
 Secondary data 
 Questionnaires 
 HE 
 FUE 
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In table 5.6, attention should be drawn to the fact that the six layers of the onion research 
model are discussed within the column headed ―Research aspect‖. However, it is also evident 
that two additional aspects are discussed in this column as well, which are not part of the 
research onion – the HCI paradigm and the Conceptual framework. Figure 5.9 illustrates the 
onion research model which has been adjusted for this particular research project. The HCI 
paradigm and conceptual framework aspects are not included in this figure. Therefore, figure 
5.15 is provided to display the final research onion model to be applied. This onion 
incorporates the HCI paradigm and conceptual framework aspects as separate and additional 
layers to the existing model. 
 
 
Figure 5.15: The improved research onion model to be applied for this study  
 
It is practical for the researcher to first understand and know the paradigm in which the 
research will be undertaken. Once this has been done, focus can be directed towards the 
layers of the onion research model, starting with the philosophy and moving down to the 
actual techniques and procedures that will be used. It is for this reason that the HCI paradigm 
layer is situated at the exterior of the onion ring and before the Research philosophy layer. 
Figure 5.15 provides an indication of the research processes and considerations required in 
terms of the layers, in order to develop the USec framework. This is observed in terms of the 
ring representing the Conceptual framework, which is the goal and final ring that needs to be 
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reached. However, this can only be achieved by accomplishing the requirements for all of the 
other layers that precede it. 
 
A brief mention at this point to previous chapters that were discussed and chapters that are to 
follow is necessary.  This will improve understanding regarding chapter flow, connection and 
progression in the thesis.  To reiterate, chapter 1 presented the problem and discussed the 
research questions. In chapters 2 and 3 a theoretical investigation was conducted in HCI and 
USec respectively. Founded on secondary data (selected data collection technique) from 
these two chapters, a process to develop heuristics for SADs and a USec HE (first iteration) 
were established. Their development is presented and discussed in chapter 4. It must be noted 
that the USec HE (first iteration) is the outcome of completing phase 1 of the process. In 
chapter 5 the research design and methodology applied to this study is presented.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses a multiple case study (selected strategy) that was conducted on two 
OHSNs. This includes the data collected and analysed from the participants using FUEs, HEs 
and user satisfaction questionnaires (selected data collection techniques). It must be noted 
that the case study is the outcome of completing phase 3 of the process. Chapter 7 discusses 
the results from the experts, whom evaluated the USec HE (first iteration) with the validation 
tool. The results are analysed and interpreted. It must be noted that the validation conducted 
is the outcome of completing phase 2 of the process. Following, chapter 8 presents the USec 
framework. It discusses the components and resulting relationships that have been formed 
based on chapters 4, 6 and 7. The components are the USec HE (second iteration), the 
process to develop heuristics for SADs and the validation tool. The conclusion of the thesis is 
presented in chapter 9. 
 
5.8  ETHICS AND ANONYMITY 
Ethical considerations are essential in research. The required ethical clearances were obtained 
by the university in order to conduct the research. The privacy and protection of the 
participants were also acknowledged. Trochim (2006b) discusses five key phrases to provide 
ethical protections in social and medical research. By considering these, the rights of the 
research participants will be fulfilled. These are discussed in the context of this research and 
include the following phrases: 
 
1. Voluntary participation. People should not be forced to participate in the research. 
This usually occurs at universities or prisons where researchers will use ―captive 
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audiences‖ as their subjects. The participants for the FUE were postgraduate students 
who participated voluntarily. The experts to conduct the validations were approached, 
and confirmed their participation or not. 
 
2. Informed consent. This requires participants to be fully informed of the procedures 
and risks involved in the research. In addition they will need to provide their consent 
in order to participate. The participants in the FUE were provided with a consent form 
for each OHSN that they evaluated. This form stated the procedures of the research 
and required their signature to confirm their consent (see Appendix B.43: Consent 
Form for MedHelp and B.44: Consent Form for Google Health). No consent forms 
were required for the experts because they conducted their validations in their own 
time and space, using a validation tool that was created in this study to evaluate the 
USec HE, which is also an outcome of this study. 
 
3. Risk of harm. Participants should not be placed in any situation in which they are at 
any risk of harm during the research. This includes physical and psychological harm. 
The FUE was conducted in a lab at the NMMU, which is the environment where the 
participants conduct their research work. Hence they were familiar with the 
surroundings and experienced no unease. 
 
4. Confidentiality. This guarantees that identifying information of participants (if it 
exists) will only be available to people who are directly involved in the research. In 
this case, this includes the researcher and the supervisors of the study. 
 
5. Anonymity. This guarantees that the participants remain anonymous during the course 
of the study. This is a stronger form of privacy than confidentiality; however, it is 
more difficult to accomplish. Anonymity will be assured by identifying participants 
with the letter ―P‖ combined with a numeric value.  
 
5.9  SUMMARY  
This chapter focused on the research design and methodology of the study and is regarded as 
the most critical chapter of the research. There is a wealth of theory regarding research design 
and methodologies and, at times, the different theories may contradict one another, as to 
which method is better suited for a particular study and as to how it should be implemented. 
Therefore, the research design and methodology was discussed in detail by the use of a 
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model. Moreover, the options selected at each level of the disintegration were supported in 
the context of this research study. 
 
Before the model could be implemented, it was necessary to investigate the research 
paradigms that exist. These investigations led to the conclusion that the most suitable 
paradigm would be an engineering one. Once the paradigm was selected, it was then possible 
to introduce the model on which the research design and methodology would be based. This 
was the research onion model. In addition, the reasons for implementing the model were 
given. The model is divided into six layers: on layer one, the research philosophies were 
discussed – the chosen research philosophy was interpretivism. On layer two, the research 
approaches were discussed and inductive reasoning was chosen. The research strategies are 
the focus of layer three, where a case study is selected. On layer four research choices are 
considered. For this layer the mixed-model method was implemented. Time horizons are 
discussed on layer five and the option selected was a longitudinal study. The final layer, layer 
six, is dedicated to the research techniques and procedures. Combinations of options were 
employed that include secondary data, questionnaires, HE and FUE. 
 
A discussion on frameworks then followed. It was important to understand the components 
and relationships involved in developing a framework, as such information is vital for 
developing the USec framework. Subsequently, the research questions for the study were 
mentioned. The study has one main research question that is supported by four sub questions.  
 
Owing to the fact that a number of data collection techniques were used it is important to 
integrate the collected data, as improved data validity will result. This is achieved by means 
of data triangulation, which was the next section discussed. All of what had been discussed 
thus far in the chapter in terms of research design and methodology was then summarised in 
the next section, the research design overview. In accordance with the research design 
overview, figure 5.16 is presented. It recapitulates the research methodological process that 
was followed in this study to address the primary research question. The research 
methodological process is presented in two stages to distinguish between the preparation and 
the management of data. Stage 1 is concerned with the preparation, while stage 2 
concentrates on data management. To conclude the chapter, the controls that would be put 
into place to ensure that ethical considerations are adhered to were mentioned. 
 
Chapter 5: Research Design & Methodology 
 
150 
 
 
Figure 5.16: The research methodological process  
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY – ONLINE HEALTH SOCIAL 
NETWORKS  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the case study conducted on OHSNs. This case study applied three 
data collection methods: an FUE, a HE and a user satisfaction questionnaire. 
 
Section 6.2 will introduce OHSNs and related information. Section 6.3 presents the results 
from the case study and, based on the analysis, recommendations and conclusions are made. 
A summary is presented in section 6.4.  
 
6.2 ONLINE HEALTH SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Social networking describes a host of interactions between individuals within a social 
network. Online social networking tools exploit Internet technologies to support social 
networking actions among people. These tools may assist health organisations to better 
understand the needs of their consumers who use health and social care services, as they 
provide the people with a ―voice‖ to help improve health services along all boundaries and to 
promote an increased health conscious (Purdy, 2008). 
 
A critical factor for the adoption of health social networking tools is that they are easy to use. 
People should be able generate and share health content easily. Some of the more popular 
tools include wikis, blogs, podcasting/vodcasting, social bookmarking, collaborative tagging 
(or folksonomies), tag clouds, instant messaging, email, mashups, and RSS feeds. These tools 
form part of Web 2.0, the current evolution of the Internet. Some of the tools are discussed in 
table 6.1. Popular websites where the particular tools are being used are also provided. In 
addition, examples relating to the health field are provided (Boulos & Wheelert, 2007; Purdy, 
2008). 
Table 6.1: Web 2.0 tools 
Web 2.0 tool Common examples            
(not in health field) 
Examples in health field 
Wikis: collaborative software 
tools that permit users to add 
content, yet that content can be 
subject to editing by any person. 
Wikipedia: 
http://www.wikipedia.or
g/ 
 
Wiki Surgery: 
http://www.wikisurgery.com 
Flu Wiki:                      
http://fluwikie.com 
Blogs: simple content Most social networking DrugScope DrugData Updated blog: 
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Web 2.0 tool Common examples            
(not in health field) 
Examples in health field 
management tools. They provide 
non-experts with the ability to 
build Web diaries or online 
journals. 
websites provide blog 
features  
http://drugscope.wordpress.com/ 
Lord Darzi’s Blog:                                               
www.ournhs.nhs.uk/category/darzi/ 
Podcasting /vodcasting: permits 
digital downloads in audio and 
video formats from websites to 
MP3 and MP4 players. 
YouTube: 
http://www.youtube.co
m/ 
New England Journal of Medicine 
podcasts 
Johns Hopkins Medicine podcasts 
RSS feeds: permit users to 
automatically be notified of new 
content and updates on websites 
of their interest. 
CNN: 
http://edition.cnn.com/se
rvices/rss/ 
 
BBC News Health: 
http://newsrss.bbc.co.uk/rss/newslin
e_uk_edition/health/rss.xml 
New Scientist – Health: 
http://pheedo.com/f/newscientist_he
alth/rss10 
Mashups: provide capabilities 
for integration and derivative 
work by combining two or more 
pieces of digital media from 
different sources. 
Digg: 
http://www.digg.com/ 
 
HealthMap: 
http://www.healthmap.org 
 
 
The fact that Web 2.0 social networking tools are being used within the health and medical 
fields has led to the development of various social health systems terminologies. New 
terminologies have surfaced, including eHealth, PHR 2.0, Health 2.0, patient portals and 
Medicine 2.0 (Hughes et al., 2008). These systems are mostly integrated with Web 2.0 tools 
(as implied from the ―2.0‖ extension in their terminologies). In this study these types of 
website are termed OHSNs. There is ample space for innovation in this area. For example, 
industry is currently investigating solutions that can offer users more useful information, 
collected from their physical activity monitoring devices (Yeratziotis, Sannemann, Viitanen 
& Nieminen, 2011). This can provide a platform for service integration with OHSNs and 
other services. 
6.2.1 Personal Health Information 
 
ISO 27799 (Health informatics – Information security management in health using ISO/IEC 
27002) defines personal health information (PHI) as ―information about an identifiable 
person which relates to the physical or mental health of the individual or to provision of 
health services to the individual‖ (ISO/IEC 27799, 2008). This includes the following 
(ISO/IEC 27799, 2008): 
Chapter 6: Case Study – Online Health Social Networks 
 
154 
 
 Registration information of the individual required for the provision of health 
services. 
 Payment information or eligibility for health care with regard to the individual. 
 Information to uniquely identify the individual for health purposes (e.g. number or 
symbol). 
 Information about the individual collected in the course of the provision of health 
services. 
 Information derived from testing or examinations of a body part or bodily substance. 
 Identification of a person (e.g. a health professional) that provides healthcare to the 
individual. 
Support for patient control over PHI is now more evident than ever before (Halamka, Mandl 
& Tang, 2007). This is considered to be an appealing approach, given that it solves the 
consent and privacy issues that organisations face in the exchange of health data. The 
emphasis is on providing patients with custody over the PHI. They can therefore utilise their 
PHI in various ways. When patients are empowered and provided with such custody, they 
become personally responsible for protecting the confidentiality of their information. The 
outcome is accelerated health information exchange, as consent is no longer considered a 
barrier (Halamka et al., 2007).  
 
Patient control of health data may indeed be a desirable prospect. However, this has to be 
done in a methodical manner. The answer is not to remove security responsibilities from 
health care organisations and transfer them over to the patients, without assisting them in 
security matters. In order to succeed, issues such as privacy, policies, data ownership and 
personal control need to be investigated (Halamka et al., 2007). These security issues need 
attention from two perspectives: the health-care providers’ side and the patients’ side. This 
case study is concerned with the security and privacy aspects commencing from the patient 
perspective in OHSNs. 
 
6.2.2 Themes and Capabilities 
 
An in-depth analysis of Health 2.0 and Medicine 2.0 assists in identifying similarities in a 
number of key and prominent themes. These themes are representative of online social 
networking environments and most, if not all, should be integrated in other health social 
systems as well. The themes include the following (Hughes et al., 2008; Eysenbach, 2008): 
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1. Participation – The participants that are involved (e.g. doctors, patients, nurses). This 
empowers end-user participation and has resulted in a health care culture change. 
2. Collaboration – The impact on traditional and collaborative practices in medicine. 
3. The ability to provide health care which is personalised. 
4. The promotion of ongoing medical education. 
5. The associated method- and tool-related issues (e.g. the potential for inaccurate 
content provided by the end-user). 
6. Social networking – It is central to Web 2.0 applications and provides the basis for 
people to create connections. 
7. Apomediation – This relates to users identifying trustworthy and credible information 
and services over the Web 2.0. 
8. Openness – This relates to Web 2.0 from standards, transparency, interoperability, 
open source, and open interfaces’ perspectives. This also includes transparency and 
openness to information that was previously of limited access. 
Web 2.0 communities compile a wealth of information on selected topics for shared 
knowledge rather than for individual knowledge. This information centres on social 
networking and has revolutionised the manner in which people collaborate and communicate. 
By creating an online community for patients, a Web 2.0 community may be developed that 
promotes conversations regarding health practices (Frost & Massagli, 2008; Eysenbach 
2008). 
 
An important aspect of OHSNs is that they are not only fun, like Facebook or Flicker, but 
that they also need to be secure and trustworthy. They also need to provide immediate 
benefits for the users, as well as incentives (Yeratziotis et al., 2011). This will motivate users 
to participate and contribute constructively in a health virtual community (Eysenbach, 2008). 
These websites are mainly designed for the patient population and their success depends on 
the utilisation of PHI by its users. Hence, security and privacy is critical. 
  
OHSNs provide patients with the capabilities to interact and communicate with their 
healthcare providers. Some of the more popular websites include MS HealthVault, Google 
Health, Care Converge, MedHelp, MEDSEEK, and PatientsLikeMe. There is optimism 
regarding the advancement and adoption of OHSNs in the future (Kuhn, 2008; Eysenbach, 
2008). 
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OHSNs benefit healthcare providers and patients equally because they increase productivity 
and efficiency. Depending on their level of functionality, patients are able to register and 
complete forms online. This saves time and reduces physical visits to healthcare providers. 
Patients can request prescription refills online, make medication requests and order health 
equipment (e.g. glasses, contact lenses). They can also access medical records and health 
information and receive their lab tests and x-rays. In addition, they can pay bills and schedule 
appointments.  
 
Patients are able to communicate directly with their healthcare providers (e.g. ask questions 
and/or leave comments) in simply-tracked, well-managed, documented and evaluated 
methods (Katz & Moyer, 2004; Alder, 2006). OHSNs may be free-standing or integrated with 
a system owned by the health care provider. In essence, these technologies can help revitalise 
primary care, improve patient–doctor communication and enhance patient access (Alder, 
2006). To summarise, the key benefits of OHSNs are the following (Katz & Moyer, 2004):  
1. They address patient communication with the health care providers. This is a need 
that was not met before. As a result, patient satisfaction will improve and service 
delivery will be more effective. 
2. Efficiency of service delivery will be improved even more by substituting non-
efficient communication styles with more efficient ones (e.g. through improved 
management of medical problems). 
3. Business practices are improved because patient billing and registration becomes 
more efficient. 
Research proves that by providing patients with their online health records, communication 
and trust with their healthcare providers improves (Frost & Massagli, 2008). The patient data 
are also better completed and the overall clinical encounter is one of better quality. However, 
providing patients with static medical information can be overwhelming. If patients are to 
interpret this information correctly, the health record must be more than just a static 
repository of health data. It should rather support patients in combining different sources of 
data, and provide knowledge as well as software tools in which patients may become active 
participants in their own health (Frost & Massagli, 2008). 
 
6.2.3 Barriers and Concerns 
 
The benefits of OHSNs are evident; however, there are many barriers that will need to be 
overcome for successful implementation. Already mentioned are aspects such as the 
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compensation for services, patient privacy and confidentiality, practical workflow concerns 
and medico-legal concerns (Alder, 2006). In addition, the overwhelming numbers of online 
messages from the patients must be managed; websites need to be easy to use; assurance 
should be given that the interpersonal relationships between physicians and patients will not 
be lost; and patients educated about privacy concerns (Zickmund, Hess, Bryce, McTigue, 
Olshansky, Fitzgerald, et al., 2007). These issues relate to privacy, security, usability and UX. 
Therefore, the concept of USec is critical in such an environment. 
 
The potential of well-designed OHSNs is clearly understood. However, these systems will 
only fulfil their potential if the patients themselves know how to use them effectively. To 
achieve this, the websites must be user-friendly and meet the particular needs of the patients. 
This will ensure that they are helpful and also accepted by the patients. This requires OHSNs 
to be evaluated according to usability, satisfaction and helpfulness criteria derived from the 
patients’ perspective. They will also need to effectively promote health information 
(Farzanfar, Finkelstein & Friedman, 2004).   
 
6.2.4 The Semantic Web 
 
The Internet is currently in the Web 2.0 era, which makes use of social networking tools that 
facilitate collaboration, sharing and openness of information and resources. The next level of 
the Web is referred to as Web 3.0 or the semantic Web. There have been a wide range of 
definitions to explain this term, which have caused debate. A definition provided by John 
Markoff defines Web 3.0 as ―a set of technologies that offer efficient new ways to help 
computers organize and draw conclusions from online data‖ (Borland, 2007). 
 
The purpose of Web 3.0 is to make computers understand information without human 
intervention. This will enable them to do most of the work relating to the finding and sharing 
of required information (Mortimer, 2007; Borland, 2007). The semantic Web and Web 3.0 are 
terms that are used interchangeably. One may argue that the term Web 3.0 is used as a 
marketing ploy more than anything else. The term, semantic Web, is used because the 
primary feature of this version of the Web is to use metadata. It also requires the use of 
semantic annotation within Web documents in order to articulate meaning, as expressed by 
Berners-Lee (in Giustini, 2007). This would entail blending semantic Web data-handling 
techniques with Web 2.0 features (Borland, 2007). The use of software and intelligent agents 
is critical for its success (Metz, 2007; Mortimer, 2007), as these agents will make decisions 
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on behalf of the user (Mortimer, 2007). In some cases, it has been said that the ―thing‖ called 
Web 3.0 is only a subset of the semantic Web vision (Borland, 2007). 
 
The semantic Web is at a vastly theoretical stage and will take time to fulfil its promise 
(Hughes et al., 2008; Eysenbach, 2008). If it does fulfil it, the Web will become easier to use. 
Computers will perform tasks on the users’ behalf so that they may focus on their work 
(Giustini, 2007). However, some businesses have already started to adopt the new 
technologies. They are applying the simpler semantic Web tools at the moment while 
avoiding the more ambitious ones. Tools such as providing once-inaccessible data sources 
online, improving automate database searches, helping users select holiday destinations and 
sorting through complicated financial data more efficiently are already being implemented 
(Borland, 2007). 
 
For the health industry, Web 3.0 is deemed to be a necessary component for better health 
practices. In fact, the medical industry is one of the first groups involved in the development 
of the semantic Web. The W3C (World Wide Consortium) has thus launched the Health Care 
and Life Sciences Interest Group. They are chartered to ―develop and support the use of 
semantic Web technologies and practices to improve collaboration, research and 
development, and innovation adoption in the Health Care and Life Science domains. Success 
in these domains depends on a foundation of semantically rich system, process and 
information interoperability‖ (Jessen, 2007). 
 
Doctors will be able to find the information they require instead of just searching for it, as 
they do in the ―unorganised‖ Web 2.0. Medical librarians also believe it will lead to the 
development of better mechanisms for information retrieval, as this is becoming increasingly 
difficult at the moment (Giustini, 2007). Bioinformatics and systems biology in particular 
will benefit from using Web 3.0 and data representation and management will improve 
considerably. The processing of large quantities of data, in disparate systems with rich 
semantic tools will provide knowledge discovery (Jessen, 2007). Giustini, (2007) believes 
that publishing clinical data that can be scrutinised openly will also produce a wealth of 
medical knowledge. 
 
Another outcome from Web 3.0 is the development of a personalised healthcare system or 
personalised medicine, as it is better referred to. The tools will be in place to analyse genetic 
profiles, once again due to the quantities of information being produced. This will assist in 
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treating patients’ health problems according to their own personal information gathered. 
However, providing patients with better ways to manage their disease based on their genetic 
and environmental profile will be a challenge (Jessen, 2007). But the huge datasets and 
virtual three-dimensional tools may help provide treatments for new diseases and natural 
disasters (Giustini, 2007). 
 
Modern health care applications for both patient and health-care provider use are generally 
embedded with social tools and capabilities in their design. A contradiction tends to surface 
here, as these tools promote free sharing of personal information over the Internet, yet 
security of PHI remains a key priority and in many cases an obstacle to the adoption of these 
tools. Improved designs are required to ensure that users can share and use PHI and be 
guaranteed that it is done in the most secure and trustworthy manner. This approach must also 
be easy to understand and use for the end-users.  
 
Part of the solution to this is to apply USec practices to the design of an OHSN. The research 
conducted in the areas of USec and InfoSec needs to be combined and addressed in an 
understandable context. This context will provide input into the development of a framework 
for USec in online social networking environments; a framework that is equally imperative 
for both users and developers. The main outcome will be a comprehensive and theoretical 
guide for the developers, which will provide them with the ability to enhance their services to 
end-users. This will be achieved by ensuring security and usability is a unified process, which 
can be incorporated into the design of their software. As a result, user competencies and 
preferences will be acknowledged, leading to USec.  
 
6.3 THE CASE STUDY 
A multiple-case study (Yin, 2008) was conducted on two OHSNs. This strategy examines 
various cases. Such studies can offer a complete representation of UX’s interaction with 
products; evaluating its effectiveness via its strengths and weaknesses. This provides a range 
of constructive information for analysis, from which data patterns emerge, improving thereby 
the product, once recommended changes have been implemented. The data collection 
techniques within the case study consisted of an FUE, a HE and a user satisfaction 
questionnaire. The case study will be discussed in this section. 
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6.3.1 Data Collection Method I – Formative Usability Evaluation 
 
A FUE, as discussed in section 5.5.8.3, was conducted as part of the case study. The FUE 
method is used by development teams to evaluate a product. Accordingly, one needs to know 
what information can be obtained by the evaluation beforehand (Benyon et al., 2005). This 
method was used to assess the USec on the two websites. The purpose of the FUE method as 
applied in the broader research study is twofold:  
1. Test the application of the new USec HE that was developed and reported in chapter 4 
(Yeratziotis et al., 2012). The USec HE is a tool for determining security and privacy 
usability violations on interfaces. 
2. Assess the level of USec on the two websites (Yeratziotis, Pottas & van Greunen, 
2011b). Therefore, it is necessary to determine how usable the security/privacy 
features and information are that participants need to interact with and understand. 
This would be a comparative study that would help determine the ―do’s and don’ts‖ 
with regard to the design of security and privacy on an OHSN. As a result, 
recommendations can be provided for improving USec on OHSNs. 
 
6.3.1.1 The Selected OHSNs 
 
The FUE was conducted on two OHSNs. These were Google Health and MedHelp. Figure 
6.1 presents the MedHelp homepage and figure 6.2 presents the webpage that users are 
directed to once they have logged-in to Google Health. As mentioned in section 5.5.8.3, a 
selection procedure was followed to determine the OHSN to be studied. The selection 
procedure is summarised as follows:  
1. Review literature in online social networking and OHSNs to identify characteristics.  
2. Develop and apply the requirements based on the characteristics identified previously.  
This resulted in 21 candidate websites. 
3. Develop and apply a minimum set of requirements on the 21 websites, resulting in 
seven candidate websites. 
4. Apply bonus requirements to the seven websites to determine the final 2 websites for 
the study.  
MedHelp is an online health community that connects people with medical experts and others 
who have similar experiences. It empowers over 12 million people each month to take control 
of their health. It is a privately-funded company that has long-standing partnerships with the 
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top medical institutions. The infrastructure allows patients actively to manage their health 
through its condition-specific health applications and Personal Health Records (PHRs).  
 
 
Figure 6.1: MedHelp homepage (http://www.medhelp.org/)      
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Google Health webpage once logged-in (www.google.com/health/)  
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Google Health allows users to organise, track, monitor, and act on their health information. 
With a Google Health account, users can store, manage and share all their health and 
wellness information in one central place. It allows users to share their information with 
whomever they want. Google Health uses sophisticated security techniques to help keep 
users’ information secure and private.  
 
This study has been examining Google Health since 2009, but, it should be noted that Google 
retired the Google Health service on 1 January 2012.  
(http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/update-on-google-health-and-google.html).   
 
Users will be able to download their data in various formats until 1 January 2013. The reason 
for this is that Google Health was designed to provide people with access to their personal 
health information in a consumer-centred approach. Accordingly, Google wanted to have an 
impact on the day-to-day health experiences of millions of users. After a few years of 
existence, however, it has not had the desired effect and has only been adopted by certain 
user groups (e.g. tech-savvy patients and their caregivers, fitness and wellness enthusiasts). In 
essence, Google has not been successful in translating the limited usage into widespread 
adoption in the daily health routines of millions of people.  
 
6.3.1.2 Participants 
 
A total of six participants were used in the usability evaluations. The participants were 
postgraduate students from the field of ICT. Table 6.2 provides more detail about the 
participant profiles. 
Table 6.2: Participant profiles 
Participant Level of studies Research focus 
P1 PhD Health informatics 
P2 Masters Health informatics 
P3 Masters InfoSec 
P4 Masters InfoSec 
P5 PhD HCI 
P6 PhD HCI 
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The participants can be considered as computer experts, which may have affected their 
perceptions and judgments. However, supporting their selection is the fact that they had a 
familiarity with social networks (e.g. Facebook), allowing them to express informed 
opinions. It would have been preferred to have participants with experience on OHSNs 
specifically, but it was difficult to identify such participants, as OHSNs are a relatively 
unknown online service in South Africa and most are limited to users in America and Europe. 
Another difficulty with recruiting such participants would have been their reluctance to share 
their ―real‖ health information with a researcher. In the light of these constraints, it is 
believed that the postgraduate students provided a viable and sensible selection of 
participants. 
 
6.3.1.3 Scenarios and Tasks 
 
Once the OHSNs were selected, participants were provided with scenarios. These are stories 
that provide general descriptions about the surrounding context. This helps participants to 
better understand the user that they are representing as a potential user of the website. The 
tasks are more specific and describe the actions that a participant will need to perform during 
the usability evaluation. These were typical tasks that users of an OHSN would need to 
perform in a real-life context. The tasks in the scenarios addressed interactions of a 
security/privacy nature. 
An initial scenario was provided for each OHSN. Based on this scenario, a total of seven 
tasks needed to be conducted on the MedHelp and Google Health websites. Each of the seven 
tasks included their own sub-scenarios that built on the initial scenario. Additionally, in order 
to achieve the goal of a task, a number of sub-tasks would need to be completed. The 
participants also had the option to provide comments for each sub-task, including both 
negative and positive comments. The tasks are described in table 6.3. The numbers in 
brackets next to the task represent the number of subtasks that need to be performed to 
complete the overall task in MedHelp and Google Health respectively.  
Table 6.3: The tasks for the FUE 
Task Description Purpose 
1 Home page impression (8) (8) To determine if the participants’ impression of the 
homepage instils trust and how it impacts on their decision 
to register on the website. 
2 Registration process (17) (17) In order to use the full capabilities of the website, users’ 
are required to register and create an online user profile. 
Participants’ created a user profile with minimum personal 
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information. 
3 Account settings/My account 
(23) (18) 
Users’ may be concerned about protecting their personal 
information as well as possible. A central place where they 
can configure all the security and privacy settings for their 
user profile is required. This central place is referred to as 
―Account settings‖ in MedHelp and ―My account‖ in 
Google Health. 
4 Find a friend/Share your profile 
(5) (9) 
This task examined the process of sharing information 
with other patients. In MedHelp the participants were 
required to send a friend invitation before sharing 
information. Google Health does not allow for the concept 
of creating friends. However, it allows users to share their 
profile with others by sending a share request. 
5 Find a doctor/Import your 
medical record (8) (10) 
The participants were required to find a doctor on 
MedHelp and assess the profile of that doctor. In Google 
Health, they would need to have an online medical record 
to share information and communicate with health-care 
providers. Participants’ examined the process of doing 
both without making real communication with health-care 
providers or importing medical records in both MedHelp 
and Google Health. 
6 Website online policies (11) 
(10) 
This task focused on the website policies. Policies are 
provided to users during registration, yet it is debatable 
whether these will be perused in detail at this stage. 
7 Security considerations (6) (7) This task mentioned several security considerations 
regarding the websites. It did not require participants’ to 
complete any tasks. They just had to provide their 
comments (if any). These considerations included identity 
signals (certificates), session locks, simultaneous 
connections to a profile, deleting a profile and third-party 
websites. 
 
The case study evaluated the security and privacy features of the two OHSNs. It is important 
to clarify that the usability criteria applied are measuring the security and the privacy features 
of the websites alone and not the overall usability of the websites. The results presented are 
based on evaluating the security and privacy features in terms of usability criteria and on 
evaluating the task in terms of USec. 
6.3.1.4 Results and Analysis 
 
The results from the FUE are now presented. Following the analysis, recommendations are 
made for improving the level of USec on both OHSNs. 
6.3.1.4.1 Applying usability criteria on security and privacy features 
The specific usability criteria include ease-of-use, terminology, ease-of-learning, feedback, 
awareness, errors, and help and documentation. In addition to these, trust, which is not 
necessarily a usability criterion, is also measured. Trust has an impact on UX and in order to 
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use OHSNs to their full capabilities, they need to provide security and privacy features that 
can gain user trust. The selected usability criteria measure the following aspects: 
 Ease-of-use - Measures the security/privacy features on the basis of characteristics 
such as simplicity, user-friendliness, flexibility and least steps in completing a task. 
 Terminology - Measures the logical, natural order of information. It uses phrases and 
concepts familiar to users and avoids complicated security/privacy terms. This is 
commonly known as speaking the users’ language. 
 Ease-of-learning - Measures the ease in learning to use the security/privacy features, 
as well as ease in remembering features after not using them for a time. Ease of 
learning allows users to build on their knowledge without deliberate efforts. 
 Feedback - Measures timely feedback in response to participants’ security actions. It 
is important that users are always informed about the status of their actions. 
 Awareness - Consequences must be made apparent to users before performing the 
actual security actions. Users must also be aware of their own security status.   
 Errors - Measure the level of protection that users have to avoid making security 
errors. If errors occur, the problem and its solution must be provided. Messages must 
be in plain language so that users can recover from the error. 
 Help and documentation - Measures the level of guidance and assistance users need to 
complete security tasks. A usable website minimises the need for assistance. 
However, it is practice to provide help and documentation in case these are required. 
Similar to providing help for general tasks, which are the users’ primary goals, 
support for security information and instructions, which are generally the users’ 
secondary goals, is also necessary. 
 Trust - Measures the participants’ confidence in correctly performing security tasks 
and providing personal information. 
 
Usability criteria were represented in several sub-tasks. After evaluation, participants 
provided an overall rating based on acknowledged usability criteria (Pierotti, 1995; Nielsen, 
2006). Tables 6.4 and 6.5 represent the frequency of the participants’ responses (n = 6). The 
scores are representative of the number of users that selected the following: VG = Very 
Good; G = Good; BA = Barely Acceptable; P = Poor; and VP = Very Poor. The total for the 
responses are accumulated for each score as well. The intention is to identify usability criteria 
that are lacking in some way, and to improve these to a level of Good. Achieving an average 
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of Very Good is the ultimate objective; thereby, achieving the best UX for patients interacting 
with the website’s security and privacy features.  
Table 6.4: Overall usability ratings for security and privacy features on MedHelp 
Usability criteria VG G BA P VP 
Trust 1 2 1  2 
Ease-of-use 2 3 1   
Terminology  4 1 1  
Ease-of-learning 1 3 2   
Feedback  3 1 2  
Awareness 1 3  2  
Errors  1 4 1  
Help & documentation 1 2 1 2  
TOTAL 6 21 11 8 2 
 
Table 6.5: Overall usability ratings for security and privacy features on Google Health 
Usability criteria VG G BA P VP 
Trust 2 4    
Ease-of-use 2 4    
Terminology 4 2    
Ease-of-learning 1 5    
Feedback  5 1   
Awareness 1 5    
Errors  2 2 2  
Help & documentation 1 5    
TOTAL 11 32 3 2  
 
A total of six participants evaluated the security and privacy features of MedHelp and Google 
Health according to eight usability criteria. This provided a total of forty-eight participant 
responses for each OHSN. The responses from each OHSN are compared in the graph in 
figure 6.3. The graph indicates that Google Health’s security and privacy features are more 
usable than those of MedHelp. Following figure 6.3 is a detailed discussion on the usability 
criteria and their relating scores for each OHSN. 
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Figure 6.3: Comparison on the usability of MedHelp and Google Health’s security and privacy features  
With regards to the Trust criterion, Google Health scored higher than MedHelp. Participants’ 
with a Very Good or Good trust relationship on Google Health occurred less often on 
MedHelp. What is alarming is the Barely Acceptable and Very Poor trust relationships built 
between participants’ and MedHelp. 
 
With regards to the Ease-of-use criterion, Google Health scored marginally better than 
MedHelp. Overall, ease-of-use was Very Good or Good. However, one participant rated 
MedHelp as Barely Acceptable. 
 
With regards to the Terminology criterion, Google Health scored higher than MedHelp, with 
Very Good and Good, while MedHelp scored a Good rating overall. However, Barely 
Acceptable and Poor ratings also occurred. 
 
With regards to the Ease-of-learning criterion, Google Health scored higher than MedHelp 
with Very Good and Good, while MedHelp averaged a Good score with one Very Good and 
two Barely Acceptable scores. 
 
With regards to the Feedback criterion, Google Health scored higher than MedHelp, with 
Good for all participants except one, who deemed it Barely Acceptable. MedHelp had three 
Good scores, one Barely Acceptable and two Poor scores. 
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With regards to the Awareness criterion, Google Health scored higher than MedHelp on this 
measure, with an average Good, which included one Very Good score.  MedHelp barely 
averaged a Good, with one Very Good score. However, it included two Poor scores, which 
are concerns. 
 
With regards to the Errors criterion, both websites scored low and averaged Barely 
Acceptable. 
 
With regards to the Help and documentation criterion, Google Health scored higher than 
MedHelp with an average Good, with one Very Good score. MedHelp had mixed scores, with 
one Very Good, two Good, one Barely Acceptable and two Poor scores. The inconsistency of 
the scores, the Barely Acceptable and Poor scores were a concern. 
 
The results indicate that Google Health has higher levels of usability with regard to its 
security and privacy features. Terminology scored a Very Good, while other usability criteria, 
apart from errors, averaged Good, thereby being acceptable, even though they could be 
improved. The only real concern was with the errors criterion; this averaged Barely 
Acceptable and requires improvement. Following this, of lesser concern, is the feedback 
criterion.  
 
MedHelp requires substantial improvements on many usability criteria. The ease-of-use, 
terminology and ease-of-learning criteria are acceptable, although these could be 
considerably improved. Immediate attention and improvements is needed for trust, feedback, 
errors, help and documentation. 
 
6.3.1.4.2 Applying usable security ratings on tasks 
 
Participants provided their overall ratings for the seven tasks, based on their UX in 
performing the tasks. They had to measure the two criteria defining USec in performing the 
overall task and its subtasks – how usable and secure those features were. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 
represent the frequency of the participants’ responses (n = 6). The scores are representative of 
the number of participants’ that selected the following: S & U = Secure & Usable; S & MU = 
Secure & Moderately Usable; S & NU = Secure & Not Usable; NS & U = Not Secure & 
Usable; and NS & NU = Not Secure & Not Usable. A total for the responses is accumulated 
for each score as well. In table 6.6, note that there are five answers instead of six for Task 1. 
This was because one participant provided no rating here.  
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Comparisons were based on how usable and secure the tasks were for the participants, 
according to their experiences. The goal is to identify the tasks that are weak from a USec 
perspective: either from a lack of security, usability, or both. Once identified, improvements 
can be made in performing a task, resulting in a more secure and usable experience for the 
users. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 represent the frequencies of the participants’ responses (n = 6). 
Table 6.6: Overall security and usability ratings for the tasks on MedHelp 
Task S & U S & MU S & NU NS & U NS & NU 
1 – Home page impression 2 1   2 
2 – Registration process 3 1 1 1  
3 – Account settings/My account 2 2   2 
4 – Find a friend/Share your profile 2 1 2 1  
5 – Find a doctor/import your medical 
record 
1 3  1 1 
6 – Website online policies 2 2  2  
7– Security considerations 1 2  1 2 
TOTAL 13 12 3 6 7 
 
Table 6.7: Overall security and usability ratings for the tasks on Google Health 
Task S & U S & MU S & NU NS & U NS & NU 
1 – Home page impression 4 2    
2 – Registration process 5 1    
3 – Account settings/My account 2 4    
4 – Find a friend/Share your profile 5 1    
5 – Find a doctor/import your medical 
record 
2 3  1  
6 – Website online policies 4 1  1  
7– Security considerations 1 5    
TOTAL 23 17  2  
 
A total of six participants evaluated the USec level of MedHelp and Google Health, 
according to seven tasks. This provides a total of forty-two participant responses. MedHelp 
had forty-one however, because one rating was not provided, as mentioned previously. The 
responses from each OHSN are compared in the graph in figure 6.4. The graph indicates that 
performing tasks on Google Health’s provides more USec than on MedHelp. Following 
figure 6.4 is a detailed discussion on the tasks and their related scores for each OHSN. 
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of USec when performing tasks on MedHelp and Google Health 
Task 1 refers to the rating of the impression of the homepage. Google Health scored high, as 
participants trusted it more than MedHelp’s homepage. Four scores suggest that the Google 
Health homepage is Secure & Usable; and two scores give Secure & Moderately Usable. 
This is averaged as Secure & Usable. MedHelp had two Secure & Usable, one Secure & 
Moderately Usable and two Not Secure & Not Usable scores. The inconsistency of the scores 
is of concern. Two scores rated as Not Secure & Not Usable cause concern, making it 
difficult to determine an average for MedHelp. 
 
Task 2 is on the registration process. Google Health scored higher, with five scores for Secure 
& Usable, and one for Secure & Moderately Usable, hence averaging Secure & Usable. 
MedHelp had mixed scores, with three Secure & Usable, one Secure & Moderately Usable, 
one Secure & Not Usable and one Not Secure & Usable. The inconsistency should be 
investigated, even though it averaged a Secure & Moderately Usable. 
 
Task 3 focuses on the central place where users configure their security settings. Google 
Health’s My account scored higher than MedHelp’s Account settings, having four Secure & 
Moderately Usable and two Secure & Usable. Google Health averaged Secure & Moderately 
Usable. MedHelp included two Secure & Usable, two Secure & Moderately Usable and two 
Not Secure & Not Usable. This makes it difficult to determine an average. 
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Task 4 focuses on sharing information with other users. Google Health’s Share-your-profile 
rated higher than MedHelp’s Find-a-friend. Having five Secure & Usable and one Secure & 
Moderately Usable scores, Google Health averaged Secure & Usable. MedHelp’s mixed 
scores: two Secure & Usable, one Secure & Moderately Usable, two Secure & Not Usable, 
and one Not Secure and Usable make it difficult to determine an average. 
 
Task 5 focuses on the steps to connect with health-care providers: finding a doctor on 
MedHelp and importing a medical record in Google Health. Google Health rated slightly 
higher than MedHelp, with two Secure & Usable, three Secure & Moderately Usable and one 
Not Secure & Usable. Google Health averaged Secure & Moderately Usable. MedHelp had 
one Secure & Usable, three Secure & Moderately Usable, one Not Secure and Usable and 
one Not Secure & Not Usable. The MedHelp score averaged Secure & Moderately Usable. 
 
Task 6 evaluates the online policies. Google Health scored slightly higher than MedHelp, 
with four Secure & Usable, one Secure & Moderately Usable and one Not Secure & Usable, 
and a final average of Secure & Usable. MedHelp had two Secure & Usable, two Secure & 
Moderately Usable and two Not Secure & Usable, averaging as Secure & Moderately 
Usable. 
 
Task 7 investigates additional security considerations. Google Health scored higher than 
MedHelp with one Secure & Usable and five Secure & Moderately Usable; consequently, it 
averaged Secure & Moderately Usable. MedHelp had one Secure & Usable, two Secure & 
Moderately Usable, one Not Secure & Usable and one Not Secure & Not Usable. This made 
it difficult finding an average for MedHelp. 
 
Google Health provides more USec than MedHelp in performing security tasks. For Google 
Health, homepage impression, registration, sharing-your-profile and online policies were 
Secure & Usable. Configuring security settings (via My account), importing-a- medical 
record and security considerations were rated Secure & Moderately Usable. Thus these 
require improvements in the usability component, as security is deemed adequate. 
 
MedHelp rated poorly against Google Health in terms of USec when performing security-
related tasks. For MedHelp, registration process, finding-a-doctor and online policies rated: 
Secure & Moderately Usable. The security/privacy features to perform these tasks need 
usability improvements. The tasks of homepage impression, security settings (via Account 
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settings), find-a-friend and security were inconclusive because of inconsistency in ratings. 
This requires investigation. The problem may be in a lack of security, usability, or both; thus, 
improvements are needed. 
 
6.3.1.5 Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for improving the usability of security and privacy on both OHSNs are 
provided, according to the usability criteria (Yeratziotis et al., 2011b). Table 6.8 provides 
recommendations for MedHelp and table 6.9 for Google Health. 
Table 6.8: USec recommendations for MedHelp 
Usability 
criteria 
MedHelp recommendations 
Trust 1. Provide mechanisms to verify doctor credibility (e.g. articles, real-life 
stories, ratings, patient reviews and testimonials). However, this can raise 
extra privacy issues as users are not using real names either. Provide 
Google links where users can download additional information about the 
doctor. Provide confirmation of doctor credentials by university or work 
institution. Provide a mechanism for doctors to verify their own credibility 
when they register on the website.  
2. Only permit single sign-in sessions. 
3. Ensure the verification of email accounts before users are granted access to 
the website. 
4. Provide codes that verify health information. These must be explained and 
be easily identifiable on the interface (e.g. MedHelp complies with the 
HON Code. However, users were not aware of it and it was also difficult to 
identify on the interface. A participant that was aware of it still did not trust 
it because it is verified by a non-profit organisation. Include additional 
codes e.g. HIPAA). 
5. Provide valid certificates on the website. 
6. Provide more security information (e.g. last account activity session and 
signalling the IP address from which the account is accessed). 
7. Users who log out should not be able to return to the previous page by 
clicking the back button of their browser. 
8. Provide less advertising on the website. 
9. Consider providing a minimum registration fee for users to join the website. 
10. Make security and privacy features more visible on the homepage. Apart 
from the log-in feature, security policies are hidden in an overpopulated 
interface, making them difficult to identify. 
11. Provide users with a choice for setting an idle log-out time that they deem 
secure and usable. This will ensure a session lock after a period of inactivity 
(e.g. similar to time-out sessions on e-banking websites).  
12. Provide default settings that are the most advantageous to the user.  
13. Users should not need to provide a reason for deleting their account. It 
Chapter 6: Case Study – Online Health Social Networks 
 
173 
 
Usability 
criteria 
MedHelp recommendations 
should be optional, in case they wish to do so. 
Ease of use 1. Provide more information regarding the purpose of a function (e.g. block-
list, privacy features). 
2. Provide reasoning when a user has been blocked. 
3. Reposition the Account settings link either to the top right-hand corner of 
the interface (next to the logout link) or provide a tab for Account settings 
instead of a link (similar to the My Home and Profile tabs). 
4. The purpose of the Block-list function is explained when users hover over a 
question mark next to it with the mouse pointer. Novice users may not 
foresee such an action in order to get this information. 
Terminology 1. Provide a checkbox for users to select when stating that ―I accept the terms 
and conditions‖. 
2. Provide shorter sentences in policies. Some are too long, which makes 
reading and understanding them difficult.  
3. Provide policies with simpler language. They currently read like legal 
documents, which are difficult to understand. However, this is their purpose 
and it is standard practice. It may be useful to consider simpler version 
policies in addition to the legal ones. 
4. Key points are not revealed regarding what will be released and how 
information will be used, although they indicate what information will not 
be used for (e.g. Disclosure to third-party advertising companies, privacy 
concerns to connect with Facebook). 
Ease of learning 1. The text size for the Account settings sub-links are too small in comparison 
to other text on the interface, which makes them difficult to identify. 
2. Provide the procedure for verifying the email address in the Notifications 
sub-link.  
3. Provide better descriptions for actions and features. These are not clear for 
first time users. 
4. Provide distinct boundaries for sub-links. Users cannot always determine in 
which sub-link they are visually. 
Feedback 1. Confirm changes more visibly. Identification is difficult because they are 
not at the point of recent activity (e.g. change password, change privacy 
settings). 
2. Once users change their nickname (as requested by the website), the 
notification message remains, even if the nickname has been successfully 
changed. Only when users select signup is it removed.  
3. The website delays notifying users if a nickname is in use. In addition, 
suggested nicknames are difficult to remember, even though they are 
difficult to guess and are ―close‖ to users’ initial preferences.  
4. Provide emails to verify the change of password.  
5. The ―change password‖ window must be closed once the process is 
complete and confirmation is provided. 
6. Provide a current status when sending an invite to a friend (e.g. pending 
reply). 
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Usability 
criteria 
MedHelp recommendations 
Awareness 1. The details of the user who is logged-in must be more visible. It is difficult 
to identify because of location and text size.  
2. It is not apparent that the Account Settings link refers to the security and 
privacy settings of the user profile. 
3. Users are not made aware of the consequences of unblocking another user.  
They are only provided with a pop-up screen asking them if they are sure 
about this action. 
4. Provide more information about friend invitation requests when accessing 
the Friends link.  
5. There is no confirmation that friend invitation requests have been sent.  The 
only time it is observable is when the user selects the Invite button. 
6. Provide more options and descriptions in the Account settings link instead 
of sub-links (similar to Facebook). 
Errors 1. Provide more guidance in error messages (e.g. where a password does not 
match confirmation password, try providing a solution to the problem as 
well, such as Caps Lock is active).  
2. When a user enters an incorrect verification code during registration, the 
website fails to generate a new one. 
Help & 
documentation 
1. Provide more information about security, privacy and confidentiality in the 
FAQs (e.g. Is my information safe? Who can view my account? Who is the 
custodian of my information? What happens with my information when I 
deregister? Do third-party websites access my information? Are the doctors 
credible?)  
2. Provide more guidance on how a user can link their profile to their 
Facebook account and how Facebook benefits from this. 
 
Table 6.9: USec recommendations for Google Health 
Usability 
criteria 
Google Health recommendations 
Trust 1. Provide more country-specific policies. Security/privacy issues tend to be 
well presented but are the same, regardless of the users’ country of origin 
(selected when users create their profile). In addition to general website 
policies, there could be supplementary ones specific to the country of 
origin. These must also be provided in the native languages, along with 
English. 
2. Provide more information and reviews about the third-party websites that 
deliver additional health services. This includes criteria for including them 
in Google Health. Because Google Health states that it is the sole 
responsibility of the user to review and approve the third-party service, trust 
is reduced. 
3. Provide codes that verify health information (e.g. Department of Health, 
HIPAA, HON Code). 
4. Only permit single sign-in sessions. 
5. The identity signal should be retained in the Privacy Principles window, 
even though it appears on the main Google Health window. This shows 
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Usability 
criteria 
Google Health recommendations 
inconsistency in presenting security information. 
6. Provide users with a choice for setting an idle log-out time that they deem 
secure and usable. This will ensure a session lock after a period of inactivity 
(e.g. similar to time-out sessions on e-banking websites). 
Ease of use No recommendations. 
Terminology 1. Re-phrase the statement ―By clicking on 'I accept' below you are agreeing 
to the Terms of Service above and the Privacy Policy‖.  
2. Provide an additional policy for Google Health and third-party websites that 
clearly states the responsibilities and services of each. 
3. Provide explicit measures stipulating privacy and security guarantee of 
users’ personal information. 
Ease of learning 1. Provide more icons. Users should have the option to use a text- or icon-
based interface. Currently, it is very text-based. 
2. Verifying an email account must be simple and clear to the users.  When 
users register, the status of their account is displayed as not verified, with 
no additional instructions. 
Feedback 1. Even though feedback is generally identifiable, providing it in pop-up 
messages and in a larger text may increase usability.  
2. Regarding the Show activities tab, brief descriptions are required to further 
improve understanding.  
3. Provide a mechanism to check for email account availability during 
registration. This can provide instant feedback. 
Awareness 1. Provide more information about the private lock icons on the users’ profile 
page. The participants guessed what the icons meant. They also stated that 
their field knowledge allowed them to understand what the icons referred 
to, but they need to be made clearer for other users. 
2. Provide more information about the purpose of the Activity report function. 
3. Make it clearer that the My account function can be used by users to 
configure the security and privacy settings of their profile.  
4. Provide a setting for users whereby they may customise the expiry date in 
the Share with others function. This relates to sharing their profile with 
another user. 
Errors 1. During the registration process, users are required to submit the page before 
receiving any error messages (e.g. mismatch in password and confirmation 
password or incorrect verification code). Usability would be increased if the 
system were to notify the user that there is an error in the current input field 
before the user moves to the next one.  
2. Mandatory fields are not displayed during the registration process. This can 
limit the possibility of a potential error (e.g. users are forced to re-enter 
information because the field is left blank in the initial registration process).  
3. When users select to search for updates, an error occurs and no information 
is provided regarding the problem or the solution. 
Help & 
documentation 
1. Provide more information about the security and privacy of users’ personal 
health information on the Privacy Centre page. This applies to the Help 
Centre page as well (e.g. Security of my account, health information, my 
information when I delete my account). 
 
Recommendations for both the OHSNs are based on the participants’ feedback.  The 
scenarios provided to the participants’ helped create a mental model regarding the 
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experiences of a typical user. All tasks conducted related to security and privacy interactions 
as well as the concerns that a user would experience when using the particular OHSN. 
 
6.3.2 Data Collection Method II – Heuristic Evaluation 
 
Once the participants’ had completed their tasks, they used the USec HE to evaluate the 
OHSN, as discussed in section 5.5.8.4. A task could comprise a number of subtasks, which 
would inform specific checklist items from the USec HE. These demonstrated the way in 
which the specific subtask is addressed by a checklist item in the USec HE, with most 
subtasks having corresponding checklist items for their evaluation. Each user had tasks and 
subtasks for MedHelp and Google Health. Appendix B.2: Scenarios and Tasks (MedHelp) 
and Appendix B.3: Scenarios and Tasks (Google Health) present the tasks that participant 1 
conducted on each of these respectively. It also includes the participant’s comments and 
answers to questions. Similarly, appendices B.9 and B.10 present the views of participant 2 
on MedHelp and Google Health respectively. Appendices B.16 and B.17 present the views of 
participant 3, appendices B.23 and B.24 present the views of participant 4, appendices B.30 
and B.31 present the views of participant 5 and appendices B.37 and B.38 present the views 
of participant 6. 
The HE included a column in which participants’ could provide additional comments, 
although this was optional. Any comments made could relate to the OHSN, the checklist item 
or both. Table 6.10 summarises the checklist items for which the participants’ provided 
negative, yet constructive comments, which identified problems. These should be considered 
in the next iteration in order to improve the USec HE. The frequency with which a problem 
was identified is also presented in the table.  
Table 6.10: Participant issues with checklist items 
Checklist Item Problem and Recommendations Task 
1.2 If pop-up windows are used to 
display security-related error 
messages, do they allow the user to 
see the field in error? 
a) This item should be rephrased a) 1 
4.1 Are users initiators of security 
actions rather than respondents? 
a) Confusion between the words ―users’‖ 
and ―respondents‖ 
a) 1 
5.1 Have security items been grouped 
into logical zones, and have headings 
been used to distinguish between the 
zones? 
a) Disagreement with categorisation of 
checklist item under heuristic 
a) 1 
6.1 Is only the security information 
essential to decision making 
a) Difficult to understand item a) 1 
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Checklist Item Problem and Recommendations Task 
displayed on the screen? 
6.4 Are security prompts expressed in 
the affirmative? 
a) Suggested examples of prompts be 
provided 
a) 1 
8.3 Do security-related prompts imply 
that the user is in control? 
a) Suggested examples of prompts be 
provided 
a) 1 
11.3 Can users switch easily between 
security help and their work? 
a) The word ―work‖ is vague 
 
a) 1 
11.4 Do instructions follow the 
sequence of user security actions? 
a) Depends on what the user needs to do 
since there are lots of alternatives in 
different situations. 
a) 1 
11.5 Does the system provide users 
with updated security educational 
opportunities, if they desire it? 
a) Difficult to understand item a) 1 
13.2 Can protected or confidential 
areas be accessed with certain 
passwords? 
a) The word ―certain‖ password is vague 
b) Difficult to understand item 
a) 2 
b) 3 
13.11 Are notification messages 
relating to security and privacy 
displayed to the user before access to 
the system is granted? 
a) The phrase ―Are notification messages‖ 
is vague 
b) Not clear if notification messages 
includes pop-up message boxes 
a) 1 
b) 1 
13.15 Does the system employ 
automated tools that provide 
notification to the user upon 
discovering discrepancies during 
integrity verification? 
a) Difficult to understand item a) 3 
 
The issues with the USec HE, as identified by the participants, are presented in table 6.10. To 
address these, not only the problems in the websites should be considered, but also and more 
importantly, the process for developing heuristics for SADs should be addressed. This allows 
one to determine where modifications are necessary and subsequently iterate back to a 
relevant task that can solve an issue. Firstly, the phase of iteration must be determined. 
Following this, the task within the phase that relates to the specific problem is identified. In 
this case, all issues will be addressed in phase 1. This is because phase 1 focuses on the 
design of the high-level heuristics. Problems relating to the validation of the high-level 
heuristics or the application of them in a context would have been addressed in phases 2 and 
3 respectively.  
 
The next step is to determine in which task of phase 1 a participant issue can be resolved. 
This is presented in table 6.11. The checklist item and problem columns are the same as in 
table 6.10. Therefore, just the number of the checklist item and the problem letters is 
provided in table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11: Tasks of phase 1 where participant issues can be addressed 
Checklist item Problem Task 
1.2 , 4.1, 6.1, 
6.4, 8.3, 11.3, 
11.5 & 13.15 
a)  a) 2 – Name high-level heuristics according to themes identified 
5.1  a)  a) 4 – Group checklist items based on high-level heuristic names 
11.4  a)  a) 1 – Review literature 
13.2 & 13.11 a)  
b)  
a) 2 – Name high-level heuristics according to themes identified 
b) 2 – Name high-level heuristics according to themes identified 
 
It is clear from table 6.11 that most issues relate to the wording of items in the HE checklist; 
making the terminology clearer and understandable. The problem with checklist 5.1 relates to 
its categorisation under a heuristic name and the problem with checklist item 11.4 is that it is 
context dependent. All items present areas for possible modifications that can improve the 
USec HE. 
 
The checklist items have been modified to address the participant concerns. The modified 
version of the USec HE is presented in chapter 8. It is also worth mentioning that the 
sequence of the heuristics and their checklist items differed during the evaluations with 
participants’. The reason for this was to associate the sequence of tasks and subtasks in the 
scenarios and tasks manuscript with the order of heuristics and their checklist items in the 
USec HE. This would make it easier for participants’ to complete tasks and then evaluate 
them with relevant checklist items. Appendix B.4: USec HE (MedHelp) and Appendix B.5: 
USec HE (Google Health) present the results from the HEs that participant 1 conducted on 
each of these OHSNs respectively. Similarly, appendices B.11 and B.12 present the HEs of 
participant 2 on MedHelp and Google Health respectively. Appendices B.18 and B.19 present 
the HEs of participant 3, appendices B.25 and B.26 present the HEs of participant 4, 
appendices B.32 and B.33 present the HEs of participant 5 and appendices B.39 and B.40 
present the HEs of participant 6. 
 
6.3.3 Data Collection Method III – User Satisfaction Questionnaire 
 
The final method used in the case study was a user satisfaction questionnaire, as mentioned in 
section 5.5.8.2. This followed the HE that the participants conducted on each OHSN. The 
questionnaire included fifteen items and focused on the users’ reviews regarding the 
application and usage of the USec HE as a tool for assessing the level of USec in the two 
OHSN. Table 6.12 summarises the frequencies of the participants’ responses (n = 6). In table 
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6.12 the scores for questions 1 to 13 are representative of the number of participants that 
selected the following: SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; U = Undecided; D = Disagree; and 
SD = Strongly Disagree.  
The scores for question 12 are representative of the number of participants that selected the 
following: VI = Very Important; I = Important; MI = Moderately Important; OLI = Of Little 
Importance; and U = Unimportant.  
The scores for questions 13 - 14 are representative of the number of participants that selected 
the following: VG = Very Good; G = Good; BA = Barely Acceptable; P = Poor; and VP = 
Very Poor. Table 6.12 is followed by an analysis of the questions and their related scores. 
Table 6.12: Overall ratings from user satisfaction questionnaire 
# Question SA A U D SD 
1 I can evaluate a security and privacy feature quickly applying 
the checklist items. 
 6    
2 I am satisfied with the number of checklist items included. 1 4  1  
3 The length of the USec HE should be shortened. 2 2 2   
4 It is easy to understand how to apply the USec HE.  5 1   
5 The heuristic descriptions clearly describe what the checklist 
items are evaluating. 
1 5    
6 The terminology used in the USec HE is clear and easy to 
understand. 
1 5    
7 I would need additional instructions to evaluate a website 
with the USec HE. 
 2  4  
8 It is easy to learn how to use the USec HE once you have 
used it once. 
3 2 1   
9 Checklist items are well categorised under a heuristic. 1 4 1   
10 The amount of information included in the USec HE was 
useful. 
1 4 1   
11 The use of the USec HE is complex  1 1 4  
# Question VI I MI OLI U 
12 Developing tools that improve the usability of security and 
privacy features. 
4 2    
# Question VG G BA P VP 
13 Overall, how would you rate the quality of the USec HE? 1 5    
14 Overall, how would you rate the effectiveness of the USec 
HE? 
 5 1   
 
Question 1 examined the time required to evaluate security and privacy features on a website 
using the USec HE. All participants Agree that the evaluation can be done quickly by 
applying the relevant checklist items.  
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Question 2 examined the participants’ satisfaction with regard to the number of checklist 
items included in the USec HE. Results show one Strongly Agree, four Agree and one 
Disagree with regard to their satisfaction. Overall, participants were satisfied with the 
number of checklist items included. 
Question 3 examined the length of the USec HE. This question relates directly to Question 2. 
The results show that two participants Strongly Agree, two Agree and two are Undecided 
with regard to shortening the length of the HE. The results contradict those in Question 2. 
Therefore, the length of the HE and the number of checklist items within it is an area that 
requires more attention in the next iteration phase. 
Question 4 examines the ease of use of the USec HE. The results show that overall 
participants felt that the tool was easy to use. Five participants Agree and one is Undecided 
that it is easy to understand how to apply the tool during evaluation. 
Question 5 examines the descriptions of the heuristics. Each heuristic consists of a name and 
an associated description. Categorised under the heuristic name are relevant checklist items 
that operationalise it. This assists experts in understanding its application in context.  
Generally, participants felt that the heuristic descriptions adequately describe what their 
associate checklist items evaluate. Results show one Strongly Agree and five Agree on this 
level. 
Question 6 relates to the terminology used in the USec HE. Overall, participants were 
satisfied with the language and the results show one Strongly Agree and five Agree scores 
regarding clear and easy-to-understand terminology. 
Question 7 examined the instructions that were provided for the USec HE. The consensus 
was that the instructions are sufficient. It should be noted that the instructions and design of 
the USec HE were based on well-recognised and applied HEs. These include the Xerox HE 
system checklist and Jakob Nielsen’s severity ratings. The results show that two participants 
Agree and four Disagree regarding additional instructions to conduct an evaluation. 
Question 8 examined the ease of learning to use the USec HE. This is important because 
experts should remember how to reuse the tool in subsequent evaluations. Results show that 
three participants Strongly Agree, two Agree and one is Undecided about the tool being easy 
to remember how to use. Generally, it is regarded as a tool that is easy to remember how to 
use. 
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Question 9 examines the categorisation of checklist items under their heuristics. This 
question relates directly to Question 5. The results show that the checklist items are well 
categorised, as one participant answered Strongly Agree, four Agree and one Undecided for 
this. These results are further confirmed, as the results from this question correlate with those 
of Question 5. 
Question 10 examines the usefulness of the amount of information provided in the USec HE. 
This ensures that the participants are satisfied that the information in checklist items is useful 
for determining security/privacy usability violations on websites and applications.  Generally, 
the results show that participants felt that the information is useful, as one answered Strongly 
Agree, four Agree and one Undecided for this question.  
Question 11 examines the complexity involved in using the USec HE. This question directly 
relates to Question 4 and there is a correlation between the results of both questions. In regard 
to question 11, the results show that one participant answered ―Agree‖, one ―Undecided‖ and 
four ―Disagree‖ that it is a complex tool to use. 
Question 12 was not directly focused on the USec HE. Instead, it required the participants’ 
opinions concerning the development of USec tools. Since they had the opportunity to assess 
the level of USec on the two OHSNs using the available tool, they could provide an informed 
opinion. Their opinions were grounded on their experiences as users, utilising the 
security/privacy features of each website. The results show that four participants stated that it 
is Very Important and two that it is Important to develop tools that improve the usability of 
security and privacy features for users. This helps to justify the contribution of the proposed 
tool and the research.  
Question 13 examined the overall quality of the USec HE. The tool can be regarded as being 
of good quality, as one participant rated it Very Good and five rated it Good. However, this 
does suggest that the tool could be further improved. 
Question 14 examined the overall effectiveness of the USec HE. The overall effectiveness of 
the tool was deemed satisfactory, as five rated it Good and one rated it Barely Acceptable. Of 
concern is the Barely Acceptable rating. Once again, the results suggest that the tool can be 
further improved. 
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Question 15, which is not included in table 6.12, was an optional question. Participants could 
provide suggestions for improving the USec HE. Accordingly, one participant suggested 
reducing the length of the tool, which was confirmed by the results of Question 3. 
To summarise, the only real concern that might require improvement in the next iteration of 
the tool is its length, which needs to be reduced. The effectiveness and quality of the tool is 
more than satisfactory. This is positive and suggests that the tool is successful in achieving its 
intended objectives. However, it would be worthwhile in future research to examine where 
further improvements could be made to improve quality and effectiveness. 
6.4 SUMMARY  
This chapter began by discussing OHSNs and provided an overview of the environment (or 
context) in which the USec HE was applied. Upon introducing the OHSNs, PHI was 
mentioned – the essence of an OHSN. A discussion followed on their themes and capabilities, 
whereupon the focus moved to barriers and concerns for the adoption of OHSNs. In addition, 
the semantic Web was introduced and its potential role and impact on the medical field was 
highlighted. 
 
The chapter then focused on the case study. The first method used in the case study, the 
formative usability method, was initially discussed. This included discussions on the selected 
OHSNs, the participants, scenarios and tasks. The results and analysis from the evaluations 
followed. These results were based on two factors: evaluating the security and privacy 
features of the OHSNs by applying usability criteria and evaluating the tasks that 
participants’ performed by applying USec ratings. Regarding their security and privacy 
features, results indicated that Google Health had higher levels of usability in comparison to 
MedHelp. Regarding the tasks performed, results indicated that Google Health provided more 
USec than MedHelp. Analogous recommendations were then made for improving both 
OHSNs.  
 
This was followed by a discussion on the second method, the HE. Participants’ evaluated the 
OHSNs with the USec HE after they had completed their FUE. They then provided feedback 
relating to both the OHSNs and the USec HE. Regarding the USec HE, twelve possible areas 
for improvement were identified. These included checklist items 1.2, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 6.4, 8.3, 
11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 13.2, 13.11 and 13.15. It must be clarified that participants applied the USec 
HE after first iteration during the FUE, as presented in table 4.3 (despite its modification to 
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associate the tasks and subtasks with heuristics and checklist items, as mentioned in section 
6.3.2). The improved USec HE after second iteration is based on the participants and experts 
feedback and is presented in table 8.2.  
 
The final method used in the case study was a user satisfaction questionnaire, in terms of 
which participants’ provided their overall opinions about the USec HE. Based on the results, 
it is concluded that the USec HE is an effective tool that can achieve its objectives. However, 
the length of the tool should be reduced. In chapter 7 the results and analysis from the 
experts’ validations are presented.          
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS FROM VALIDATION TOOL  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the assessments that were conducted by the experts, who used a 
validation tool to assess the USec HE. In addition, assessment criteria were established to 
evaluate the heuristics and their checklist items. Other factors that impact on the validity of 
the USec HE were also evaluated; these also form part of the validation tool and will be 
discussed in this chapter. Section 7.2 will analyse and discuss the results of the validations 
and a summary is presented in section 7.3.  
 
7.2 THE VALIDATION TOOL 
The validation tool was designed in MS Excel and comprised seven sheets (or sections). 
These included instructions, expert biographical information, heuristics assessments, 
checklist items assessment, severity ratings, material assessment and a satisfaction 
questionnaire. Each of these will be discussed in more detail in their respective sections 
within this chapter. The validation tool is presented in Appendix A.2: Validation Tool 
Template. The complete ratings of the four experts are also available in the appendices. 
Appendix C.1: Validation Tool of Expert 1 presents the ratings of expert 1. Similarly, 
appendix C.2 presents the ratings of expert 2, appendix C.3 presents the ratings of expert 3 
and appendix C.4 presents the ratings of expert 4. 
 
7.2.1 Sheet I – Instructions 
 
This sheet was used to explain the nature of an HE to the experts and how it can be used to 
evaluate an interface for usability violations. It then mentioned the purpose of the validation 
tool and the fact that it would be used to assess a new set of USec heuristics. In addition, 
experts were provided with the complete USec HE in a PDF format. This was provided for 
viewing purposes so that they could have a better understanding of the ―look and feel‖ of an 
HE. Specific instructions were also provided for each sheet. These were available on the 
actual sheet.  
 
7.2.2 Sheet II – Expert Biographical Information 
 
This sheet was used to record the biographical details of the experts and was important to 
determine the level of expertise that each of the experts possessed in terms of the three fields 
of USec, HCI and InfoSec. This would help measure their comments or feedback for the 
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modifications that are provided in the validation tool and would contribute to understanding 
the perspective from which they give their opinions and how they rate in terms of their level 
of skill in the other fields. Other biographical information was also collected. Selected details 
of the experts’ biographical information are summarised in table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Expert profiles 
 Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 
Country South Africa UK Zimbabwe China 
Occupation Academic Academic Academic Academic 
Industry IT Education Education Education 
Experience (years) 15 30 6 29 
HCI experience Intermediate Expert Intermediate Expert 
InfoSec experience Expert Expert Expert Intermediate 
USec experience Intermediate Expert Intermediate Intermediate 
 
Table 7.1 thus indicates that two of the experts were HCI experts, three were InfoSec experts, 
and one was a USec expert. One of them can be considered as a ―triple-expert‖, with 
expertise in all three fields. 
 
7.2.3 Sheet III – Heuristics Assessments 
 
The focus of this sheet was to assess the high-level heuristic names together with their 
descriptions. These form the ―groups‖ into which relevant checklist items would be 
categorised. The development of the high-level heuristics and their descriptions were 
discussed in section 4.4. This sheet specifically addressed the importance and clarity of name 
and description. Experts could also provide optional comments were they felt necessary. One 
expert did not provide an importance rating for heuristic 6. Hence there are in total thirteen 
high-level heuristics for USec. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 summarise the frequencies of the experts’ 
responses (n = 4) for the importance and clarity of the high-level heuristics. In table 7.2 the 
scores are representative of the number of experts that selected the following: VI = Very 
Important; I = Important; MI = Moderately Important; OLI = Of Little Importance; and NI = 
Not Important. The total for the responses are accumulated for each score, as well in both 
tables. 
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Table 7.2: Overall ratings for the importance of the USec high-level heuristics 
# Heuristic VI I MI OLI NI 
1 Visibility 2  2   
2 Revocability 3  1   
3 Clarity 3 1    
4 Convey Features/Expressiveness  1 2 1  
5 Learnability 3  1   
6 Aesthetics and Minimalist Design 1 1 1   
7 Errors 4     
8 Satisfaction 2 1   1 
9 User Suitability 3  1   
10 User Language 4     
11 User Assistance 3 1    
12 Identity Signal  3   1 
13 Security and Privacy 2 2    
TOTAL 30 10 8 1 2 
 
The purpose of the importance rating was to determine whether any heuristics can be 
eliminated from the final USec HE. To retain a heuristic, the average of the experts’ 
responses must infer that it is either a Very Important or an Important heuristic for the USec 
HE. 
 
It was decided that the visibility heuristic would be retained as two experts rated it as Very 
Important and two as Moderately Important. This confirms that it is an essential heuristic for 
USec. The first Moderately Important score was awarded by an InfoSec expert, who also 
added that a balance is required in terms of the security status information provided to a user. 
This should keep a user informed, but it should not confuse or frighten (e.g. if the user status 
is moderately secure and not fully secure). The second Moderately Important score was 
awarded by a USec expert with no additional comments. 
 
The revocability heuristic would be retained as three experts rated it as Very Important and 
one as Moderately Important. This confirms that it is an essential heuristic for USec. The 
Moderately Important score was awarded by an InfoSec expert and the score can be justified 
by the comments of the USec expert, who stated that revocability is required but within 
reason. There are security actions where revocability should not be permitted (e.g. revoking 
the security code of a credit card to authorise an online payment). That being said, 
revocability can be applied to many other security actions that a user performs (e.g. revoke a 
login, revoke access to information). 
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The clarity heuristic would be retained, as three experts rated it as Very Important and one as 
Important. This confirms that it is an essential heuristic for USec. The Important score was 
awarded by an InfoSec expert.  
 
The convey features/expressiveness heuristic was awarded the lowest scores on average. One 
expert rated it as Important, two as Moderately Important and one as Of Little Importance. 
The scores suggest that this heuristic is not essential and could therefore be eliminated from 
the USec HE. The two Moderately Important scores were awarded by the one InfoSec and 
HCI experts, while the USec expert rated it as Of Little Importance. There was thus 
consensus among the experts in each field that it is not an indispensable heuristic. 
 
The learnability heuristic would be retained as three experts rated it as Very Important and 
one as Moderately Important. This confirms that it is an essential heuristic for USec. The 
Moderately Important score was awarded by the USec expert.  
 
The aesthetics and minimalist design heuristic had mixed scores. The USec expert did not 
provide a rating for this heuristic. However, the scores included one Very Important from an 
InfoSec expert, one Important from the HCI expert and one Moderately Important from the 
second InfoSec expert. Hence, the results suggested that it is an essential heuristic for USec 
and it would therefore be retained. The rating of the HCI expert is supported by those of the 
InfoSec experts. 
 
The errors heuristic would be retained as all four experts rated it as Very Important. This 
confirms that it is an essential heuristic for USec. However, the USec expert raised the 
concern that, despite the heuristic’s evident importance, error messages might benefit 
attackers as much as the intended users.  
 
The satisfaction heuristic would be retained as two experts rated it as Very Important, one as 
Important and one as Not Important. This confirms that it is an essential heuristic for USec. 
The Not Important score was awarded by the USec expert, who added that users cannot be in 
control of security, rather it is the system that controls security. The HCI expert rated it as 
Very Important, while the two InfoSec experts rated it as Very Important and Important 
respectively. Taking into account the overall scores, it was decided to retain this heuristic, 
despite the strong argument of the USec expert.  
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The user suitability heuristic would be retained as three experts rated it as Very Important and 
one as Moderately Important. This confirms that it is an essential heuristic for USec. The 
Moderately Important score was awarded by the HCI expert. One InfoSec expert supported 
this heuristic by agreeing that novice users should be provided with less security information 
in comparison to the more advanced users. 
 
The user language heuristic would be retained as all four experts rated it as Very Important. 
This confirms that it is an essential heuristic for USec. No additional comments were made 
by the experts in terms of this heuristic. 
 
The user assistance heuristic would be retained as three experts rated it as Very Important and 
one as Important. This confirms that it is an essential heuristic for USec. The Important score 
was awarded by an InfoSec expert.  
 
The identity signal heuristic would be retained as three experts rated it as Important and one 
as Not Important. This confirms that it should be included in the USec. The Not Important 
score was awarded by the USec expert who also stated that research proves users do not take 
note of the identity signal and therefore it does not impact on usability. This is a valid 
argument presented by the expert, which does uphold considering the elimination of the 
heuristic. The argument is based on two facts; first, users do not use identity signal 
information because they do not notice it, and second, it is impossible for the identity signal 
to impact on usability if users are unaware of it in the first place. Therefore, making the 
identity signal more noticeable on the browser of use should be the first priority, followed by 
improving its usability thereafter. However, this is beyond the scope of this study. Finally, 
owing to the fact that the other three experts were in agreement that it is an important 
heuristic, it is retained.  
 
The security and privacy heuristic would be retained as two experts rated it as Very Important 
and two as Important. This confirms that it is an essential heuristic for USec. The Important 
scores were awarded by the one InfoSec expert and the HCI expert. The USec expert rated it 
as Very Important, while adding that ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability is 
always maintained is the core goal of all security systems, even though it is probably an 
unattainable one.  
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In review, there were a total of four experts who evaluated the 13 high-level heuristics for 
their level of importance. This provides a total of fifty-two possible responses. One of the 
experts did not provide a rating for the aesthetics and minimalist design heuristic, resulting in 
a total of fifty-one expert responses. The totals for each rating per heuristic are listed in table 
7.2 and displayed in the graph in figure 7.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Comparison of ratings for the importance levels of each USec heuristic 
Table 7.3 focuses on the clarity of the high-level heuristics. This measure assessed if the 
terminology used for the USec high-level heuristic names and descriptions is unambiguous 
and easy to understand. The scores are representative of the number of experts that selected 
the following: VG = Very Good; G = Good; BA = Barely Acceptable; P = Poor; and VP = 
Very Poor. 
Table 7.3: Overall ratings for the clarity of the USec high-level heuristics 
# Heuristic VG G BA P VP 
1 Visibility – the system should keep users informed about their 
security status 
4     
2 Revocability – the system should allow users to revoke any of 
their security actions 
2 1 1   
3 Clarity – the system should inform users in advance about the 
consequences of any security actions 
4     
4 Convey Features/Expressiveness – the system should guide 
users on security in a manner that still gives them freedom of 
expression 
1 2 1   
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# Heuristic VG G BA P VP 
5 Learnability – the system should ensure that security actions are 
easy to learn and remember 
4     
6 Aesthetics and Minimalist Design – the system should offer 
users relevant information relating to their security actions 
2  1 1  
7 Errors – the system should provide users detailed security error 
messages that they can understand and act upon 
3 1    
8 Satisfaction – the system should ensure that users have a good 
experience when using security and that they are in control 
3 1    
9 User Suitability – the system should provide options for users 
with diverse levels of skill and experience in security 
3 1    
10 User Language – the system should use plain language that 
users can understand with regard to security 
4     
11 User Assistance – the system should make security help 
apparent for users 
3 1    
12 Identity Signal – the system should have valid certificates and 
the information should be available on the browser of use 
1 3    
13 Security and Privacy – the system needs to consider integrity, 
availability, confidentiality and privacy 
 2 2   
TOTAL 34 12 5 1  
 
The results shown in table 7.3 indicate that improvements can be made to certain heuristics in 
terms of their clarity. The heuristics that can be improved include the following: 
 Revocability – The USec expert rated this Barely Acceptable. This could possibly 
relate to the comment the same expert made when evaluating the importance of this 
heuristic; that is, security actions can be revoked within reason. This should be 
depicted in the description. 
 Convey features/expressiveness – The USec expert rated this Barely Acceptable and 
stated that the meaning is ambiguous. However, the importance of this heuristic was 
rated low and it was therefore eliminated from the final USec HE. 
 Aesthetics and minimalist design – The USec expert rated this Poor because the 
heuristic name and description do not match, while the HCI expert rated this Barely 
Acceptable. Based on the fact that the HCI and USec expert were not satisfied with 
the clarity, the description must be revised. 
 Errors – When evaluating the importance of the heuristic, the USec expert previously 
mentioned caution should be exercised in ensuring that error messages do not benefit 
attackers. Furthermore, the description can denote that users must be told how to 
recover when possible or what to do when this in not possible. 
 Identity signal – The heuristic can be reviewed, even though it has an overall Good 
rating. Only one InfoSec expert rated it as Very Good. 
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 Security and privacy – The heuristic was rated Barely Acceptable by the two experts 
from HCI and USec. The USec expert could not understand the use of the term 
consider within this context. An InfoSec expert addressed this concern and suggested 
that the term consider should be replaced with ensure and that what was mentioned 
previously be included to ensure that confidentiality, integrity and availability are the 
goals, even though they are perhaps unattainable. 
 
In review, a total of four experts evaluated the 13 high-level heuristics for level of clarity. 
This provides a total of fifty-two possible responses. The totals for each rating per heuristic 
are listed in table 7.3 and displayed in the graph in figure 7.2. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Comparison of ratings for the clarity levels of each USec heuristic 
To conclude their assessments of the heuristics, experts provided their opinions on the 
completeness of the set and could also suggest additional information that should have been 
considered. There were mixed views about the completeness of the thirteen heuristics for 
USec. An InfoSec expert and the HCI expert agreed that the set was complete while second 
InfoSec expert was undecided, and the USec expert disagreed that the set is complete. None 
of the experts suggested any additional information that should have been considered. 
 
The USec expert stated that the applicability of the heuristics depends on who the user is. In a 
case where the user is an actual ―genuine‖ user of the system, then all the heuristics are 
relevant. In a case where the user is an attacker, then all the heuristics may not be relevant 
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because the system must now provide as little information as possible; hence the reason that 
USec is such a challenging field. In the real world, users cannot always be offered what they 
want owing to security concerns. The expert also stated that the views which are provided, 
reflect the notion that the user is an actual ―genuine‖ user of the system and not an attacker. 
 
The deductions from the heuristic assessments are that there are areas for possible 
improvements. Based on the results and comments, these include the following: 
 Eliminate the convey features/expressiveness heuristic from the final USec HE. 
 Consider the elimination of the identity signal heuristic from the final USec HE. 
 Review the wording used in the descriptions of the revocability, aesthetics and 
minimalist design, errors, identity signal and security and privacy high-level 
heuristics. 
 
7.2.4 Sheet IV – Checklist Items Assessment 
 
The purpose of this sheet was to assess the checklist items for each high-level USec heuristic 
that was presented in section 7.2.3. These items were categorised under a high-level heuristic 
in phase 1 of the process for developing heuristics for SADs. Creating the checklist items by 
applying the tailored made method, grouping them and then reviewing their grouping as a 
whole are the outcomes of tasks 3, 4 and 5 respectively in phase 1.  
The assessments specifically addressed the clarity, grouping and relevance of each checklist 
item. Experts also gave a final verdict for the item. As with the previous sheet, experts could 
provide optional comments to support their ratings. To conclude their assessments, experts 
provided their opinions on the completeness of the set of checklist items and could also 
suggest additional information that should have been considered. The aim was to gain 
consensus among the experts to ensure that the fields of HCI, InfoSec and USec are 
considered and represented. This can be challenging at times because the fields can offer 
conflicting views. 
Measuring the clarity of the wording used for the checklist item would determine whether the 
terminology is clear and easy to understand or if re-wording is required in the next iteration 
cycle of the process. Measuring the grouping for a checklist item would determine if it is well 
categorised under a high-level heuristic. Measuring the relevance of a checklist item would 
determine whether it is appropriate in identifying a security/privacy usability violation. The 
verdict allows the expert to provide a final decision on whether or not the checklist item 
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should be included in the USec HE. The number of checklist items included in each high-
level heuristic is presented in table 7.4. 
Table 7.4: The number of checklist items within each USec high-level heuristic 
# Heuristic Checklist 
Items 
Numbering 
Order 
1 Visibility 4 1.1–1.4 
2 Revocability 6 2.1–2.6 
3 Clarity 4 3.1–3.4 
4 Convey Features/Expressiveness 4 4.1–4.4 
5 Learnability 7 5.1–5.7 
6 Aesthetics and Minimalist Design 4 6.1–6.4 
7 Errors 5 7.1–7.5 
8 Satisfaction 3 8.1–8.3 
9 User Suitability 6 9.1–9.6 
10 User Language 6 10.1–10.6 
11 User Assistance 5 11.1–11.5 
13 Security and Privacy 27 13.1–13.27 
12 Identity Signal 5 12.1–12.5 
 
To measure the clarity, experts selected one of the following ratings: Very Good; Good; 
Barely Acceptable; Poor; or Very Poor, while they selected one of the following ratings: 
Strongly Agree; Agree; Undecided; Disagree or Strongly Disagree to assess grouping. To 
measure the relevance, experts used one of the following ratings: Very Relevant; Relevant; 
Moderately Relevant; Of Little Relevance or Not Relevant, and the ratings for their verdict 
included: Retain; Undecided or Remove. Each checklist item was evaluated on the basis for 
the aforementioned criteria. The checklist items that will be discussed in their particular 
sections based on the heuristics in which they are categorised, are those that did not receive 
any of the following ratings: 
 Very Good/Good rating for their clarity  
 Strongly Agree/Agree rating for their grouping  
 Very Relevant/Relevant rating for their relevance  
 Retain rating for their verdict 
 
7.2.4.1 Visibility 
 
Checklist item 1.2 states: If pop-up windows are used to display security-related error 
messages, do they allow the user to see the field in error? The item received a Barely 
Acceptable rating for its clarity and an Undecided verdict for keeping it in the USec HE. Both 
ratings were awarded by the USec expert. This expert noted that users tend to ignore pop-up 
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windows. Hence, instead of pop-up windows a focus on messages that are displayed next to 
the field in question is preferred. The checklist item will be rephrased to represent this view. 
To rate the completeness of the visibility checklist items, experts selected one of the 
following ratings: Yes; Not Sure and No. The results included one Yes, one No and two Not 
Sure ratings. A final comment from the USec expert is that visibility should also involve the 
security status information of a user. An InfoSec expert also commented on whether security 
actions should be visible before the user even initiates security operations. Both comments 
would be considered to improve the set of checklist items for visibility.  
7.2.4.2 Revocability 
 
Checklist item 2.1 states: Do security options in menus make obvious whether de-selection is 
possible? The item received a Not Relevant rating for its relevance and a Remove verdict. 
Both ratings were awarded by the USec expert. All the other experts rated the item as Very 
Relevant and Retain. Based on the overall ratings, the checklist item would not be modified 
and it would remain in the Revocability heuristic. 
Checklist item 2.2 states: Can users easily reverse their security actions? The item received a 
Barely Acceptable rating for its clarity, a Not Relevant rating for its relevance and a Remove 
verdict. All ratings were awarded by the USec expert. All other experts rated the item as Very 
Relevant and Retain. The USec expert mentioned that the item needs to be rephrased because 
it is not feasible to easily reverse all security actions. The checklist item would be rephrased 
to represent this view and would remain in the Revocability heuristic. 
Checklist item 2.5 states: Can users cancel out of security operations in progress? It received 
two Undecided ratings for its grouping, a Moderately Relevant rating for its relevance and an 
Undecided verdict. All ratings were awarded by the USec expert. The second grouping rating 
was awarded by the HCI expert. Interrupting a security action in progress is not important if 
users can still reverse it after the action is completed. Additionally, reversing security actions 
is considered in checklist item 2.2. Therefore, the checklist item would be eliminated from 
the Revocability heuristic. 
Checklist item 2.6 states: Is there an ―undo‖ function at the level of a single security action 
or for a complete group of security actions? It received a Barely Acceptable rating for its 
clarity, a Disagree rating for its grouping, a Not Relevant rating for its relevance and a 
Remove verdict. All ratings were awarded by the USec expert. Similar to checklist item 2.5, 
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this has been considered in checklist item 2.2.  Reducing the length of the USec HE is 
expressed in the results of the satisfaction questionnaires (see section 7.2.7). Since the 
checklist item is already covered in checklist item 2.2, it would be eliminated from the 
Revocability heuristic. 
The ratings for the completeness of the revocability checklist items included three Yes 
ratings, while one expert did not provide a rating. No final comments were made by any of 
the experts.  
7.2.4.3 Clarity 
 
Checklist item 3.1 states: Are users prompt to confirm security actions that have drastic, 
destructive consequences? It received a Moderately Relevant rating for its relevance and a 
Remove verdict. The ratings were awarded by the USec expert. The expert explains that users 
ignore prompts and the best method in which to present prompts to users is yet to be 
determined. Despite this, it is still required for users to confirm a security action, which may 
have consequences for their own security. This is supported by the other experts, whom all 
rated the item as Very Relevant. The checklist item would not be modified and it would 
remain in the Clarity heuristic. 
Checklist item 3.2 states: Are the function keys that can cause the most serious consequences 
in hard-to-reach positions? It received a Strongly Disagree rating for its grouping, a Not 
Relevant rating for its relevance and a Remove verdict from the USec expert. The HCI expert 
delivered an Undecided verdict. The ratings are supported by the perception that most 
security related actions are not achieved through function keys. The results showed that only 
the InfoSec experts agreed to keep the item. There was no consensus with the experts from 
the USec and HCI fields; therefore the checklist item would be eliminated from the Clarity 
heuristic. 
Checklist item 3.3 states: Does the system warn users if they are about to make a potentially 
serious security error? Checklist item 3.4 states: Does the system prevent users from making 
security errors whenever possible? They both received Poor ratings by the USec expert for 
their clarity. Providing an example of the type of security errors for each item would assist 
evaluators to better understand their application. An example would be provided for each 
checklist item and they would remain in the Clarity heuristic. 
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The ratings for the completeness of the clarity checklist items included three Not Sure ratings, 
and one Yes rating. A final comment from the USec expert is that security error examples for 
items 3.3 and 3.4 should be provided. A comment form an InfoSec expert is that the system 
should also clearly explain why a specific security action should be taken (from a security 
viewpoint) and what are the risks for the user, if the action is not taken. Both comments 
would be considered to improve the set of checklist items for Clarity. 
7.2.4.4 Convey Features/Expressiveness 
 
The Convey features/expressiveness heuristic will be eliminated from the USec HE, as was 
discussed in section 7.2.3. However, the checklist that produced low scores will be 
mentioned.  
Checklist item 4.1 states: Are users’ initiators of security actions rather than respondents? 
The USec expert awarded the following scores; Barely Acceptable for the clarity, Strongly 
Disagree for the grouping, Not Relevant for the relevance and a Remove verdict. The ratings 
are supported by the view that the system always initiates security actions and not vice versa. 
The other experts were satisfied with the grouping of the item and no comments were made 
with regard to re-grouping it into another heuristic. Considering the USec expert’s comments 
in combination with the elimination of the convey Features/expressiveness heuristic, the 
checklist item would also be eliminated. 
Checklist item 4.2 states: Does the system correctly anticipate and prompt for the users’ 
probable next security-related activity? The USec expert awarded a Barely Acceptable rating 
for the clarity. The other experts were satisfied with the grouping and no comments were 
made about re-grouping it into another heuristic. Considering this, in combination with the 
elimination of the convey Features/expressiveness heuristic, it was decided that the checklist 
item would also be eliminated. 
Checklist item 4.3 states: By looking, can the user tell the security state of the system, and the 
alternatives for security-related actions, if needed? The USec expert awarded a Strongly 
Disagree rating for the grouping. The checklist item did receive Very Relevant ratings from 
the other experts, while the USec expert stated that the item is better located in the visibility 
heuristic. The one InfoSec expert also supported this view. Both views relate to a previous 
comment of the second InfoSec expert. The comment was made in the visibility checklist 
items, regarding the visibility of security actions before the user even initiates security 
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operations. Taking these considerations into account, checklist item 4.3 would be re-grouped 
and categorised in the Visibility heuristic. 
Checklist item 4.4 states: Is there a clear understanding of the systems security capabilities? 
Experts were satisfied with the grouping and no comments were made with regard to re-
grouping it into another heuristic. Considering this in combination with the elimination of the 
convey Features/expressiveness heuristic, the checklist item would also be eliminated. 
The ratings for the completeness of the Convey features/expressiveness checklist items 
included three Yes ratings, and one Not Sure rating. A comment form an InfoSec expert is 
whether the security capability claims of a system can be verified. This is an area for future 
research but beyond the scope of this work, even though it can impact on USec. Verifying 
that the security capabilities are maintained and adhered to would positively influence trust 
from the user perspective. 
7.2.4.5 Learnability 
 
Checklist item 5.1 states: Have security items been grouped into logical zones, and have 
headings been used to distinguish between the zones? The USec expert commented that there 
was uncertainty in the meaning of the item. All other experts rated its clarity as Very Good. 
Hence, the checklist item would not be modified and would remain in the Learnability 
heuristic. 
Checklist item 5.3 states: Are security operations easy to learn and use? The USec expert 
suggests separating the item, as each; easy to learn and easy to use are fields of their own. 
The checklist item would be separated to represent this view and both items would remain in 
the Learnability heuristic. 
Checklist item 5.4 states: Are there security selection defaults? The USec expert questions if 
this is desirable for security because users seldom change default settings and this could 
contribute to insecure behaviours. This is a valid point, yet two experts rated its relevance as 
Very Relevant and one as Relevant. It may be that it is beneficial to have default settings, 
nevertheless users must be made aware of their current default settings when interacting with 
the system for the first time. Oppositely, security is usually a secondary goal for users and it 
is likely that they will discard this type of information when it is presented to them. 
Nonetheless, the checklist item would be rephrased to represent this view and remain in the 
Learnability heuristic. 
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Checklist item 5.6 states: Does the system protect users from making severe errors? The item 
received a Remove verdict from the USec expert. The rating may relate to the fact that a 
system does not comply with this, has failed in its main objective, which is to protect the 
intended users. The two InfoSec experts rated its relevance as Very Relevant and the HCI 
expert as Relevant. Based on the overall scores, the checklist item would not be modified and 
it would remain in the Learnability heuristic. 
Checklist item 5.7 states: Is security-related information presented in a standardised 
manner? An InfoSec expert commented that standardisation can be split between an 
individual system and across security systems. Users who interact with different security 
systems would require standardised terms across them.  It is important to clarify that the 
USec HE does not only assess security systems. Moreover, it evaluates the security 
components of all applications/websites. In the case of the checklist item, it focuses on the 
individual system. It is unlikely for the security-related information of all systems to be 
presented in the same manner. The checklist item would be rephrased to represent the view 
that within the individual system, security-related information must be presented in a 
standardised manner. The item would remain in the Learnability heuristic. 
The ratings for the completeness of the Learnability checklist items included two Yes ratings, 
while two experts did not provide a rating. The comments would be considered to improve 
the set of checklist items for Learnability.  
7.2.4.6 Aesthetics and Minimalist Design 
 
Checklist item 6.1 states: Is only the security information essential to decision making 
displayed on the screen? The USec expert commented that the item should address the user 
specifically. That is a valid point because it eliminates a possible misunderstanding; that of 
making essential security information viewable to an attacker. The checklist item would be 
rephrased to represent this view and it would remain in the Aesthetic and minimalist design 
heuristic. 
Checklist item 6.4 states: Are security prompts expressed in the affirmative? The HCI expert 
awarded a Barely Acceptable rating for clarity, a Moderately Relevant rating for relevance 
and an Undecided verdict. Additional comments were not made, although the other experts’ 
ratings support the inclusion of the item. An example would be provided to improve the 
item’s clarity and it would remain in the Aesthetic and minimalist design heuristic. 
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The ratings for the completeness of the Aesthetic and minimalist design checklist items 
included two Yes ratings, one Not Sure rating, while one expert did not provide a rating. The 
comments would be considered to improve the set of checklist items for Aesthetic and 
minimalist design.  
7.2.4.7 Errors 
 
Checklist item 7.5 states: Are the security-related error messages accurate in their 
descriptions? The USec expert provided a Barely Acceptable rating for the clarity due to 
scepticism regarding the possibility of being accurate without providing too much 
information to an attacker. The ratings of the other experts supported the inclusion of the 
item. This checklist item would not be modified and it would remain in the Errors heuristic. 
The ratings for the completeness of the Errors checklist items included two Yes ratings, one 
Not Sure, while one expert did not provide a rating.  
7.2.4.8 Satisfaction 
 
Checklist item 8.1 states: Is each individual security setting a member of a family of security 
options? The HCI expert awarded a Barely Acceptable rating for the clarity, an Undecided 
rating for grouping, a Moderately Relevant rating for relevance and an Undecided verdict. 
The USec expert also commented that the item is difficult to understand; hence, the checklist 
item would be eliminated. More details are provided in this regard when the completeness of 
the Satisfaction checklist items is discussed. 
Checklist item 8.2 states: Has colour been used specifically to draw attention and indicate 
status changes for security-related actions and information? The HCI expert awarded a 
Barely Acceptable rating for clarity, an Undecided rating for grouping, a Moderately Relevant 
rating for relevance and an Undecided verdict. The USec expert was concerned about colour 
being a clear indicator, as it would not accommodate colour blind users. Additionally, 
security status was mentioned previously for inclusion in the visibility heuristic. Therefore, 
the item would be addressed in terms of visibility and would be eliminated from the 
satisfaction heuristic.  
Checklist item 8.3 states: Do security-related prompts imply that the user is in control? The 
HCI expert awarded a Barely Acceptable rating for clarity, an Undecided rating for grouping, 
a Moderately Relevant rating for relevance and an Undecided verdict. The USec expert stated 
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that in reality the system is always in control with regard to security and users should not be 
misled by thinking otherwise. The checklist item would be eliminated and details will be 
provided when the completeness is discussed. 
The ratings for the completeness of the satisfaction checklist items included one Yes rating, 
one Not Sure rating, one No rating, while one expert did not provide a rating. A final 
comment from the HCI expert was that all items did not seem to be focused on user 
satisfaction. Meanwhile, the USec expert queried whether it is even possible to satisfy users. 
It would seem that this is difficult to quantify and presents a new area of research. The 
purpose of the USec HE is to assist developers to design usable features for security and 
privacy. Ultimately, this will impact on the users’ experiences. Hence, it is important that the 
checklist items can be used to assist in this quest by making their applicability and 
understanding possible. Checklist items 8.1 and 8.3 fail in this regard and, being a new area, 
they are difficult to quantify. Therefore they would be eliminated, while item 8.2 would be 
accommodated in the visibility heuristic. 
In section 7.2.3, the importance of the satisfaction heuristic was measured as it achieved high 
scores and worthy support for its inclusion. It was also mentioned that the heuristic is 
essential and that it will be retained. Following the assessments of its checklist items, it has 
been established that it should instead be eliminated from the USec HE. This is due to the fact 
that items 8.1 and 8.3 have been eliminated and item 8.2 would be re-grouped in the visibility 
heuristic. 
7.2.4.9 User Suitability 
 
Checklist item 9.1 states: If the system supports both novice and expert users, are multiple 
levels of security error messages detail available? The USec expert delivered a Remove 
verdict, albeit making a supporting comment that tailoring error messages according to the 
expertise of users is an interesting concept. The ratings of the other experts strongly 
supported the inclusion of the item. Hence, this checklist item would not be modified and 
would remain in the User suitability heuristic. 
Checklist item 9.3 states: If the system supports both novice and expert users, are multiple 
levels of security detail available? The USec expert delivered a Remove verdict, although the 
ratings of the other experts strongly supported the inclusion of the item. The checklist item 
would therefore not be modified and would remain in the User suitability heuristic. 
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Checklist item 9.4 states: Can users easily change the level of security detail? The USec 
expert delivered a Remove verdict, while the HCI expert awarded a Barely Acceptable rating 
for clarity, an Undecided rating for grouping, a Moderately Relevant rating for relevance and 
an Undecided verdict. However, both the InfoSec experts were satisfied with the item. 
Considering that there is no consensus with the HCI and USec experts, the checklist item 
would be eliminated from the User suitability heuristic. 
Checklist item 9.5 states: Can users easily change between novice and expert levels? The 
USec expert delivered a Remove verdict. The HCI expert awarded a Barely Acceptable rating 
for clarity, an Undecided rating for grouping, a Moderately Relevant rating for relevance and 
an Undecided verdict. However, the InfoSec experts were yet again satisfied with the item. 
However, as with the previous item, there is no consensus between the three fields and 
therefore the checklist item would be eliminated from the User suitability heuristic. 
The ratings for the completeness of the User suitability checklist items included one Yes 
rating, two Not Sure ratings, while one expert did not provide a rating. The comments would 
be considered to improve the set of checklist items for aesthetic and minimalist design. A 
comment from an InfoSec expert is that security help/training should also be tailored to the 
expertise of the user. This comment would be considered in the User assistance heuristic. The 
USec expert commented that the concept in this heuristic seems to be to tailor for the security 
expertise of the user. Although this is important for usability, there is a concern about its 
relevance within the security area.  
7.2.4.10 User Language 
 
All experts were pleased with the checklist items for the User language heuristic. The USec 
expert suggested examples for items 10.5 and 10.6: checklist item 10.5: Is privacy jargon 
avoided? Checklist item 10.6: Is security jargon avoided?  
The ratings for the completeness of the User language checklist items included one Yes 
rating, two Not Sure ratings, while one expert did not provide a rating. An InfoSec expert 
probed whether the naming of checklist items 10.1 and 10.2 related directly to the security 
related role of an action. Examples would be provided to distinguish between the naming of 
security actions and objects in 10.1 and 10.2. 
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7.2.4.11 User Assistance 
 
All experts were pleased with the checklist items for the User assistance heuristic. Previously, 
in the User suitability heuristic, an InfoSec expert mentioned that it would be useful to 
provide assistance that is tailored to user expertise (e.g. novice or expert). A checklist item 
would thus be provided to express this view and it would be included in the User assistance 
heuristic. 
The ratings for the completeness of the User assistance checklist items included one Yes 
rating, two Not Sure ratings, while one expert did not provide a rating.  
7.2.4.12 Identity Signal 
 
Overall, experts awarded high ratings for the checklist items of the Identity signal heuristic. 
However, an InfoSec expert and the USec expert stressed that the type of information 
included in an identity signal will be beyond the security knowledge of a novice user. In 
addition, novice users do not usually read such information and are likely to interact with 
non-trustworthy sources, even though they are warned beforehand. The second InfoSec 
commented that it would be useful to have a feature in the identity signal for immediate 
verification of the Issuer, who provides the certificate. The experts understand the importance 
of the identity signal but are not convinced of its usefulness to novice users.  
In section 7.2.3, the identity signal was mentioned as a heuristic for possible elimination. 
Based on the above comments, the idea is not to eliminate the Identity signal heuristic but 
rather to eliminate checklist items that seem to be too complex for novice users and to retain 
those that are more understandable. Checklist item 12.3 states: Does the identity signal 
include human-readable information about the certificate subject? Checklist item 12.4 states: 
Does the identity signal include the Issuer fields’ organisation attribute to inform the user 
about the party responsible for that information? As a result, checklist items 12.3 and 12.4 
will be eliminated from the identity signal heuristic. 
Checklist item 12.5 states: Are there privacy indicators informing users about the privacy 
practices of the system? Experts were satisfied with this item, based on their ratings. 
However, after items 12.3 and 12.4 were eliminated, item 12.5 had to be regrouped. The 
improvements made to the aesthetic and minimalist design heuristic contributed to this 
decision. Item 12.5 is now better represented in this heuristic because it relates to visual 
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design. Retaining the item in the USec HE is well supported because it aids in protecting 
sensitive information that can be manipulated (e.g. OHSN, E-learning etc.).  
The ratings for the completeness of the Identity signal checklist items included one Yes 
rating, two Not Sure ratings, while one expert did not provide a rating.  
7.2.4.13 Security and Privacy 
 
Checklist item 13.1 states: Are protected areas completely inaccessible? An InfoSec expert 
awarded a Moderately Relevant rating for relevance and an Undecided verdict. The expert 
also commented that certain areas would probably be read-only but not modifiable. The USec 
expert delivered a Remove verdict and commented that this is not a usability issue and 
therefore should not be considered as a USec violation. The checklist item would be 
eliminated from the Security and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.2 states: Can protected or confidential areas be accessed with certain 
passwords? An InfoSec expert and the USec expert suggested that the term passwords is too 
restrictive because it only represents a single form of authentication. The checklist item 
would be rephrased and would remain in the Security and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.5 states: Does the system grant access to a user based on valid 
authorization? The USec expert commentated that this is not a usability issue; instead, it is a 
requirement for the system to function correctly. Hence, the item should not be considered as 
a USec violation. The checklist item would accordingly be eliminated from the Security and 
privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.7 states: In the case where the user must provide sensitive personal 
information, does the system state what measures are used to protect this data? The USec 
expert commented that the system should also ensure that those measures are actually taken. 
Hence the checklist item would be rephrased and would remain in the Security and privacy 
heuristic. 
Checklist items 13.8 and 13.9 respectively state: Does the system notify users on their access 
privileges? Does the system initiate a session lock after a period of inactivity or upon user 
request? Based on the experts’ previous comments, these items are examples for showing a 
user’s security status. Accordingly a checklist item has been included in the visibility 
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heuristic to address this. As a result items 13.8 and 13.9 will be eliminated from the Security 
and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.11 states: Are notification messages relating to security and privacy 
displayed to the user before access to the system is granted? The USec expert delivered a 
Remove verdict by arguing that users will not read the messages because they are goal 
directed to their main activity. Nonetheless, the other experts awarded high scores for this 
item. Consequently, it would not be modified and it would remain in the Security and privacy 
heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.14 states: Does the system install required software updates automatically 
and notify the user about this action? The USec expert delivered a Remove verdict by arguing 
that this can be regarded as a security violation since it is an action not prompted by the user. 
Additionally, an InfoSec expert awarded an Undecided rating for the grouping and did not 
provide additional comments. Based on the ratings and concerns, the item would be 
eliminated from the Security and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.15 states: Does the system employ automated tools that provide notification 
to the user upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification? The USec expert 
delivered an Undecided verdict on the basis that this will be useful only if the users know 
what to do about it. Nonetheless, the other experts awarded high scores for this item. 
Consequently, it would not be modified and it would remain in the Security and privacy 
heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.18 states: Does the system notify the user of any information system 
weaknesses or vulnerabilities associated with reported security incidents? The USec expert 
delivered a Remove verdict on the basis that this is more of a legality issue, and although it 
affects the user, it is beyond the scope of USec. Nonetheless, the other experts awarded high 
scores for this item. Consequently, it would not be modified and it would remain in the 
Security and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.19 states: Does the system notify the user about the conduct of backups 
relating to their personal information? The USec expert delivered a Remove verdict on the 
basis that this is not usually done in practice and that the average user would not be interested 
either. However, it would be better to instead provide a contact for any security-related 
questions users may have. In addition, the other experts awarded high scores for this item. 
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Taking all into account, the checklist item would be rephrased and would remain in the 
Security and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.20 states: Is there a backup policy that regulates how copies of information 
should be taken and tested regularly? An InfoSec expert awarded an Undecided rating for the 
grouping and argued whether backups could be considered specific to privacy. The other 
experts awarded high scores for this item. Consequently, it would not be modified and it 
would remain in the Security and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.21 states: Does the system provide awareness and educate the user on how 
to complete tasks? An InfoSec expert awarded an Undecided rating for the grouping and the 
USec expert delivered a Remove verdict. The InfoSec expert was not convinced that 
awareness relates to privacy while the USec expert maintained that since security is not the 
users’ main goal; there is no need to provide awareness for completing security tasks. Based 
on the ratings and concerns, the item would be eliminated from the Security and privacy 
heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.22 states: Does the system enforce minimum password complexity of 
defined requirements? The USec expert delivered a Remove verdict. The expert added that 
passwords are a research area in their own right and that there is no agreement on password 
strength or indeed whether such restrictions do more good than harm. Nonetheless, the other 
experts awarded high scores for this item. Consequently, it would not be modified and it 
would remain in the Security and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.24 states: Does the system enforce password minimum and maximum 
lifetime restrictions? An InfoSec expert awarded an Undecided rating for grouping and a 
Moderately Relevant rating for relevance and delivered an Undecided verdict. The USec 
expert delivered a Remove verdict. Both experts agreed that this can in fact negatively affect 
security. The USec expert mentions that changing passwords regularly can reduce security 
because users will write them down or choose increasingly weak ones. In line with this view, 
the InfoSec expert mentions that forcing too complex passwords, or too many changes, or 
preventing password reuse, all lead to users writing passwords down. Based on the ratings 
and concerns, the item would be eliminated from the Security and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.25 states: Does the system prohibit password reuse for a defined number of 
generations? An InfoSec expert awarded an Undecided rating for grouping, a Moderately 
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Relevant rating for relevance and an Undecided verdict. No additional comments were made. 
Yet, the ratings are likely to be based on the comments the same expert made in terms of item 
13.24. However, the other experts awarded high scores for this item. Consequently it would 
not be modified and it would remain in the Security and privacy heuristic. 
Checklist item 13.27 states: Does the system require users to confirm statements indicating 
that they understand the conditions of access? The USec expert suggested providing an 
example. Thus, an example would be included with the checklist item and it would remain in 
the Security and privacy heuristic. 
The ratings for the completeness of the Security and privacy checklist items included two Yes 
ratings, one Not Sure rating, while one expert did not provide a rating. Final comments were 
made by an InfoSec expert. This expert queried whether users should be able to select and 
ultimately provide consent for what personal information can be used and how it is used, as 
this should not just be a common accept-or-deny situation that covers all information. This is 
an interesting idea that requires further investigation. Checklist item 13.27 addresses this to a 
small extent and the manner in which privacy policies/statements are presented online is a 
well-studied area. Once again, this can impact on USec, but such a discussion is beyond the 
scope of the USec He. The purpose here was to assess the checklist items, which were 
developed by conducting a literature review in phase 1 and determining the most usable 
manner in which to present privacy policies to users was not an integral part of the literature 
review. Additionally, the InfoSec expert suggests that security and privacy statements must 
be concise. A checklist item would thus be included to address this suggestion. 
In review, there were a total of four experts who evaluated 86 checklist items for clarity, 
grouping, relevance and verdict. This provides a total of three hundred and forty-four 
possible responses, which represent their ratings. The graph in figure 7.3 displays the number 
of low ratings awarded for each of the criteria, which is the sum of low ratings from all 
experts. Series 1 represents the actual number of low ratings from the three hundred and 
forty-four in total; and series 2 represents the low rating percentage for the particular 
criterion. In terms of figure 7.3, low ratings are defined as the checklist items that did not 
receive any of the following ratings: 
 Very Good/Good rating for their clarity 
 Strongly Agree/Agree rating for their grouping 
 Very Relevant/Relevant rating for their relevance  
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 Retain rating for their verdict 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Low ratings for checklist items based the criteria 
The deductions from the checklist item assessments, based on the results and comments of 
the experts, are 
 Eliminate the convey features/expressiveness and satisfaction heuristics. 
 Retain the identity signal heuristic. 
 Eliminate checklist items 2.5 and 2.6 from the revocability heuristic. 
 Eliminate checklist item 3.2 from the clarity heuristic. 
 Add a new checklist item in the clarity heuristic that explains why security actions 
must be taken and the consequences of not taking them. 
 Eliminate checklist items 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4 from the convey features/expressiveness 
heuristic. 
 Re-group checklist item 4.3 and categorise it in the visibility heuristic. 
 Eliminate checklist items 8.1 and 8.3 from the satisfaction heuristic. 
 Address checklist item 8.2 in the visibility heuristic and eliminate it from the 
satisfaction heuristic. 
 Eliminate checklist items 9.4 and 9.5 from the user suitability heuristic. 
 Add a new checklist item to the user assistance heuristic that focuses on providing 
security help according to the level of user expertise. 
 Eliminate checklist items 12.3 and 12.4 from the identity signal heuristic. 
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 Re-group checklist item 12.5 and categorise it in the aesthetics and minimalist design 
heuristic. 
 Eliminate checklist items 13.1, 13.5, 13.14, 13.21 and 13.24 from the security and 
privacy heuristic. 
 Address checklist items 13.8 and 13.9 in the visibility heuristic and eliminate them 
from the security and privacy heuristic. 
 Add a new checklist item in the security and privacy heuristic that focuses on 
providing concise security and privacy statements. 
 Provide examples for checklist items 2.4, 3.2, 3.3, 6.4, 10.1, 10.2, 10.5, 10.6 and 
13.27. 
 Rephrase the checklist items 1.2, 2.2, 5.4, 5.7, 6.1, 13.2, 13.7 and 13.19. 
 Separate checklist item 5.3. 
 
The above deductions will be addressed and the improved USec HE will be presented in 
chapter 8. In table 6.10, the issues that participants had with checklist items were presented. 
These were deduced from the application of the USec HE when evaluating the two OHSNs. 
Their concerns will also be considered in the improved USec HE. Table 7.5 presents the 
checklist items that participants expressed concerns about as well as the problem is also 
presented. The table shows whether the experts shared the same view with a participant for a 
specific problem and lastly presents the outcome of the problem. 
Table 7.5: Addressing the participant issues with the checklist items  
Checklist 
Item 
Problem Expert  
Agreement 
Outcome 
1.2  Rephrase 
suggested 
 Item has been rephrased 
4.1  Rephrase 
suggested 
X Item has been eliminated due to expert 
ratings/comments 
5.1  Disagree with 
grouping 
X Item remains in original group since all experts 
were satisfied 
6.1  Rephrase 
suggested 
 Item has been rephrased 
6.4  Example 
suggested 
 Example included 
8.3  Examples 
suggested 
X Item has been eliminated however due to expert 
ratings/comments 
11.3  Rephrase 
suggested 
X Item has been rephrased 
11.4  Relevance of item 
depends on 
situation 
X Item remains unchanged since all experts were 
satisfied 
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Checklist 
Item 
Problem Expert  
Agreement 
Outcome 
11.5  Rephrase 
suggested 
X Item has been rephrased  
13.2  Rephrase 
suggested 
 Item has been rephrased 
13.11  Rephrase 
suggested 
X Example included 
13.15  Rephrase 
suggested 
X Item has been rephrased 
 
7.2.5 Sheet V – Severity Ratings 
 
Severity ratings are applied to measure the extent of usability violations in an HE. Jakob 
Nielsen awarded his own severity ratings in combination with his well-known usability 
heuristic set. Although they have been widely adopted for HEs, there are cases where they are 
insufficient to measure the extent of usability violations in a SAD, as was determined by Sim 
et al. (2009) when they created heuristics to evaluate computer assisted assessment 
applications. The same rationale exists in this study with regard to the severity ratings for the 
USec HE, as there was a need to create customised severity ratings that can be more effective 
in measuring the extent of USec violations. This is because Nielsen’s severity ratings are 
based solely on a usability perspective, and consequently, they lack a security perspective. 
Taking into account Nielsen’s severity ratings (Nielsen, 1994), and by modifying and 
adapting them with the standards for security categorisation of federal information and 
information systems (FIPS PUB 199, 2004), it was possible to include a security perspective 
in them as well to compliment a usability one. The result was two different sets of USec 
severity ratings that experts would assess in order to determine the most effective match for 
the USec HE.  
 
Nielsen used a four-level rating scale to measure the severity of usability problems. Experts 
will evaluate the interface and if they determine a usability violation, they will rate it with a 
value of 0 – 4 in order to measure its extent. The ratings include: 
0. I don't agree that this is a usability problem at all.  
1. Cosmetic problem only: need not be fixed unless extra time is available on 
project.  
2. Minor usability problem: fixing this should be given low priority. 
3. Major usability problem: important to fix, so should be given high priority.  
4. Usability catastrophe: imperative to fix this before product can be released. 
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Investigating the potential impact of a security breach for organisations and individuals 
provided a potential platform to integrate security with Nielsen’s severity ratings. FIPS 
Publication 199 defines three levels of potential impact on organisations or individuals should 
there be a breach of security (i.e. a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability). The 
application of these definitions must take place within the context of each organisation and 
the overall national interest. The three levels of impact are defined and include (FIPS PUB 
199, 2004): 
1. The potential impact is LOW if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could 
be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organisational operations, organisational 
assets, or individuals. 
2. The potential impact is MODERATE if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organisational 
operations, organisational assets, or individuals. 
3. The potential impact is HIGH if the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organisational 
operations, organisational assets, or individuals. 
 
Nielsen’s severity ratings and FIPS three levels of potential impact of a security breach 
helped determine two sets of USec severity ratings. It is important that severity ratings are 
easy to understand and apply to a violation in a manner that makes the extent of the violation 
comprehensible. By considering all these factors, two USec severity rating sets were 
presented.  Set 1 is presented in table 7.6.  
Table 7.6: USec severity ratings for Set 1 
Rating Severity classification 
0 I do not agree that this is a USec violation at all. 
1 Minor USec violation: the potential impact is LOW therefore fixing this should be given a 
low priority. 
2 Modest USec violation: the potential impact is MODERATE therefore fixing this should be 
given a moderate priority. 
3 Major USec violation: the potential impact is HIGH therefore it is important to fix and 
should be given a high priority. 
4 USec catastrophe: the potential impact is SEVERE and therefore it is imperative to fix 
before product can be released. 
 
Accompanying the USec severity ratings for Set 1 were the following potential impact 
descriptions: 
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 LOW potential impact: security/privacy is maintained and usability is at an acceptable 
level 
 MODERATE potential impact: security/privacy is maintained and usability is not at a 
reasonable level 
 HIGH potential impact: security/privacy is not maintained and usability is at a 
satisfactory level 
 SEVERE potential impact: security/privacy and usability is not maintained 
 
The potential impacts are more serious when security and privacy are not maintained in 
comparison to usability. In the context of online social networking environments, where 
users’ personal information is constantly at risk, protection is key.  The USec severity ratings 
must also determine if the violation occurs because it fails from a security or usability 
standpoint. This is demonstrated in the construction of both sets – Set 2 follows the same 
logic as Set 1, although it does represent a simpler version of it. Set 2 is presented in table 
7.7. 
Table 7.7: USec severity ratings for Set 2 
Rating Severity Classification 
0 Secure and usable 
1 Secure and moderately usable 
2 Secure and not usable 
3 Not secure and usable 
4 Not secure and not usable 
 
The expert assessment examined the severity ratings for Sets 1 and 2 separately. It 
specifically addressed the ease of application and relevance of each set. Experts could also 
provide optional comments were they felt necessary, although one of the four experts did not 
complete this sheet. Tables 7.8 and 7.9 summarise the frequencies of the experts’ responses 
(n = 3) for the ease of application and relevance of Set 1. In table 7.8 the scores are 
representative of the number of experts that selected the following: VE = Very Easy; E = 
Easy; U = Undecided; D = Difficult and VD = Very Difficult. 
Table 7.8: Overall ratings for the ease of application of the USec severity ratings for Set 1 
Rating Severity classification VE E U D VD 
0 I do not agree that this is a USec violation at all 2   1  
1 Minor USec violation: the potential impact is LOW therefore 
fixing this should be given a low priority 
2   1  
2 Modest USec violation: the potential impact is MODERATE 
therefore fixing this should be given a moderate priority 
2 1    
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Rating Severity classification VE E U D VD 
3 Major USec violation: The potential impact is HIGH 
therefore it is important to fix and should be given a high 
priority 
2 1    
4 USec catastrophe: The potential impact is SEVERE and 
therefore it is imperative to fix before product can be released 
2 1    
 
The results show that the severity ratings in Set 1 are in general easy to apply when 
evaluating an interface for USec violations. However, an expert in the InfoSec field stated 
that ratings 0 and 1 were difficult to apply. The expert did not provide additional comments 
to further explain these views.  However, according to their results, the other two experts, 
from InfoSec and HCI fields were satisfied with the ease of application. Table 7.9 focuses on 
the relevance of the severity ratings. All experts rated each of the severity ratings as very 
relevant for measuring USec violations. In table 7.9 the scores are representative of the 
number of experts that selected the following: VR = Very Relevant; R = Relevant; MR = 
Moderately Relevant; OLR = Of Little Relevance and NR = Not Relevant. 
Table 7.9: Overall ratings for the relevance of the USec severity ratings for Set 1 
Rating Severity Classification VR R MR OLR NR 
0 I do not agree that this is a USec violation at all. 3     
1 Minor USec violation: the potential impact is LOW 
therefore fixing this should be given a low priority. 
3     
2 Modest USec violation: the potential impact is 
MODERATE therefore fixing this should be given a 
moderate priority. 
3     
3 Major USec violation: The potential impact is HIGH 
therefore it is important to fix and should be given a 
high priority. 
3     
4 USec catastrophe: The potential impact is SEVERE 
and therefore it is imperative to fix before product 
can be released. 
3     
 
Tables 7.10 and 7.11 summarise the frequencies of the experts’ responses (n = 3) for the ease 
of application and relevance of Set 2 respectively. In table 7.10, the scores are representative 
of the number of experts that selected the following: VE = Very Easy; E = Easy; U = 
Undecided; D = Difficult and VD = Very Difficult. 
Table 7.10: Overall ratings for the ease of application of the USec severity ratings for Set 2 
Rating Severity classification VE E U D VD 
0 Secure and usable 2    1 
1 Secure and moderately usable 1 1  1  
2 Secure and not usable 2 1    
3 Not secure and usable 2 1    
4 Not secure and not usable 3     
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The results for the ease of application of Set 2 are similar to those from Set 1. The InfoSec 
expert, who scored severity ratings 0 and 1 as Difficult in Set 1, rated them as Very Difficult 
and Difficult in Set 2. More concerning is the score assigned to severity rating 1, as it may 
require revision. Regarding severity rating 0, it is common practice to include such a rating 
and HCI experts will be well aware of the use and application. Hence, it may be the 
background of the specific expert that influenced the scores awarded it because it might not 
make sense to have a severity rating for a feature that does not classify as a violation.  
 
The second InfoSec expert scored severity ratings 2 and 3 as Easy. From the additional 
comments provided it can be established that improving the wording of the specific severity 
ratings could have resulted in Very Easy scores for both. In particular, the expert would have 
preferred the severity classification to be Secure but not usable for severity rating 2 and 
Usable but not secure for severity rating 3. Overall, the results indicate that the severity 
ratings in Set 2 can also be considered as easy to apply, when evaluating an interface for 
USec violations.  
 
Table 7.11 focuses on the relevance of the severity ratings for Set 2. Once again, the results 
mimic those of Set 1. All experts rated each of the severity rating as very relevant for 
measuring USec violations. In table 7.11 the scores are representative of the number of 
experts that selected the following: VR = Very Relevant; R = Relevant; MR = Moderately 
Relevant; OLR = Of Little Relevance and NR = Not Relevant. 
Table 7.11: Overall ratings for the relevance of the USec severity ratings for Set 2 
Rating Severity Classification VR R MR OLR NR 
0 Secure and usable 3     
1 Secure and moderately usable 3     
2 Secure and not usable 3     
3 Not secure and usable 3     
4 Not secure and not usable 3     
 
To conclude their assessments of the severity ratings, experts gave their opinions regarding 
the completeness of each set and could also suggest additional information that should have 
been considered. They then selected the USec severity rating set that they preferred. All 
experts expressed the opinion that both sets are complete and, therefore, did not suggest any 
additional information that should have been considered. Set 1 was the preferred set of the 
two, being preferred by two experts, one from HCI and one from InfoSec. The other InfoSec 
expert preferred Set 2. 
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The deductions from the severity ratings assessments are that the USec severity ratings of Set 
1 represent the preferred option when measuring the extent of USec violations on an 
interface. These are easy to apply and are very relevant for their purpose. Areas for possible 
improvements that have been suggested include the following: 
 Review wording for severity rating 0 of Set 1 
 Review wording for severity rating 1 of Set 1 
 
7.2.6 Sheet VI – Material Assessment 
 
The focus of this sheet was to assess the material that was considered to develop the USec 
HE. The assessment examined the usability and USec material and the security and privacy 
material separately and specifically addressed the novelty and relevance of the materials. 
Experts could also provide optional comments were they felt necessary, but one of the four 
experts did not complete this sheet. Tables 7.12 and 7.13 summarise the frequencies of the 
experts’ responses (n = 3) for the novelty and relevance of the usability and USec material 
respectively. In table 7.12 the scores are representative of the number of experts that selected 
the following: UTD = Up To Date; PU = Partially Updated; OD = Out Dated; and NDE = 
Not Domain Expert. 
Table 7.12: Overall ratings for the novelty of usability and USec material 
# Document UTD PU OD NDE 
1 Web security context: UI guidelines 3    
2 10 principles for secure interaction design 2 1   
3 6 criteria for HCI-S 2 1   
4 10 preliminary guidelines for USec 2 1   
5 Xerox HE checklist 1 1  1 
 
The results from table 7.12 are positive and show a consensus among the experts. Their 
general view is that none of the usability and USec material is outdated. All experts rated the 
Web security context UI guidelines as Up to Date. Two experts rated the ten principles for 
secure interaction design as Up to Date and one as Partially Updated. Similarly, two experts 
rated the six criteria for HCI-S as Up to Date and one as Partially Updated. The same ratings 
were provided for the 10 preliminary guidelines for USec with two Up to Date and one 
Partially Updated. Finally, the Xerox HE checklist gave mixed scores; one Up to Date one 
Partially Updated and one Not Domain Expert. 
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Table 7.13 focuses on the relevance of the material for usability and USec. In table 7.13 the 
scores are representative of the number of experts that selected the following: VR = Very 
Relevant; R = Relevant; MR = Moderately Relevant; OLR = Of Little Relevance; NR = Not 
Relevant; and NDE = Not Domain Expert. 
Table 7.13: Overall ratings for the relevance of usability and USec material 
# Document VR R MR OLR NR NDE 
1 Web security context: user interface guidelines 3      
2 10 principles for secure interaction design 3      
3 6 criteria for HCI-S 3      
4 10 preliminary guidelines for USec 2 1     
5 Xerox HE checklist 3      
 
The results from table 7.13 again show a consensus among the experts. Their general view is 
that the usability and USec material considered are very relevant. All experts rated the Web 
security context UI guidelines and the ten principles for secure interaction design as Very 
Relevant; similarly, all three rated the six criteria for HCI-S as Very Relevant. Two experts 
rated the ten preliminary guidelines for USec as Very Relevant and one as Relevant. Finally, 
all experts once again rated the Xerox HE checklist as Very Relevant. This is particularly 
pleasing because the Xerox HE was the well-known heuristic set used for the tailored made 
method in order to develop the checklist items for the USec heuristics.  
 
Tables 7.14 and 7.15 summarise the frequencies of the experts’ responses (n = 3) for the 
novelty and relevance of the security and privacy material respectively. In table 7.14 the 
scores are representative of the number of experts that selected the following: UTD = Up To 
Date; PU = Partially Updated; OD = Out Dated; and NDE = Not Domain Expert. 
Table 7.14: Overall ratings for the novelty of security and privacy material 
# Document UTD PU OD NDE 
1 EU data protection regulations 1 1  1 
2 Security-inherent properties combined with ISO 9241 2 1   
3 Privacy space framework 1 1  1 
4 Privacy guidelines of Cranor 1 1  1 
5 ISO/IEC 27002 2 1   
6 NIST Special Publication 800-53 1 1  1 
 
The results from table 7.14 are respectable in that none of the experts rated any of the security 
and privacy material as outdated. One expert rated the EU data protection regulations as Up 
to Date, one as Partially Updated and one responded Not Domain Expert. Two experts rated 
the security-inherent properties combined with ISO 9241 as Up to Date and one as Partially 
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Updated. One expert rated the privacy space framework as Up to Date, one as Partially 
Updated and one answered Not Domain Expert. The same results were provided for the 
privacy guidelines of Cranor, with one Up to Date, one Partially Updated and one Not 
Domain Expert. Two experts rated ISO/IEC 27002 as Up to Date and one as Partially 
Updated. Finally, the NIST Special Publication 800-53 had mixed scores; one Up to Date one 
Partially Updated and one Not Domain Expert. 
 
Table 7.15 focuses on the relevance of the material for security and privacy. In table 7.15 the 
scores are representative of the number of experts that selected the following: VR = Very 
Relevant; R = Relevant; MR = Moderately Relevant; OLR = Of Little Relevance; NR = Not 
Relevant; and NDE = Not Domain Expert. 
Table 7.15: Overall ratings for the relevance of security and privacy material 
# Document VR R MR OLR NR NDE 
1 EU data protection regulations 3      
2 Security-inherent properties combined with ISO 
9241 
2 1     
3 Privacy space framework 2 1     
4 Privacy guidelines of Cranor 1 2     
5 ISO/IEC 27002 3      
6 NIST Special Publication 800-53 2 1     
 
The results displayed in table 7.15 show a consensus among the experts. Their general view 
is that the security and privacy material considered is very relevant. This can be concluded 
because three of the five have been awarded Relevant scores by the HCI expert. With regards 
to the security and privacy material, the opinions of the InfoSec experts hold more value, as it 
is them who determine whether security and privacy have been well represented in the USec 
HE. All experts rated the EU data protection regulations as Very Relevant. Moreover, two 
experts rated the security-inherent properties combined with ISO 9241 as Very Relevant and 
one as Relevant. The same results were awarded for the privacy space framework, with two 
Very Relevant and one Relevant. One expert rated Cranor’s privacy guidelines as Very 
Relevant and the other two as Relevant. All experts rated ISO/IEC 27002 as Very Relevant. 
Finally, two experts rated the NIST Special Publication 800-53 as Very Relevant and one as 
Relevant. 
 
To complete their assessments of the materials, experts gave their overall opinions. 
Moreover, they were given an opportunity to suggest additional materials that should have 
been considered. All experts suggested that the usability and USec material was complete and 
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none provided suggestions for additional material to be considered. In terms of the security 
and privacy material, two experts suggested it was complete, while one was not sure about 
completeness. However, that expert did not suggest alternative materials that could be 
considered, nor did the other two experts suggest additional materials.  
 
The deductions from the material assessments are that the usability and USec material is not 
out dated and is particularly relevant. The same applies to the security and privacy materials. 
Accordingly, no areas for possible improvements were identified with regard to the materials 
of each field – InfoSec and HCI. 
 
7.2.7 Sheet VII – User Satisfaction Questionnaire 
 
The final sheet in the validation tool was a user satisfaction questionnaire. This was similar to 
the one answered by participants in the FUE in section 6.3.3, which was conducted on the 
OHSNs. However, this questionnaire contained more items, eighteen to be exact, and focused 
on the experts’ views regarding the USec HE as a tool for assessing the level of USec in 
online social networking environments. Table 7.16 summarises the frequencies of the 
experts’ responses (n = 3). It should be noted that one of the four experts did not complete 
this sheet in their validation and another did not answer question 14. In table 7.16 the scores 
for questions 1 to 13 are representative of the number of experts that selected the following: 
SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; U = Undecided; D = Disagree; and SD = Strongly 
Disagree.  
The scores for question 14 are representative of the number of experts that selected the 
following: VI = Very Important; I = Important; MI = Moderately Important; OLI = Of Little 
Importance; and U = Unimportant.  
The scores for questions 15 and 16 are representative of the number of experts that selected 
the following: VG = Very Good; G = Good; BA = Barely Acceptable; P = Poor; and VP = 
Very Poor. 
 
Last of all, the scores for question 17 are representative of the number of experts that selected 
the following: VU = Very Useful; U = Useful; BU = Barely Useful; NU = Not Useful; and 
NVU = Not Very Useful. Following table 7.16 is an analysis of the questions and their 
relating scores. 
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Most of the questions that the participants had in the FUE, which are listed in table 6.12, were 
also provided to the experts. In particular, the first eleven questions are identical. However, 
questions 12, 13 and 17 in table 7.16 were only provided to the experts. Questions 15 and 16 
in table 7.16 are identical to questions 13 and 14 respectively, in table 6.12. 
Table 7.16: Overall ratings from user satisfaction questionnaire 
# Question SA A U D SD 
1 I can evaluate a security and privacy feature quickly 
applying the checklist items. 
1 2    
2 I am satisfied with the number of checklist items included.  2  1  
3 The length of the USec HE should be shortened. 1 1 1   
4 It is easy to understand how to apply the USec HE on an 
interface. 
2  1   
5 The heuristic descriptions clearly describe what the 
checklist items are evaluating. 
1 2    
6 The terminology used in the USec HE is clear and easy to 
understand. 
1 2    
7 I would need additional instructions to evaluate an interface 
with the USec HE. 
 1  2  
8 It is easy to learn how to use the USec HE once you have 
used it once. 
2  1   
9 Checklist items are well categorised under a heuristic. 2  1   
10 The amount of information included in the USec HE was 
useful. 
1 1 1   
11 The use of the USec HE is complex  1  2  
12 The proposed USec severity ratings are effective in 
measuring the degree of a security/privacy usability 
violation. 
 2 1   
13 The material used to develop the USec HE is acceptable 
and sufficient? 
2 1    
# Question VI I MI OLI U 
14 Developing tools that improve the usability of security and 
privacy features on an interface. 
 2    
# Question VG G BA P VP 
15 Overall, how would you rate the quality of the USec HE? 2 1    
16 Overall, how would you rate the effectiveness of the USec 
HE? 
 3    
# Question VU U BU NU NVU 
17 Overall, how useful is the USec HE to identify 
security/privacy usability violations on an interface? 
2 1    
 
Question 1 examined the time required to evaluate security and privacy features on a website, 
using the USec HE. Two experts Agree and one Strongly Agree that the evaluation can be 
done quickly by applying the relevant checklist items. It is important that the tool can be used 
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quickly as this can contribute to its adoption. In that respect, the results are acceptable and 
satisfying. 
Question 2 examined the experts’ satisfaction with regard to the number of checklist items 
included in the USec HE. Results show two Agree and one Disagree that they are satisfied in 
this regard. The one Disagree score is concerning because it is the opinion of an HCI expert 
who is knowledgeable about UIMs. Consequently, the number of checklist items included in 
the HE is an area that will need to be reviewed. 
Question 3 examined the length of the USec HE. This question directly relates to Question 2. 
The results show one Strongly Agree, one Agree and one Undecided with regard to 
shortening the length of the HE. These results do not exactly align with those in Question 2, 
except for the opinion of the HCI expert. Therefore these results confirm that the opinion of 
the HCI expert is correct. As mentioned previously, the length of the HE and the number of 
checklist items within it is an area that requires more attention in the next iteration phase. 
Question 4 examines the ease of use of the USec HE. The results show that two experts 
Strongly Agree and one is Undecided about the fact that it is easy to understand and use.  The 
Undecided expert is from InfoSec field. Considering this and the background of the other two 
experts, the ease of use can be regarded acceptable. 
Question 5 examines the descriptions of the heuristics. Each heuristic consists of a name and 
an associated description. Categorised under the heuristic name are the relevant checklist 
items that operationalise it, which assists experts in understand its application in context.  
Generally, experts felt that the heuristic descriptions adequately describe what their 
associated checklist items evaluate. Results show one Strongly Agree and two Agree on this 
level. Therefore this aspect is satisfactory. 
Question 6 relates to the terminology used in the USec HE. Overall, experts were satisfied 
with the language. Results show one Strongly Agree and two Agree scores regarding clear 
and easy to understand terminology. This shows acceptability. 
Question 7 examined the instructions that were provided for the USec HE. The results show 
that one of the experts Agree and two Disagree regarding additional instructions to conduct 
an evaluation. The expert who required additional instructions originates from the InfoSec 
field. While the instructions provided in the USec HE emulate those of well-known heuristic 
sets, they include options for the reviewers’ answers, comments and severity ratings. The way 
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in which the severity ratings can be applied during the evaluation process was also 
mentioned. The HCI expert was satisfied with the level of instructions supplied and it can be 
assumed that this relates to the experts prior experience with this UIM. Based on this, the 
consensus is that the instructions are sufficient. 
Question 8 examined the ease of learning to use the USec HE, as this will impact on the reuse 
of the tool, which is important because it indirectly demonstrates a successful design. Results 
show that two experts Strongly Agree and one is Undecided about the tool’s use being easy to 
remember. The expert that was Undecided originates from the InfoSec field and therefore the 
same rationale applies as to the previous question. It should be noted that an Undecided 
response does not necessarily warrant concern, unless, as in this case, it is expressed by the 
HCI expert. It can, however, suggest an area that requires more investigation under certain 
circumstances, as pointed out. Consequently, the tool can be regarded as easy in terms of 
remembering how it is used. 
Question 9 examines the categorisation of checklist items under their heuristics. This 
question directly relates to Question 5 and the results show that two experts answered 
Strongly Agree and one Undecided in this regard and they tend to correlate with those of 
Question 5. The exception to this is the HCI expert, who was Undecided in regard to this 
question. This means that the categorisation should be reviewed to identify checklist items 
that fit better under a different heuristic name. 
Question 10 examines the usefulness of the amount of information provided in the USec HE. 
This ensures that the participants are satisfied that the information in checklist items is useful 
to determine security/privacy usability violations on an interface. The results show that one 
expert answered Strongly Agree, one Agree and one Undecided for this question. The 
Undecided response was again from the HCI expert; however, there may be a relation with 
the answers from question 7, where the need for additional instructions was examined. The 
consensus was that the instructions were sufficient. More information than is required might 
have been provided to better inform the experts from InfoSec and USec about the HE and 
how it is used during evaluations. The Undecided response from the HCI expert to the current 
question suggests that the information provided is common knowledge to an HCI expert and 
some of it could have been excluded. However, as is stated, this question also examines the 
information in the checklist items. Therefore, the amount of information that is provided in 
each checklist item should be reviewed in an attempt to eliminate unnecessary information. 
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As was suggested in previous results, this will also impact on another area that may require 
improvement – reducing the length of the HE. 
Question 11 examines the complexity involved in using the USec HE. This question directly 
relates to Question 4 and a correlation is found with the results of both questions. The results 
show that one expert answered Agree and two Disagree that the USec HE is a complex tool 
to use. The Disagree expert is from InfoSec field; hence, considering this and the background 
of the other two experts, it can be concluded that it is not a complex tool to use. 
Question 12 evaluated the effectiveness of the proposed severity ratings to measure security 
and privacy usability violations. The results show that two experts Agree and one is 
Undecided that the severity ratings are effective. The Undecided expert was from the InfoSec 
field. It is important that the severity ratings are effective because it is their extent that 
determines where additional usability efforts are a priority in the design. The results of the 
effectiveness of the severity ratings can therefore be regarded acceptable. However, further 
investigation should be conducted to guarantee this. 
Question 13 focused on the material that was considered for developing the USec HE and 
evaluated whether the material is sufficient and acceptable. This is a decisive factor for the 
USec HE, as ensuring that the security and privacy material adequately represents the InfoSec 
field and that the usability and USec material adequately represents the HCI field is essential. 
Subsequently, this helps to determine the requirements of each field and consider them in the 
development of the heuristics and their checklist items. Results show that two experts 
Strongly Agree and one Agree that the material is sufficient and acceptable. 
Question 14 was not directly focused on the USec HE; instead, it required the experts’ 
opinions concerning the development of USec tools. One of the experts did not provide an 
answer to this question, while the other two experts stated that it is Important to develop such 
tools.  
Question 15 examined the overall quality of the USec HE. The tool can be regarded as one of 
good quality, as two experts rated it as Very Good and one rated it as Good. However, 
making the improvements suggested by the experts in previous questions may be the 
difference between having a tool that is of very good quality. 
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Question 16 examined the overall effectiveness of the USec HE. This was deemed to be 
acceptable, as all three experts rated it Good. Once again, the results suggest that the tool can 
be further improved as mentioned in the previous question. 
Question 17 examined the overall usefulness of the USec HE. Accordingly, two experts rated 
it as Very Useful and one as Useful. This confirms that it is an effective tool and makes a 
worthy contribution. 
Question 18, which is not included in table 7.16, was an optional question. Experts could 
provide suggestions for improving the USec HE. One expert mentioned that it is a very good 
tool but suggested reducing its length. Streamlining it may also reduce its complexity. This 
was confirmed by the results of Question 3. 
The findings obtained from the user satisfaction questionnaire would seem to indicate that the 
overall results are encouraging, as the effectiveness, quality and usefulness of the tool are 
more than satisfactory. This suggests that the tool is successful in achieving its intended 
objectives. Nonetheless, there are areas that can be improved. One concerning factor, 
however, is the length of the tool and both the experts and the users indicated that the length 
should be reduced. Other areas for possible improvements that have been suggested but with 
less emphasis, include  
 reviewing the categorisation of checklist items under heuristic names 
 removing unnecessary information from the checklist items, which also impacts on 
length 
 reviewing the severity ratings by applying them in context. 
7.3 SUMMARY  
This chapter focuses on the assessments that the experts conducted on the USec HE, for 
which a validation tool was provided. The validation tool consists of seven sections and 
comprises a template for evaluating new HEs. All sections of the tool have been discussed in 
detail in section 7.2 of the chapter. The first section provides instructions for the use and 
purpose of the tool and the second section is used to collect the biographical data of the 
experts. The most important information on the experts used in this validation was presented. 
In the third section of the validation tool, the heuristics were assessed. The main deductions 
were that the convey features/expressiveness heuristic should be eliminated, while rewording 
was necessary for the descriptions of five other heuristics. 
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The fourth section assesses the checklist item of each heuristic, which are categorised within 
the heuristics that were assessed in section three. An extensive discussion was conducted on 
the checklist items that did not provide positive ratings or that had specific comments from 
the experts. The main deductions were that the satisfaction heuristic and seventeen checklist 
items should be eliminated. Additionally, three new checklist items should be added, eight 
checklist items should be rephrased, one checklist item should be modified by separating it 
and two checklist items should be re-grouped. Lastly, three checklist items would be 
combined into one which would then be re-grouped. 
 
The customised severity ratings are assessed in section five. Between the two severity rating 
sets presented, the preferred one for measuring USec violations was Set 1. Section six of the 
validation tool assesses the material that was considered to develop the heuristics and their 
checklist items. The results indicated that both the usability and USec material and the 
security and privacy material were not out dated and were particularly relevant. 
 
The seventh and final section of the validation tool comprises a satisfaction questionnaire. 
Experts provide overall ratings for the new HE, which in this case is intended for USec. The 
results indicate that the experts had comparable views as those of the participants regarding 
the USec HE, as it was considered effective in achieving its objectives. Possible 
improvements would be reducing its length and reviewing the categorisation of checklist 
items under heuristic names. These were also highlighted in the assessment of checklist 
items, which is the fourth section of the validation tool. In chapter 8, the framework for USec 
will be presented. 
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CHAPTER 8: APPLICABILITY OF THE USABLE SECURITY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the framework for evaluating USec in online social networking 
environments. It serves as a proof of concept, illustrating the applicability and use of the 
proposed framework. It will also mention the supporting instruments of the framework, 
which include context, components, relationships and outputs. 
 
Section 8.2 will define the framework for the study. In sections 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5, the first, 
second and third components from the framework will be discussed, respectively. Following, 
in section 8.6, the research procedures and techniques that were used as part of the data 
triangulation process are mentioned. The summary is presented in section 8.7.  
 
8.2 THE FRAMEWORK 
To determine the applicability of the framework, a series of steps had to be worked through. 
These were the most significant in the study and they are presented in table 8.1. 
Table 8.1: The instrumental steps to construct the framework  
# Step Resource Required Result 
1 Determine what a conceptual 
framework is 
Literature for frameworks (more 
focus on conceptual 
frameworks) 
A framework to 
qualitatively evaluate 
USec in online social 
networking  
2 Determine the most appropriate 
UIM for evaluating UI 
Literature for HCI (more focus 
on UIMs) 
HE 
3 Determine how to develop 
heuristics  
Literature for HCI (more focus 
on developing heuristics) 
Process to develop 
heuristics for a SAD  
4 Develop an HE for evaluating 
USec on websites/applications 
Literature for USec, InfoSec and 
HCI fields (for HCI more focus 
on usability and UX, for InfoSec 
security and privacy) 
USec HE 
5 Investigate the context in which 
the USec HE will be applied 
Literature for online social 
networking environments (more 
focus on OHSNs) 
OHSN criteria 
6 Determine the OHSNs that will 
be used for the case study 
Apply OHSN criteria Google Health and 
MedHelp 
7 Determine how to assess the 
USec HE 
Investigate evaluation criteria 
and Likert scales for designing 
attitude instruments 
Validation tool 
 
Frameworks were discussed in section 5.5 where it was indicated that they concentrate on 
specific outputs that are produced via the research. To deliver these outputs, a set of research 
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activities must be accomplished, which are instrumental in the research process. For this 
study, the research activities are defined as the steps presented in table 8.1. Each of the steps 
had a pivotal role to play in constructing the framework. 
 
From the conceptual framework definition that was provided in section 5.5, the most 
revealing fact is that it outlines a set of beliefs and theories that support a particular research. 
This may be a written product that explains in graphical and narrative forms the main aspects 
of research and elucidates notions such as concepts, variables, factors and relationships, 
among others (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The thesis provides the evidence representing the 
theories and beliefs of this particular research and explains it in both narrative and graphical 
forms. Lethbridge and Laganiere (2005) state that a framework is composed of components 
and relationships; a view that has been adopted in this study. These authors’ diagram of the 
composition of a framework, which was presented in figure 5.8, has been considered and 
modified to represent the composition of the framework in this study. The components of a 
framework to evaluate USec in online social networking environments are presented in figure 
8.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: The composition of the framework to evaluate USec in online social networking  
 
The components of the framework, which are illustrated in figure 8.1, are the USec HE, the 
process to develop heuristics for a SAD and the validation tool. As stated previously, 
relationships form an integral part of a conceptual framework. Accordingly, there are three 
fundamental relationships that tie the three components together in this framework: 
1. A relationship between the process to develop heuristics for a SAD and the USec HE. 
To develop the USec HE the process needs to be considered and applied. 
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2. A relationship between the validation tool and the USec HE. To ensure the 
applicability and validity of the USec HE, the validation tool had to be applied in 
order to assess it. 
3. A relationship between the process to develop heuristics for a SAD and the validation 
tool. The validation tool is applied in task 2 of phase 2 in the process of developing 
heuristics for SADs. Phase 2 and its relevant tasks were discussed in section 4.3.2. 
The components and relationships have been established. However, a context is required in 
which to implement them. This context is online social networking environments. This offers 
a suitable context, as many non-expert users utilise such environments on a daily basis to 
connect with other users and share information. However, users are becoming more aware of 
the implications for not protecting oneself online, USec can nevertheless be an influential 
contributor in this regard. There are various categories of online social networking websites. 
These include personal contact management websites (e.g. Facebook), business networking 
websites (e.g. LinkdIn), cultural trends networking websites (e.g. Twitter) and health 
websites (Huggins, 2007). In terms of the online social networking context, the category 
selected for this research is OHSNs.  
 
The components of the framework and their relationships produce specific outputs. In terms 
of the framework for evaluating USec in online social networking, the components are 
1. a process to develop heuristics for SAD 
2. a validation tool 
3. USec HE  
The specific outputs that result from the components relationships are 
1. high-level heuristics and checklist items for USec 
2. expert feedback to improve Output 1 
3. requirements for OHSN 
4. USec recommendations for MedHelp and Google Health 
5. user feedback to improve Output 1 
The context, components and outputs of the USec framework are presented in figure 8.2.  In 
figure 8.2, ―O1‖ stands for ―Output 1‖; figure 8.3 also illustrates the relationships that are 
formed within the framework. 
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Figure 8.2: The composition of the framework to evaluate USec in online social networking environments in 
terms of context, components and outputs 
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Figure 8.3: The composition of the framework to evaluate USec in online social networking environments in terms of context, components, outputs and relationships 
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8.3 COMPONENT I – THE PROCESS TO DEVELOP HEURISTICS FOR SAD 
The process to develop heuristics for SADs has been discussed in chapter 4. In this section, 
the three phases of the process will be briefly presented. The purpose is to demonstrate the 
applicability of the process. This is achieved by explaining what was done in each of the 
tasks for each phase in order to develop the USec HE. Figure 8.4 presents the tasks for phase 
1: Design high-level heuristics. 
 
 
Figure 8.4: The tasks of phase 1 to develop the USec HE 
 
Phase 1 consists of five tasks: 
Task 1 – Review literature: Literature on usability, UX, security, privacy and USec was 
reviewed. 
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Task 2 – Name high-level heuristics according to themes identified: From the literature 16 
themes were identified. After integrating confidentiality, integrity, availability and privacy 
into a single theme (security and privacy), 13 high-level heuristics with descriptions resulted. 
Task 3 – Tailor existing heuristics to fit the SAD: The Xerox HE system checklist was applied 
for the tailored made method. This resulted in 86 checklist items that could address the SAD. 
Task 4 – Group checklist items based on high-level heuristic names:  The 86 checklist items 
were categorised under the 13 high-level heuristics. 
Task 5 – Review grouping of checklist items: Following the grouping of the checklist items 
into their respective high-level heuristics, a review was conducted. The outcome was that no 
re-grouping was required. 
 
Phase 2: Validation of high-level heuristics consists of four tasks, which are presented in 
figure 8.5: 
Task 1 – Identify and select experts: The experts selected included two from InfoSec, one 
from HCI and one from USec. 
Task 2 – Apply validation tool to validate high-level heuristics: Experts applied the validation 
tool to assess the USec HE. The tool included seven sheets in total. Sheet one comprised the 
instructions, which are not illustrated in figure 8.4. The validation tool will be discussed in 
more detail in section 8.4 since it is a component of the framework. 
Task 3 – Analyse review results: The results from the validation tool were interpreted, 
analysed and conclusions were made. These were discussed in chapter 7. 
Task 4 – Iterate and re-design high-level heuristics: Based on the conclusions made in the 
previous task, areas for improvements were defined, as presented in figure 8.4. The 
rephrasing of eight checklist item required the process to iterate to tasks 1 (Literature review) 
and 3 (Tailor existing heuristics to fit the SAD) of phase 1. The modification of one checklist 
item required the process of iterating to task 1 (Literature review) of phase 1. The re-grouping 
of three checklist items required the process to iterate to tasks 4 (Group checklist items based 
on high-level heuristic names) and 5 (Review grouping of checklist items) of phase 1 
respectively.  
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Figure 8.5: The tasks of phase 2 to develop the USec HE 
 
Figure 8.6 presents the tasks for phase 3: Application of high-level heuristics. 
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Figure 8.6: The tasks of phase 3 to develop the USec HE 
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Phase 3 consists of six tasks: 
Task 1 – Identify and select appropriate websites for evaluation: Social network criteria were 
established to assess a number of OHSNs. Based on the procedure, Google Health and 
MedHelp were selected. 
Task 2 – Develop scenarios and tasks for the evaluation: Participants were provided with 
scenarios, which required them to complete seven main tasks. The tasks are illustrated in 
figure 8.5. 
Task 3 – Identify and select users: Six participants were selected. These were postgraduate 
students; two from health informatics, two from HCI and two from InfoSec. 
Task 4 – Apply high-level heuristics to evaluate the website: Upon completing the scenarios 
and tasks, the participants applied the USec HE to evaluate the OHSN. Once this was done, 
they completed a user satisfaction questionnaire. 
Task 5 – Analyse user feedback of using heuristics: The results from the evaluation were 
analysed and the outcome was 22 USec recommendations for Google Health and 41 for 
MedHelp. These were mentioned in chapter 6. 
Task 6 – Iterate and re-design high-level heuristics: From the perspective of the USec HE, 
twelve improvements were suggested by the participants. Most related to the re-phrasing of 
the checklist items, which required the process to iterate to tasks 1 (Literature review) and 3 
(Tailor existing heuristics to fit the SAD) of phase 1. In addition, the checklist items 
suggested for improvement were compared against the experts’ assessments of them. 
 
8.4 COMPONENT II – THE VALIDATION TOOL 
The analysis of the validation tool results were discussed in chapter 7. The validation tool is 
applied in task 2 of phase 2 of the process. As mentioned previously, there are seven sheets 
included in the tool and each of these will be presented in this section. The validation tool is 
customised for USec; however, it can be used as a template for creating similar validation 
tools. The tool would be modified to evaluate the heuristics of a SAD for which they are 
being developed (see Appendix A.2: Validation Tool Template). The descriptions of each 
sheet will follow. Sheet 1 provides the instructions. These should explain the purpose of the 
tool and of the overall research. The sheet includes basic instructions on how the tool will be 
used, since there are specific instructions on each sheet. Additionally, the sheet has links to 
all other sheets in the tool. It is advisable to send the HE created as a separate document, as it 
provides experts with a view of the proposed complete tool. Sheet 1 is presented in figure 8.7. 
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Figure 8.7: Sheet 1 of the validation tool (see sheet 1 of Appendix A.2: Validation Tool Template)
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Sheet 2 is used to collect the experts’ biographical information and includes the basic 
information required for this study. More information can be included and collected, 
depending on the study. The first seven items are quite general, while items eight, nine and 
ten are for the SAD. These items would most likely be modified when creating heuristics for 
another SAD, unless the HCI, InfoSec or USec form part of the SAD. In that case, that item 
would remain in the sheet. Sheet 2 is presented in figure 8.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Sheet 2 of the validation tool (see sheet 2 of Appendix A.2: Validation Tool Template) 
 
Sheet 3 is used to assess the high-level heuristics and their descriptions. In section A 
importance and clarity are measured. In addition, experts may provide optional comments at 
each heuristic. Section B is used to determine the completeness of the heuristic set. A part of 
Sheet 3 is presented in figure 8.9. Sheet 4 measures the checklist items for each of the high-
level heuristics from sheet 3. These are measured for clarity, grouping and relevance. Experts 
then provide a final verdict on the inclusion of the item and can also provide optional 
comments for each item. The completeness of the checklist items for a high-level heuristic 
are then determined. A part of Sheet 4 is presented in figure 8.10. 
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Figure 8.9: Part of Sheet 3 of the validation tool (see sheet 3 of Appendix A.2: Validation Tool Template) 
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Figure 8.10: Part of Sheet 4 of the validation tool (see sheet 4 of Appendix A.2: Validation Tool Template)
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Sheet 5 is used to assess the customised severity ratings for a new HE. This sheet is only 
included if customised severity ratings are required. Otherwise, the severity ratings of well-
known heuristic sets can be applied (e.g. Nielsen’s severity ratings) and this sheet will be 
excluded. In the case of this study, two sets of customised severity ratings were assessed for 
ease of application and relevance in section A. Experts can also provide optional comments 
for each rating in the set. Section B is used to determine the completeness of each severity 
rating set, while in section C, experts provide their preference for a severity rating set to 
measure USec violations. Part of Sheet 5 is presented in figure 8.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.11: Part of Sheet 5 of the validation tool (see sheet 5 of Appendix A.2: Validation Tool Template) 
 
Sheet 6 is used to assess the material considered to develop high-level heuristics and their 
checklist items. Materials are assessed for novelty and relevance in section A. Experts can 
also provide optional comments for each piece of material. Section B is used to determine the 
completeness of the materials. In this study, two sets of materials were considered: the first 
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set being usability and USec material and the second set security and privacy material. Sheet 6 is presented in figure 8.12. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.12: Part of Sheet 6 of the validation tool (see sheet 6 of Appendix A.2: Validation Tool Template)
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Sheet 7 is a satisfaction questionnaire. The experts will provide their overall opinions on the 
new HE on this sheet. Sheet 7 is presented in figure 8.13.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.13: Sheet 7 of the validation tool (see sheet 7 of Appendix A.2: Validation Tool Template) 
 
8.5 COMPONENT III – THE USEC HE 
The USec heuristics and checklist items from the first iteration were presented in chapter 4. 
Based on the analysis of the experts’ validation tools and the participant comments made 
during the application of the USec HE, some modifications and improvements have been 
made. Table 8.2 presents the final heuristics and checklist items for USec, which are the 
result of the second iteration. This is an improvement from the first iteration, as presented in 
table 4.3. A template of the complete USec HE with severity ratings is provided in Appendix 
A.1: USec HE. It is important to note that the term user in the USec HE defines an intended 
user of the website/application (e.g. a hacker is not considered as an intended user). 
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Table 8.2: The USec HE after second iteration (see Appendix A.1: USec HE) 
1. Visibility – the system should keep users informed about their security status 
1.1 If there are observable delays in the system’s response time to a security-related action, is the user 
kept informed of the system’s progress? 
1.2 Are security-related error messages displayed next to the field in question?  
1.3 After the user completes a security action, does the feedback indicate that the next group of actions 
may be started? 
1.4 Is there some form of feedback for every security-related action? 
1.5 Is the user's status on the system visible (e.g. who is logged in, what level of privileges, timeout)? 
1.6 By looking, can the user tell the security state of the system, and the alternatives for security-related 
actions, if needed? 
2. Revocability – the system should allow users to revoke security actions where appropriate 
2.1 Do security options in menus make obvious whether de-selection is possible? 
2.2 Can users easily reverse their security actions where possible? If not, does the system provide a 
compensating action? 
2.3 When prompts imply a necessary security action, are the words in the message consistent with that 
action? 
2.4 Has the system been designed so that keys with similar names are not close to each other and do not 
perform opposite (and potentially dangerous) security actions (e.g. send vs. save information)? 
3. Clarity – the system should inform users in advance about the consequences of any 
security actions 
3.1 Are users prompt in confirming security actions that have drastic, destructive consequences? 
3.2 Does the system warn users if they are about to make a potentially serious security error (e.g. make 
their pictures accessible to all users)? 
3.3 Does the system prevent users from making security errors whenever possible (e.g. make their 
entire profile accessible to all users)? 
3.4 Does the system clearly explain why a security action must be taken and what are the risks of not 
taking it? 
4. Learnability – the system should ensure that security actions are easy to learn and 
remember 
4.1 Have security items been grouped into logical zones, and have headings been used to distinguish 
between the zones? 
4.2 Does the system provide mapping: that is, are the relationships between security controls and 
security actions apparent to the user? 
4.3 Are security operations easy to learn? 
4.4 Are security operations easy to use? 
4.5 Are users informed about their security selection defaults (if they exist) during their first 
interaction? 
4.6 Do GUI menus make obvious which security items are selected?  
4.7 Does the system protect users from making severe errors? 
4.8 Is security-related information presented in a standardised manner within the individual system? 
5. Aesthetics and Minimalist Design – the system should apply appropriate visual 
representation of security elements and not provide irrelevant security information 
5.1 Is only security information which is relevant to the user displayed on the screen? 
5.2 Are all security icons in a set visually and conceptually distinct? 
5.3 Are security labels brief, familiar and descriptive? 
5.4 Are security prompts expressed in the affirmative (e.g. would you like to check your default 
settings?)?  
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5.5 Are there visual privacy indicators informing users about the privacy practices of the system? 
6. Errors – the system should provide users detailed security error messages that they can 
understand and act upon to recover 
6.1 Are security-related prompts stated constructively, without overt criticism of the user? 
6.2 Do security-related error messages inform the user of the error’s severity? 
6.3 Do security-related error messages suggest the cause of the problem? 
6.4 Do security-related error messages indicate what action the user needs to take to correct the error? 
6.5 Are the security-related error messages accurate in their descriptions? 
7. User Suitability – the system should provide options for users with diverse levels of skill 
and experience in security 
7.1. Are multiple levels of security error message detail available? 
7.2 Can users choose between iconic and text display of security information, where appropriate? 
7.3 Are multiple levels of security detail available? 
7.4 Can users customise security to meet their individual preferences? 
8. User Language – the system should use plain language that users can understand with regard 
to security 
8.1 Are security actions named consistently across all prompts in the design (e.g. using security action 
messages to block a user)? 
8.2 Are security objects named consistently across all prompts in the design (e.g. using the block 
icon/tab to block a user)? 
8.3 Is security information accurate, complete and understandable? 
8.4 Are security questions stated in clear and simple language, where used? 
8.5 Is privacy jargon avoided (e.g. information in the privacy policy)? 
8.6 Is security jargon avoided (e.g. information for security handling in policies)? 
9. User Assistance – the system should make security help relevant and apparent to users 
9.1 Is there a security help function visible (e.g. a key labelled ―Security Help‖)? 
9.2 Is the security information provided relevant? 
9.3 Can users easily switch between security help and their tasks? 
9.4 Do instructions follow the sequence of user security actions? 
9.5 Does the system provide users with opportunities for updated security education, if they desire it? 
9.6 Does the system provide security help based on user expertise (e.g. novice or expert)? 
10. Identity Signal – the system should use and display information about validated certificates 
10.1 Does the system notify the users when they are interacting with non-trustworthy sources (non-
trustworthy is a source that has no information about its identity)? 
10.2 Is the information displayed in the identity signal derived from validated certificates? 
11. Security and Privacy – the system needs to ensure integrity, availability, confidentiality and 
privacy 
11.1 Does access to protected or confidential areas require authenticators? 
11.2 Is it clear that the users give consent regarding the use of their personal information? 
11.3 Is it clearly stated for what purposes users’ personal information is used? 
11.4 Can the user update or delete inaccurate personal information? 
11.5 In the case where the user must provide sensitive personal information, does the system state what 
measures are used to protect this data and ensure that these are taken? 
11.6 Does the system enforce a limit of consecutive invalid access attempts by a user during a period of 
time? 
11.7 Are notification messages relating to security and privacy displayed to the user before access to 
the system is granted (e.g. please log-off your account during lunch time)? 
11.8 Are there controls in place that will assist the user in making sharing/collaboration decisions? 
11.9 Does the system ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain non-public 
information? 
11.10 Does the system provide notification to the user upon discovering discrepancies during integrity 
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verification? 
11.11 Does the system notify the user about the procedure to be followed in the case of duplication or 
loss of personal information? 
11.12 Does the system employ mechanisms to assist in the reporting of security incidents? 
11.13 Does the system notify the user of any information system weaknesses or vulnerabilities 
associated with reported security incidents? 
11.14 Does the system provide a contact for the users’ security-related questions? 
11.15 Is there a backup policy that regulates how copies of information are taken? 
11.16 Does the system enforce minimum password complexity? 
11.17 Does the system encrypt passwords in storage and in transmission? 
11.18 Does the system prohibit password reuse for a defined number of cycles? 
11.19 Does the system employ cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorised disclosure of 
information during transmission? 
11.20 Does the system require users to confirm statements indicating that they understand the 
conditions of access and are these explicated so that informed decisions can be made (e.g. do 
you accept that ―cookies‖ are recorded upon registration: cookies track your online browsing 
activities)? 
 
8.6 TRIANGULATION OF RESULTS 
Section 5.7 discussed triangulation, where it was mentioned that this study will use 
triangulation to enhance the credibility of the findings through the application of several data 
collection and analysis techniques. From a data collection perspective, those that were 
applied in this study included a literature review, FUE, user satisfaction questionnaires and 
HE. From a data analysis perspective, those that were applied include descriptive statistics 
and theme analysis. 
 
A concept map for this research study is presented in figure 8.14. The map presents the main 
research question with its supporting sub-questions. The research philosophy adopted for this 
study was interpretivism and the research strategy applied is a case study. To answer sub-
question 1, the fields of HCI, InfoSec and USec had to be investigated. The data collection 
technique considered for this was a literature study. To answer sub-question 2, a more in-
depth investigation into the HE UIM was required. Again, the technique considered for this 
was a literature study. To answer sub-question 3, an investigation of the assessment criteria 
was required. Research techniques applied include FUE, HE and user satisfaction 
questionnaires. To answer sub-question 4, supporting instruments for developing a 
framework were investigated. Once all the data from the various techniques were collected 
they were analysed using theme analysis and descriptive statistics, as were discussed in 
sections 5.3.7.1 and 5.3.7.2 respectively. The outcome of the triangulation process contributes 
to addressing the main research question. In order to understand how data triangulation was 
conducted, a data triangulation chart for this research study is also provided in table 8.3. 
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Figure 8.14: The concept map for this research study (based on: Alqatawna, Siddiqi, Akhgar, & Btoush, 2009) 
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The data triangulation chart displays the data collection techniques that were used to collect 
the data and interprets the way in which each of them relates to a specific goal. The 
techniques supported the main research strategy, which was a case study. 
Table 8.3: The data triangulation chart for this study 
Source 
number 
1 2 3 4 
Data 
techniques & 
procedures 
Literature review or 
secondary data 
FUE User satisfaction 
questionnaires  
HE 
Objective Gather the required 
background 
knowledge in the 
related fields 
(OHSNs, research 
methodology, 
InfoSec, HCI, and 
USec). 
Provide users 
with scenarios 
and tasks to 
perform on 
OHSNs. 
Gather users and 
experts opinions 
about the USec 
HE. 
Users will use the 
USec HE to 
evaluate the 
OHSNs. Experts 
will use a 
validation tool to 
assess the USec 
HE. 
Interpretation 
(results) 
 
 Understand the purpose of USec for OHSN (Source 1). 
 Understand UX and its role in design (Source 1). 
 Understand the requirements for InfoSec (Source 1). 
 Select the appropriate research methods for the study (Source 1). 
 Select the appropriate UIM for evaluating USec (Source 1). 
 Determine how to create a USec HE (Source 1). 
 Determine the difficulties and frustrations of users when interacting with 
security and privacy on an OHSN (Source 2). 
 Determine the users’ preferences, regarding security and privacy on an 
OHSN (Source 2). 
 Determine the level of USec on the two OHSNs (Source 2). 
 Determine the users’ overall perceptions of the OHSNs (Source 3). 
 Determine the users’ and experts perceptions about the use and 
application of the USec HE (Source 3). 
 Evaluate the OHSNs with the USec HE (Source 4). 
 Evaluate the USec HE (Source 4). 
 
The overall findings from the data triangulation chart support the validity and credibility of 
the three components of the framework. These include the process to develop heuristics for 
SADs, the validation tool and the USec HE, which all form part of the framework to evaluate 
USec in social networking environments. 
 
8.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a framework to evaluate USec in online social networking 
environments. Based on the review of frameworks in section 5.5, the framework for this 
study was defined. There were seven instrumental steps in its formulation, while the 
relationships and outputs of its components were acknowledged. The three components are 
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the process to develop heuristics for SADs, the validation tool and the USec HE. Each was 
discussed in its own section. 
 
The first component, the process to develop heuristics for SADs, was then briefly discussed. 
The discussion focused on how the process was applied to develop USec heuristics and 
presented the tasks that were conducted in each phase. Following this was a discussion on the 
second component, the validation tool, during which the seven sheets of the tool were 
presented. Once again, reference was made to how the sheets were applied to assess the USec 
HE. Subsequently, the third component, the USec HE was discussed. The modified heuristics 
and their checklist items were presented in this section. 
 
The chapter ended with a view of the data triangulation chart for this study. It mentioned the 
four data techniques and procedures that were used and presented their goals, which are the 
product of the triangulation process. The results indicate the validity and credibility of the 
framework’s components. In chapter 9, the conclusion of the research study will be 
presented.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION  
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research study was to develop a framework for evaluating USec in online 
social networking environments. The first gap identified in the literature was a lack of tools 
for evaluating USec, while the second and third gaps identified were the lack of a process to 
develop heuristics and, subsequently, to validate them, respectively. OHSNs provided an 
applicable context in which to evaluate the solutions to the identified gaps. This final chapter 
provides a platform for summarising the entire research study.  
 
Section 9.2 will provide an overview of the research and the contributions made by the 
research are discussed in section 9.3. Section 9.4 provides a reflection of the research from 
several perspectives and section 9.5 discusses the limitations of the study. Areas for future 
research are identified in section 9.6. The lessons learnt from this research experience are 
presented in section 9.7. The final section, section 9.8, comprises a summary.  
 
9.2 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
The research commenced by reviewing the existing body of knowledge and the review was 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3. In particular, chapter 2 discussed the field of HCI and its 
disciplines that are of relevance to this study. These included UCD, HCD, usability and UX. 
The chapter also mentioned the UIMs that are commonly applied in the field, with more 
emphasis on HE. In chapter 3, USec was discussed. In this chapter, InfoSec and privacy were 
introduced first and an outline of the USec field was complemented with a discussion on 
current evaluation tools. These include guidelines, standards and practical solutions for USec. 
 
The process for developing heuristics for SADs and the USec heuristics and checklist items is 
first presented in chapter 4.  That chapter demonstrates how the process is based on the HCD 
approach and then presents all three phases of the process in detail. This is followed by a 
detailed discussion on how the heuristics and checklist items for USec were developed. 
 
The research design and methodology is presented in chapter 5. The research onion model 
was used to explain the methodology, of which more detail is provided later in this section. 
Data collection and analysis techniques, frameworks and data triangulation are also 
introduced in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 provides an exploration of OHSNs. This included capabilities and barriers, among 
other information. Subsequently, the case study concerning MedHelp and Google Health was 
discussed. The participants and the scenarios and tasks they performed in the FUE were 
mentioned. Participants then applied the USec HE in order to evaluate the OHSNs and 
completed a user satisfaction questionnaire. The results of the analysis were presented and 
discussed and on this basis recommendations for USec were made for each OHSN. 
Participants also provided feedback for improving the USec HE. 
 
The assessments that experts conducted on the USec HE were discussed in chapter 7. 
Accordingly, experts applied the validation tool, consisting of seven sheets and on the basis 
of results and analysis of these assessments; it was possible to make improvements to the 
USec HE. The reasoning for implementing the suggested improvements to the USec HE is 
documented in the chapter. 
 
In chapter 8, the framework for evaluating USec in online social networking environments is 
presented. Its three components comprise the process to develop heuristics for SADs, the 
validation tool and the USec HE. These represent the modified heuristics and checklist items 
for USec, based on the improvements suggested in chapter 7, as well as the results of a 
second iteration of the process. These contributions will be discussed again in section 9.3. 
The data triangulation process was then reviewed. 
 
Founded on the problem description and rationale in chapter 1, a primary research question 
and supporting sub-questions were derived. The primary research question for this study is 
the following: 
 
 
 
 
The sub-questions are: 
 
 
 
 
 
What are the components of a framework to qualitatively evaluate usable security? 
1. Which usability inspection method can be adapted to evaluate usable security? 
2. Which approach can be followed to develop the method? 
3. How can the validity and applicability of the method and approach be tested? 
4. How can the method and approach be constituted into a framework? 
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The research design and methodology were critical in answering the primary and sub-
questions. To reiterate, the research onion model was used as a platform. Based on the model, 
this study identified the following components of the research methodology: 
 An interpretivist research philosophy 
 An inductive reasoning research approach 
 A case study research strategy 
 A mixed-methods choice  
 A longitudinal time horizon 
 Four techniques and procedures – secondary data, questionnaires, HE and FUE. These 
are supported with data triangulation.  
 
The four sub-questions were answered in different sections of the thesis. Table 9.1 
summarises the answers to all the research questions and presents a brief overview of their 
solutions. The sections in the thesis where each of the questions were referenced is also 
provided. It should be noted that a particular sub-question may be referenced in more than 
one section. From the table, it can be concluded that all sub-questions have been addressed. 
Accordingly, the primary research question has also been answered. 
 
Table 9.1: Addressing the primary and sub-questions of the research study 
Research Question Type Answer Overview Reference 
What are the 
components of a 
framework to 
qualitatively evaluate 
usable security? 
Primary  Process to 
develop 
heuristics for 
SADs 
 Validation 
tool  
 USec HE 
By addressing the sub-
questions, a framework for 
evaluating USec in social 
networking environments 
was constructed and 
presented in chapter 8. 
Section 
8.2 
Which usability 
inspection method 
can be adapted to 
evaluate usable 
security? 
Sub HE The HE UIM is discussed 
in general in chapter 2.   
The USec HE specifically, 
is presented in chapter 4.  
Sections  
2.6.9 
4.4.  
Which approach can 
be followed to 
develop the method? 
Sub Process to develop 
heuristics for 
SADs 
The literature considered 
for developing the process 
is presented in chapter 2. 
The three-phase process is 
presented in chapter 4.  
Sections 
2.6.9 
4.3 
 
How can the validity 
and applicability of 
the method and 
approach be tested? 
Sub Method: 
 Case study 
 Validation 
tool 
 Publication 
Method: 
 The results from 
applying the USec HE 
to evaluate OHSNs are 
presented in chapter 6. 
Method: 
Section  
 6.3.2 
6.3.3 
 8.5 
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Research Question Type Answer Overview Reference 
 
Approach: 
 Case study 
 Publication 
 The results from the 
validation tool are 
presented in chapter 7. 
Based on both of the 
above, the improved 
USec HE is presented 
in chapter 8, while the 
complete tool with 
severity ratings is 
available in Appendix 
A.1: USec HE.  
 Publication of the 
method is available in 
Appendix E.7: A 
Usable Security 
Heuristic Evaluation 
for the Online Health 
Social Networking 
Paradigm. 
 
Approach: 
 The results from 
applying the process to 
develop a USec HE are 
presented in chapter 8. 
 Publication of the 
approach is available in 
Appendix E.5: A 
Three-Phase Process to 
Develop Heuristics. 
 
Approach: 
 8.3 
How can the method 
and approach be 
constituted into a 
framework? 
Sub Define supporting 
instruments: 
 3 components 
 3 relationships 
 5 outputs 
 Context  
The supporting instruments 
were discussed in chapter 8. 
These provide the 
foundations for answering 
the main research question. 
Section 
8.2 
 
9.3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The importance and impact of USec is stressed throughout the thesis. Although many within 
the research community share this view, as was mentioned in chapter 3, it is not supported by 
all. In alignment with the notion that USec is beneficial, particularly in social networking 
environments, a direction for this research was formulated. This research study spanned the 
period from 2009 to 2011 and aimed at investigating the design of a framework for 
evaluating USec in social networking environments.  
 
This study has added to the body of knowledge of USec and HCI. In so doing, this study has 
identified and developed a conceptual framework that outlines the way in which USec can be 
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evaluated in the context of online social networking. The framework clarifies the components and 
outputs that are influenced by the relationships that exist between the components themselves and 
the online social networking environment. Therefore, it can be noted that this study contributes to 
evaluating USec in online social networking environments, especially in a health context. 
 
The study is also unique as the framework incorporates three novel components: a process, a 
validation tool and an HE, which were all developed in this research as well: 
 Process to develop heuristics for SAD – This is a three-phase process that can be 
followed when developing heuristics for a SAD. In phase 1 high-level heuristics are 
designed; in phase 2, the high-level heuristics are validated and in phase 3, the high-
level heuristics are applied in a context. This process adds to the body of knowledge 
for HCI because it focuses on developing new HEs, which are the most frequently 
used UIM. 
 Validation tool – The validation tool is applied to assess the new high-level heuristics 
and checklist items for a SAD. This occurs in phase 2 of the process. The validation 
tool comprises seven sheets: instructions, expert biographical information, heuristics 
assessment, checklist items assessment, severity ratings, material assessment and 
satisfaction questionnaire. The tool forms a template that can be customised 
specifically for the assessment of heuristics for a SAD. 
 USec HE – This is an HE that is specific to the application domain of USec and is 
used to identify USec violations on an interface of a website/application. As a result it 
is possible to determine the severity of these violations and to recognise where 
improvements are necessary. 
 
From a practical perspective, the study led to the development of two reliable measuring 
instruments in the validation tool and the USec HE. Beyond the boundaries of the framework, 
these can be considered as contributions in their own right. The HE can be used to measure 
the level of USec on websites/applications and the validation tool can be used to assess a new 
set of heuristics and checklist items for a SAD. With adjustments, the validation tool may be 
applicable for assessing an HE for a SAD. 
 
The USec HE was applied to evaluate two OHSNs. However, prior to its use, two additional 
contributions were made: 
 Requirements for OHSNs – These can be used to define an OHSN. There are four sets 
of requirements and each has its own criteria: social networking components, health 
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application domain, scope of functionality and supplementary factors. The criteria for 
the social networking components are profile, connections, navigation, multiple 
means of connections, visibility controls, tools for interaction and access controls. The 
criteria for the health application domain are free-standing vs. integrated, patient-
specific vs. health-care provider specific and general health vs. disease-specific. The 
criteria for the scope of functionality are end-user participation empowerment, 
medical education and information and trustworthiness. The criteria for the 
supplementary factors are number of users, number of support groups and brand. 
 USec recommendations for MedHelp and Google Health – The case study that was 
conducted on the two OHSNs yielded a number of USec recommendations. For 
MedHelp there were a total of 41 recommendations: thirteen for trust, four for ease of 
use, four for terminology, four for ease of learning, six for feedback, six for 
awareness, two for errors and two for help and documentation. For Google Health 
there were a total of 22 USec recommendations: six for trust, three for terminology, 
two for ease of learning, three for feedback, four for awareness, three for errors and 
one for help and documentation. These are defined as practical contributions. 
 
The recommendations for improving USec on MedHelp and Google Health support the 
notion that security and privacy impact on UX as well. In chapter 2, the UX Honeycomb was 
introduced. To reiterate, this currently consists of seven facets for UX: useful, usable, 
desirable, findable, accessible, credible and valuable. Morville (2004) suggests that new 
facets be introduced to further develop the UX Honeycomb. Considering this in alignment 
with the view that security and privacy impact UX, the research supports the recommendation 
stated earlier in chapter 2 to include an eighth facet; the ―secure‖ facet; into the UX 
Honeycomb to complement the existing seven facets. The Secure facet will be concerned 
with the users’ ability to perform security actions and to protect their personal information 
easily and effectively when interacting with the security and privacy features of an 
application/website. 
 
The verification of the contributions in this research study is exemplified by the scientific 
publications emanating from it, which currently include the thesis and four publications. 
 
Following the above discussion, it is clear that the results of this research study offer relevant, 
scientific and practical contributions, as well as recommendations and suggestions. 
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9.4 REFLECTION 
In this section reflections are provided from three perspectives; scientific, methodological and 
substantive.  
 
9.4.1 Scientific Reflection 
 
The problems that users experience with security and privacy were discussed in chapter 3. 
The fact that security is a problem area for UI design also contributes to poor USec. 
Consequently, developers require tools that can assist them to improve their designs in terms 
of USec. Security and privacy design issues can be alleviated with the USec HE. This is a 
contribution to the USec field. 
 
The problems with designing heuristics have been discussed in chapter 2. The fact that well-
known heuristic sets can be limited in scope when evaluating a SAD contributes to inferior 
evaluation results. HCI researchers require a process in which new HEs can be developed. In 
addition, new HEs also need to be assessed for their validity. The process to develop 
heuristics for SADs and the validation tool are therefore contributions to the HCI field. 
 
The problems that users face in OHSNs have been discussed in chapter 6. All online social 
networking environments share these, as they are not specific to health only. However, those 
for health do have particular added concerns. Accordingly, users require usable features that 
can assist them in best protecting their personal information in such environments. The 
framework to evaluate USec in online social networking environments is therefore a 
contribution to the field of USec, HCI and online social networking.  
 
9.4.2 Methodological Reflection 
 
This study investigated elements from the fields of HCI and InfoSec. The methodologies used 
in HCI are more qualitative than those for InfoSec, owing to the investigation of human 
behaviours. This requires the researcher to analyse and interpret results in specific contexts. 
Thus, it is more difficult to generalise results when conducting HCI research than InfoSec.  
 
Conducting research in the field of USec can be challenging and requires the researcher to 
have an understanding of both the HCI and InfoSec fields, which often conflict with each 
other in terms of their methodologies and objectives. It is even more challenging for 
researchers to be neutral and unbiased towards their own research background. Initially one 
would expect the researcher to remain neutral in the research process. However, one 
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subsequently realises that the researcher has to have a stance, as this represents the point of 
departure for the research. This is the approach that was taken for this study – point of 
departure is an HCI perspective. However, it is still important to be unbiased and to consider 
the field of InfoSec separately. If not, the research will not adequately represent the InfoSec 
field, which in turn will not embody the field of USec.  
 
The methodologies used in this research are more qualitative in nature, owing to the research 
stance that was taken. Nonetheless, quantitative data were collected from the user satisfaction 
questionnaires of the participants and the experts. These were analysed in terms of frequency 
counts so that conclusions could be derived from the results. Besides the literature review that 
was conducted for the InfoSec field, the validation tool also ensures that InfoSec is 
represented appropriately in the design of the USec HE. Moreover, the comments and 
assessments of the InfoSec and USec experts guarantee this.  
 
9.4.3 Substantive Reflection 
 
Reflecting on this study, it can be recognised that the scope for research in the field of USec 
is wide, as it encompasses two fields; HCI and InfoSec. Determining the point of departure 
for the research study is a priority and this is done by taking a stance. With regards to this 
study, the scope was also deemed wide, as it focused on multiple aspects, which make the 
contributions unique. Accordingly, the research required the following: 
 An understanding of the fields of HCI, InfoSec and USec to develop a USec HE 
 An understanding of UIMs to determine how to develop heuristics and checklist items 
 An understanding of evaluation criteria and Likert scales for the design of attitude 
instruments to determine how to validate a new HE 
 An understanding of social networking environments to determine requirements for 
selecting OHSNs 
 
The USec HE is a tool that will benefit users and developers alike. Developers can have their 
security and privacy features evaluated to ensure that they are usable. By doing so, users will 
be provided with security and privacy features that they can use and understand on their 
respective websites/applications. It is possible however, that the USec HE may need to be 
upgraded owing to technology changes. New technologies for security and privacy may 
require new heuristics and checklist items to evaluate them, if the existing ones are deemed 
inefficient. 
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9.5 LIMITATIONS  
Reflecting on the research study, the following limitations became apparent: 
 The FUE were conducted with postgraduate students that had no experience with 
OHSNs. Preferably, one would have used participants who are registered on an 
OHSN to conduct the evaluations. Participant selection was discussed in section 
6.3.1.2.  
 The validation tool was conducted by two experts from InfoSec, one from HCI and 
one from USec. In terms of conducting an HE, this number is adequate, as the 
literature states that three to five evaluators are recommended. However, more 
experts, particularly from the USec field, may have contributed to a higher quality and 
more effective USec HE. Nonetheless, identifying USec experts is challenging, as 
they are restricted in numbers. 
 The length of the validation tool minimised the response rate from the experts. This is 
discussed in more detail in section 9.6 because it also offers an area for possible future 
research. 
 The case study was conducted in the context of OHSNs. Within this context, the case 
study is applicable because it evaluates two cases. However, it would be valuable to 
conduct a case study in a different context as well (e.g. evaluate the level of USec in 
the context of e-banking). This is elaborated on more in section 9.6 because it also 
offers an area for possible future research. 
 Requirements that define an OHSN do not exist. Therefore, these had to be 
established in this research study by reviewing the relevant literature and by 
interacting with such websites. Once these were established, the author applied them 
to determine the two OHSNs that would be used in the case study. The selection 
process was conducted by the author alone, who also established the requirements. 
 
9.6 FUTURE RESEARCH  
Within the various chapters, areas for possible future research were identified. These are 
mentioned again below. In addition to these, other areas are also identified. The areas for 
possible future research include: 
 Applying the USec HE to evaluate another website/application (e.g. Facebook, MS 
Outlook, e-banking websites etc.). This provides a new context in which to evaluate 
USec. Based on the results of the user satisfaction questionnaires that participants 
completed, the quality and effectiveness of the USec HE was regarded as more than 
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satisfactory. However, it would seem there is still room for improvement. By applying 
the USec HE in another context, its effectiveness can be further exemplified. 
Together, areas that the USec HE fails to evaluate for a specific context can be 
determined and improvements subsequently made to them. This will further improve 
the quality of the USec HE, because it considers areas that are context specific. These 
can be regarded as ―optional heuristics and checklist items‖. Therefore, if they do not 
apply in a different context, they are simply not used. 
 Developing heuristics for a different SAD (e.g. heuristics to evaluate the design of 
instructional e-learning websites for the Deaf). In this example the SAD is an 
instructional e-learning websites for deaf users. Therefore, the literature review would 
focus on the design of instructional e-learning websites and on the abilities and 
preferences of deaf users when interacting with websites. In essence, the aim is to 
follow the three-phase process in order to create heuristics for another SAD. Areas 
where the process can be improved or modified may then be identified. By creating a 
second set of heuristics, the applicability of the process is further substantiated. 
 Improving the validation tool from the expert perspective. Based on the experts’ 
comments, the main concern with the validation tool was its length. Experts suggested 
that it would be useful to provide an alternative shorter version of the tool. This was 
also the reason that only four of the seven experts returned their assessments by the 
cut-off date. However, the USec expert also mentioned that the tool provided 
interesting and relevant ideas. In addition, the expert liked the approach applied in the 
validation. It is possible that when using the validation tool for a different SAD it 
could be shorter in length. For the USec SAD it was extensive in order to ensure that 
the HCI and InfoSec fields were well represented. As mentioned previously, the 
validation tool is a template that can be customised. For example, if a new set of 
heuristics for a SAD are not supported with checklist items, the checklist items 
assessment sheet could be excluded from the tool. Or, if no customised severity 
ratings are required for the SAD, the severity ratings sheet could be excluded. It is 
worthwhile investigating how the validation tool can be improved for the experts, as it 
is already regarded as an effective tool. Therefore, improvements would be focused 
on enhancing the experience that experts have when using the tool. For example, if 
they are concerned with the length of the tool, it may impact negatively on their 
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assessments even before they start using them. Enhancing their experience will 
contribute to the provision of optimal assessments.  
 UI design implementations for USec. Practical implementations for USec are still 
limited. Expanding on the existing solutions, heuristics or checklist items from the 
USec HE may be formed into ideas for UI design implementations. The user 
suitability heuristic is a worthy example. It states that the system should consider the 
diverse skills of users when providing them with security related information. Thus, a 
new UI design implementation for USec could monitor the users’ interactions with the 
security and privacy features in an attempt to determine their level of skill. Once this 
has been determined, security information and settings can be presented in a manner 
that suits their skill level. Nonetheless, users should still have the option to select their 
preferred skill level as well. 
 Verification of a website/application security capability claims. This would focus on 
how security and privacy claims in policies can be verified. It is important for users to 
know exactly how their personal information is protected, and user trust can be 
enhanced by verifying the claims. In terms of OHSNs, this extends beyond valid 
certificates and codes that verify health information. For example, stating in the policy 
that weekly backups are made should be verified to guarantee that this actually does 
happen.  
 Designing more usable online policies. This is an area that is well researched and that 
has a direct impact on USec. For example, Patrick and Kenny (2003) considered four 
categories of human factor requirements for effective privacy interface design. Based 
on these, they developed a technique to demonstrate how interface design solutions 
can be used when developing a privacy-enhanced application or service. This is just 
one idea for designing more usable privacy solutions. In support of this, in the 
validations conducted, an InfoSec expert expressed the opinion that users should not 
be confronted with a blanket accept-or-deny situation for a complete policy. Rather, 
the policy should be more individualised. For example, in terms of an OHSN, users 
should be able to select which personal information they give consent to be utilised by 
the OHSN and other third-party websites. 
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9.7 LESSONS LEARNT 
It is valuable to mention additional lessons that were learnt during the course of this research 
study, as they make for interesting reading and in principle support the work conducted in 
this research. 
 
The participants who conducted the FUE were unaware of the field of USec, despite the fact 
that their research backgrounds are in the fields of HCI, InfoSec and Health Informatics. 
Understandably, this would be expected considering that HCI and InfoSec have opposing 
objectives. Nevertheless, by the time they completed their evaluations, they all appreciated 
the significance of developing USec tools. This view is confirmed in the results of their user 
satisfaction questionnaires. 
 
The experts who assessed the USec HE with the validation tool presented similar views to 
those of the participants. They also realise the difficulties that users experience with security 
and, therefore, their views express a need for more USec tools. This is aided by their support 
for the development of a USec HE. Their feedback was essential to improving the USec HE 
and in delivering a tool that should satisfy advocates from the HCI, InfoSec and USec fields. 
Experts found this type of research very interesting and all look forward to the analysis of the 
results. The fact that seven experts initially accepted the invitation to participate is also 
testament to this; this despite the fact that three of those experts could not complete their 
validations. This was a result of the length of the validation tool and their other commitments. 
 
The inferences made are that the field of USec is still young and provides opportunities for 
ample research. This study shows that this type of research is equally necessary and 
interesting. Most important of all, it proved that researchers from the fields of HCI and 
InfoSec are willing to contribute and work together to provide USec research and solutions. 
This was observed in the positive attitudes and feedback provided by both the postgraduate 
students and the experts.  
 
Based on this experience, the paradox that exists in USec is questioned. Claims that usability 
and security cannot be merged have been proven invalid in this case. Instead of allowing such 
a view to persist, it is proposed to rather abandon it and to concentrate efforts on 
collaboration. Accordingly, this research demonstrates the outcomes of collaboration. 
Without the collaboration of researchers and experts in the fields of HCI, InfoSec, USec and 
Health informatics, success in this research would have been jeopardised. The researcher 
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maintains that research in USec cannot be conducted in any other fashion; by following this 
approach, the belief is that a beneficial tool for USec has been developed. 
 
9.8 SUMMARY  
This chapter summarises the research study. Following the introduction, a research overview 
was presented in section 9.2, which outlined the discussions that were undertaken in each 
chapter and presented the primary research question and sub-questions of the study. How and 
where these are addressed in the thesis was also mentioned. Section 9.3 emphasises the 
unique contributions made by this research study.  
 
Reflections from scientific, methodological and substantive perspectives are provided in 
section 9.4. The scientific reflection generalised several contributions in the context of the 
research community, while the methodological reflection described the stance taken to 
conduct USec research and, finally, the substantive reflection defined the scope of the study.  
 
In section 9.5, the limitations of the research study were listed, some of which provide 
opportunities for future research. These and other areas for possible future research are 
discussed in section 9.6. Arising from this research, six areas for future research were 
identified. In conclusion, section 9.7 pointed out some of the lessons that were learnt during 
the course of this research study. Based on the experience gained, these lessons were subtly 
transformed into suggestions for conducting USec research.  
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